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I. INTRODUCTION
T HOUGH THE EARLY 1990s brought about a proliferation
of new entrant airlines, the late 1990s was an era of bank-
ruptcies, liquidations and retrenchments for upstart airlines.
Five new airlines per year emerged from 1990 to 1995. But from
1995 until early 1999, not a single new airline began service.1
New entrants like Air South, Pan Am (which included Carnival
Airlines), Western Pacific, Kiwi, and Sun Jet International fell
into bankruptcy, while others were facing enormous financial
difficulty. By 1999, new entrants accounted for only 1.3% of the
total market. While hub concentration was growing, competi-
tive service declined 28% in city-pairs between 1994 and 1999.2
Several new entrant airlines came together in 1996 to form
the Air Carrier Association of America. The Air Carrier Associa-
tion of America was initially formed to deal with the effort of the
major airlines to shift the excise tax burden away from the larg-
est airlines and onto the smaller, affordable airlines. But as they
came together, the new entrants learned they had something
else in common. The major airlines appeared to be on a homi-
cidal mission to destroy the low-fare airlines.
The window of opportunity opened after the Valujet catastro-
phe in the Everglades, in May of 1996. The U.S. Department of
Transportation [DOT] had been a champion of the competi-
tion brought to bear by the new entrant airlines, praising their
annual $6 billion contribution to consumer savings as a clear
success of deregulation. But the Everglades crash occurred in
an election year, and for political reasons, DOT soon found it-
self neutralized. The Federal Aviation Administration grounded
ValuJet's 53 aircraft. The question in the industry became,
"Why did Delta allow Valujet to grow so large? Why didn't Delta
kill off Valujet when it had the chance?"
I Address by DOT Deputy General Counsel Steven Okun before the Nova Uni-
versity Annual Conference on International Travel & Tourism (Ft. Lauderdale,
FL, April 13, 1999).
2 [d.
3 DOT, THE Low COST AIRLINE SERVICE REVOLUTION (1996).
688
2002] PREDATION, COMPETITION & ANTITRUST LAW 689
According to the new entrants, that mind-set put a number of
relatively smaller airlines in the cross hairs of the majors. For
example, the world's largest airline, United, allegedly targeted
Frontier and Western Pacific. American allegedly set its sights
on Vanguard, Western Pacific, and Sun Jet International. Delta
allegedly targeted Valujet. Northwest allegedly targeted Sun
Country and Spirit Airlines. By 2002, Western Pacific, Van-
guard, Sun Jet International, Sun Country and Spirit had either
been driven from the market or driven into bankruptcy.
Though the DOT had earlier been able to dissuade predation
by 'jaw-boning" the major airlines into engaging in responsible
competitive behavior (by persuading Northwest and Delta to
back off of their below-cost pricing and capacity dumping in
markets entered by Reno and Valujet, respectively), such moral
persuasion no longer worked.
Low-fare new entrant airlines complained that the major air-
lines engage in below-cost pricing and capacity-dumping when a
small affordable air carrier enters the markets they dominate,
particularly when one dares to provide competition at their
"Fortress Hubs." They alleged that pricing and capacity are not
the only predatory weapons in the arsenal of the major airlines.
Predatory behavior designed to suppress competition takes
many forms.
According to the new entrants, capacity dumping and below-
cost pricing were essential foundations of this campaign to erad-
icate competition. In each situation, the tactics differed some-
what, but the alleged purpose was the same-destroy the
affordable airlines so as to raise consumer prices.
The major airlines claimed that the economic problems,
which confronted the affordable fare airlines, are that consum-
ers shied away from them after the Everglades crash. But as the
memory of the Everglades waned, new entrants alleged the ma-
jor airlines engaged in the following practices:
" Added seat capacity and flight frequency to deny competitors
of realistic or achievable break-even load factors;
" Dropped prices to below-cost levels;
" Refused competitors non-discriminatory access to their net-
works (including joint-fare or code-sharing agreements, or par-
ticipation in their frequent flyer programs);
* Biased their computer reservations system against more conve-
nient competitive offerings (by adding the equivalent of 24-
hours to competitors' connections);
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" Bribed travel agents with commission overrides to steer busi-
ness toward the major airlines and away from competitors;
" Entered into "exclusive dealing" arrangements with corporate
purchasers and regional turboprop carriers; and
" Engaged in a price 'lock-down,' whereby some major airlines
raised prices in the Fall of 1996 to account for the 10% ticket
tax reinstatement on August 27 of that year, except in markets
served by new entrants, thereby denying the upstart airlines
the ability to raise their prices to account for the 10% tax
reinstatement.
In the last four years of the Twentieth Century, only two new
entrants began service.4 After receiving 32 complaints objecting
to the predatory behavior of incumbent carriers (17 of which
were filed by new entrant airlines), in April 1998, the DOT is-
sued a proposed policy statement on unfair exclusionary con-
duct. The draft policy defined unfair exclusionary practices as a
situation in which a major airline responds to new entry into its
hub markets by cutting prices or increasing capacity in a way
that either (1) causes it to forgo more revenue than all of the
new entrant's capacity could have diverted from it, or (2) results
in substantially lower operating profit-or greater operating
losses-in the short run than would result from a reasonable
alternative strategy for competing with the new entrant.5 In
2001, DOT finally issued a policy on Unfair Exclusionary
Conduct.6
Many such complaints were also lodged with the U.S. Depart-
ment ofJustice [DOJ]. In May, 1999, the DOJ filed the first anti-
trust lawsuit in its history alleging predatory conduct by a major
airline in attempting to monopolize a market. The suit alleged
that American Airlines lowered prices and changed capacity to
4 Lorraine Woellert, Take Airline Reform Off Standby, Bus. WK.,Jan. 24, 2000,
at 50. JetBlue inaugurated service from New York Kennedy International Airport
in February 2000. Given that it began service with the highest level of capitaliza-
tion of any airline in history ($128 million), it has not been subjected to the
predatory conduct described herein, for it is, quite simply, too financially strong
to kill.
5 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AVIATION COMPETITION: INFORMATION ON
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S PROPOSED POLICY (July 1999). DOT re-
ceived more than 5,000 comments on the proposed policy. See The State of Airline
Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp.
& Infrastructure, 105th Cong. (Oct. 21, 1999) (statement of Nancy McFadden).
The final policy statement will not become effective until twelve months after it is
received by the U.S. Congress. Pub. L. 105-277.
6 DOT, Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the Air
Transportation Industry, Docket OST-98-3713 (Jan. 17, 2001).
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force three new entrant airlines (i.e., Sun Jet International, Van-
guard Airlines, and Western Pacific Airlines) to withdraw from
the Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport market, an airport in
which American maintains a hub. At this writing, the Justice De-
partment is appealing an adverse ruling by a federal District
Court.'
Consumer discontent is growing as well. Consumer com-
plaints increased 115% in 1999 over the previous year.'
In recent years, the Departments of Transportation and Jus-
tice have begun to exchange information and collaborate on
competition issues in commercial aviation. Each agency has a
different statutory mandate to protect the public against an-
ticompetitive activity, and brings different perspectives to the
problem.
This essay is divided into six broad sections:
1. The first is the present introduction.
2. In the second, we examine the empirical evidence of preda-
tory conduct. We examine how major airlines behave in three
scenarios: (1) major airline vs. major airline; (2) major airline
vs. Southwest Airlines; and (3) major airline vs. small low-cost/
low-fare airline. It is in the third category that we see the most
flagrant instances of predatory conduct.
3. In the third section we develop a case study to examine the
efforts of the world's largest airline to monopolize one of the
world's largest airports.
4. The fourth section of this essay provides a legal analysis of ca-
pacity dumping, pricing discrimination, predatory pricing,
monopoly leveraging, refusing to deal, refusing to share an
essential facility, raising rivals' costs, and exclusive dealing ar-
rangements. That analysis is heavily grounded in Sherman
and Clayton Act applications, for the case law is well devel-
oped there, and the competition laws in the Federal Aviation
Act have largely lain dormant for the two decades of deregula-
tion. While the "unfair or deceptive practice" or "unfair
method of competition" provisions of the Federal Aviation
Act 9 are not constrained by Sherman and Clayton Act inter-
pretations, 10 nonetheless the DOT is free to apply analogous
7 United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 1999). The Jus-
tice Department had earlier filed suit to block Northwest Airlines' acquisition of
the controlling block of voting stock of Continental Airlines
8 Lorraine Woellert, Take Airline Reform Off Standby, Bus. WK.,Jan. 24, 2000, at
50.
9 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2002).
10 Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
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standards to its interpretation of the Federal Aviation Act.
Moreover, as explained below, many of the predatory prac-
tices of the major airlines may offend all three statutes.
5. In the concluding section, we address the policy dimensions
of enhanced governmental oversight and enforcement of
predatory behavior by large incumbent airlines against new
entrants.
II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF PREDATION
A. HUB CONCENTRATION
Since deregulation, all major airlines but one (i.e., Southwest)
have gravitated toward the hub-and-spoke means of distribution.
Though hubbing increases costs by lowering aircraft, gate, and
labor utilization and increasing fuel consumption, airlines have
been attracted by their revenue enhancement potential. Ac-
cording to Lehman Brothers, "Airlines that control a greater
percentage of their hubs' gates obtain significant benefits in
terms of scheduling flexibility and insulation from new
competition."'"
Adding a spoke to an existing hub geometrically increases the
number of city-pair markets an airline can sell, and adds incre-
mental connecting passengers to other spokes at the hub,
thereby improving load factors. Hub dominance also enables
the dominant airline to increase the number of city-pair monop-
olies radiating from the hub, allowing monopoly fares to be im-
posed on origin-and-destination passengers. It is this monopoly
exploitation that, in a deregulated environment, only competi-
tion can remedy. Knowing that, hub dominant airlines use a
variety of means (lawful and not) to suppress competition which
threatens their monopolies.
Table 1 reveals the growth in airline concentration at major
U.S. airports. Concentration has increased at 20 of these 22 air-
ports over the past two decades, and at most it has increased
significantly.
11 BRIAN HARRIS, AIRLINES, 1998 Huit FACTBOOK 31 (Lehman Bros. 1998).
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Table 1 - Airline Concentration at Major
Market Share %12
U.S. Airports by
Airport (dominant airline) 1977 1982 1987 1996 1998
Atlanta Hartsfield (Delta) n.a. 50.3 54.5 78.6 79.2
Charlotte Douglas (US Airways) n.a. 0 1.1 92.8 91.7
Chicago O'Hare (United & American duopoly) n.a. 57.9 77.3 81.4 n.a.
Cincinnati International (Delta) 35.0 49.4 72.1 93.6 94.8
Cleveland Hopkins (Continental) n.a. 0.4 14.5 47.4 44.9
Dallas/Ft. Worth International (American) n.a. 57.3 61.9 65.4 65.2
Dallas Love n.a. 88.6 96.4 100.0 97.6
Denver Stapleton/International (United) n.a. 30.9 43.0 69.2 71.1
Detroit Metropolitan (Northwest) n.a. 13.8 61.2 80.1 71.2
Houston Hobby (Southwest) n.a. 66.3 53.7 78.2 77.8
Houston Bush Intercontinental (Continental) 20.4 22.2 73.7 78.1 77.8
Memphis International (Northwest) n.a. 0 84.9 78.5 75.5
Miami International (American) n.a. 2.0 3.7 66.4 65.8
Minneapolis/St. Paul Int'l (Northwest) 45.9 42.6 79.5 84.3 74.4
Newark International (Continental) n.a. 2.5 40.0 52.4 57.6
Philadelphia International (US Airways) n.a. 22.8 36.2 60.0 69.3
Phoenix Sky Harbor (America West) n.a. 0 44.8 39.2 42.7
Pittsburgh International (US Airways) 43.7 65.5 83.8 88.1 88.6
St. Louis Lambert International (TWA) 39.1 52.6 82.3 68.8 73.0
Salt Lake City International (Delta) n.a. 3.0 59.0 74.9 77.0
San Francisco International (United) n.a. 32.6 36.4 60.5 60.1
Washington Dulles (United) n.a. 28.6 35.0 57.4 56.4
Dr. Julius Maldutis performed several studies of concentration
at the nation's 50 largest airports between, calculating the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index [HHI] for each. The HHI is the
12 SeeJulius Maltudis, Airline Competition at the 50 Largest Airports-Update
(CIBC World Markets, Nov. 1, 1999) [hereinafter CIBC World Markets Update];
Julius Maltudis, Airline Competition at the 50 Largest Airports-Update
(Salomon Bros. July 21, 1997) [hereinafter Salomon Bros. Update]; CONSUMER
REPORTS,June 1988, at 362-67; G.A.O., AIRLINE COMPETIrION 33 (1990); AVIATION
DAILY, June 29, 1990, at 628-30; James Ott. Congress, Airlines Reassessing
Deregulation's Impact, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1987, at 163; and
Martha Hamilton, The Hubbing of America: Good or Bad?, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1989,
at HI, H2 col. 5.
Even Chicago O'Hare and Atlanta Hartsfield are increasingly dominated by a
single firm. In 1977, United had 29% of all boardings in Chicago; by 1988, it had
53%. Even before the bankruptcy of Eastern, Deltra controlled 62% of Atlanta.
Hamilton, supra, at HI, H2 col. 5. As Eastern flew into bankruptcy in March
1989, it sold its gates at Philadelphia to USAir, giving it more than 50% of that
city. Judith Valnte & Robert Rose, Concern Heightens About the Airline Industry's
March Toward Near Domination by Only a Few Major Carriers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10,
1989, at A8, col. 1. Since Frontier was absorbed, first by People Express and then
by Continental, no airport has enjoyed the three hub major carrier competition
which theretofore existed in Denver. Paul Dempsey, Antitrust Law & Policy in
Transportation: Monopoly 1$ the Name of the Game, 21 GA. L. REv. 505, 592-93 (1987).
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methodology employed by the DOJ for determining acceptable
levels of concentration for antitrust review of horizontal merg-
ers. It provides a measure based on squaring the market share
of the dominant firm. For example, a firm with a 100% monop-
oly would have a HHI of 10,000. Under the Justice Depart-
ment's analysis, an HHI below 1,000 is presumed
unconcentrated; and HHI of between 1,000 and 1,800 is be-
lieved moderately concentrated; and an HHI of above 1,800 is
deemed highly concentrated.
The 50 largest airports in the United States account for 81%
of total scheduled passenger enplanements. 13 As Chart 1
reveals, these 50 airports have an HHI well above 1,800. They
are therefore highly concentrated, under the justice Depart-
ment's analysis. The weighted average of concentration for all
50 airports rose from an HHI of 2,215 in 1977, to 3,870 in
1988.14 According to Maldutis, this represents "an unprece-
dented degree of concentration in the airline industry."'
15










tSalomon Bros. Update, supra note 12, at 4.
14 Id. at 5; Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion on Airlines, 100th Cong. 170-195 (1987) (statement of Dr. Julius Maldu~tis).
This corresponds to a reduction in the number of "effective" competitors in the
average of the 50 airports from 4.51 in 1977 to 2.85 in 1987. PAUL STEPHEN DEMP-
SEy, FLYING, BLIND: THE FAILURE OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 17-18 (1990).
15 Salomon Bros. Update, supra note 12, at 2; see also CIBC World Markets Up-
date, supra note 12.
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Maldutis' calculations actually understate the degree of con-
centration at these airports, for they fail to aggregate the market
share of the dominant carrier with the market share of its code-
sharing 'alliance' partners. Code-sharing, and the computer res-
ervations system bias associated therewith, allows a dominant
carrier to monopolize the connecting traffic at a dominant hub.
For example, using Maldutis' data, adding together the 1996
passenger enplanement market share of United in Denver of
69.21%, with the market shares of its code-sharing affiliates,
Mesa (3.48%) and Air Wisconsin (2.76%), results in a 75.45%
market share over which it exercises control, or an HHI of
5,693, one of the highest in the nation. 6
By September 1999, United Airlines had a 65.1% market
share at Denver, while United Express affiliates had an 8.8%
market share. If we add the market share of United's proposed
partner, Delta (5.4%), United's Star Alliance had a 79.3% mar-
ket share at Denver, or an HHI of 6,288.17
Hub concentration translates into escalating fares for origin-
and-destination passengers. The New York Times observed, "Pas-
sengers who live in a hub city and begin their flight there end
up paying higher fares, in some cases 50 percent more than they
would had deregulation not occurred."' 8 The U.S. General Ac-
counting Office [GAO] found that, after its merger with Ozark,
TWA increased fares 13-18% on formerly competitive routes ra-
diating from St. Louis.' 9 A similar study compared fares in mar-
kets radiating from Minneapolis-St. Paul in which Northwest
and Republic formerly competed, and found that rates rose be-
tween 18-40%.2o In 15 of the 18 hubs in which a single carrier
controls more than 50% of the market, passengers pay signifi-
cantly more than the industry norm."'
Between June 1996 and June 1997, average air fares increased
9% for origin-and-destination passengers flying to or from con-
centrated hub airports, three times the national average. Full
coach fares increased 15% at Newark, 16% at Dallas/Ft. Worth,
16 See Salomon Bros. Update, supra note 12, at 14.
17 Data provided by Denver International Airport (on file with author).
18 William Stockton, When Eight Carriers Call the Shots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1988,
at 3-1.
19 GAO, AIRLINE COMPETITION 2, 3 (1988).
20 Tom Hamburger, Fares Rose With NWA's Dominance, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
Dec. 1988, at IA.
21 Martha Hamilton, Happiness Is a Cheap Seat, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1989, at 68.
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17% at St. Louis, and 26% at Denver.92 City-pair competition is
also declining significantly. In 1992, some 12,500 routes en-
joyed competitive alternatives. By 1998, only 9,400 routes were
competitive, a 28% drop.23
The most comprehensive studies of the effect of airport con-
centration upon pricing are those performed by the General Ac-
counting Office. The GAO compared prices at 15
concentrated 24 hub airports and 38 relatively unconcentrated
airports. It found that prices were 27% higher in the concen-
trated hubs.25 A decade after deregulation, dominant airlines
charged 38% higher prices per mile at concentrated hubs than
at unconcentrated airports.2"
The DOT also studied the impact of concentration on airline
pricing, and concluded as follows:
The average fare per mile at the eight most concentrated hubs is
higher than the national average. Adjusting for the average trip
distance and the size of the market served at the eight most con-
centrated hubs, fares were on average 18.7% higher than similar
markets for other airports. This finding supports the conclusion
that high hub concentration leads to high fares for passengers
traveling to and from such cities. Fares are highest for travel be-
tween large cities within 1,000 miles of the hub.27
22 Airlines: Flying Into 'Pockets of Pain', USA TODAY, Feb. 23, 1998, at lB.
23 DOT Assistant Secretary Patrick Murphy, Address at the ABA Forum on Air
& Space Law (July 8, 1998).
24 Concentrated airports were those defined as having more than 60% of en-
planements handled by a single airline.
25 GAO, AIRLINE COMPETITION 2, 3 (1989). The report was subsequently up-
dated and expanded. See GAO, AIRLINE COMPETITION (1990).
The higher fares at concentrated airports do not reflect a premium for non-stop
service, since the average number of coupons per traveler at concentrated air-
ports was virtually identical to that at unconcentrated airports (2.26 vs. 2.28 cou-
pons). The difference persisted when average trip length was controlled, by
excluding airports those where average trip length was significantly longer than
for concentrated airports. Thus neither a higher proportion of non-stops nor a
higher proportion of short haul (and thus more costly) flights can explain the
fare premium at concentrated airports. The study also found that the increase in
fares was generally greater at concentrated airports, and that the increase in fares
was especially dramatic when a carrier established dominance during the period.
Finally, the study found that in 13 of the 14 concentrated airports, the dominant
carrier had higher fares, in some cases very much higher than other carriers at
the same airport. PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, FLYING BLIND: THE FAILURE OF AiRLINE
DEREGULATION 18-19 (1990).
26 GAO, AIRLINE COMPETITION 3 (1990).
27 DOT, SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON COMPETrITION IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC AIR-
LINE INDUSTrRY, EXECUTIYE SUMMARY 8 (1990).
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More recently, the DOT found that, "In the absence of com-
petition, the major carrier is able to charge fares that exceed its
fares in. non-hub markets of comparable distance and density by
upwards of 40 percent. 28
Kenneth Mead, then director of the GAO's transportation di-
vision, found that "no single factor is responsible for higher
fares at concentrated airports, but that it is the interaction of a
number of barriers that allows carriers at these airports to
charge higher fares. ' 29 The GAO found several factors correlat-
ing with higher fares:
1. The larger the share of gates a carrier leased at an airport,
especially on a long-term, exclusive use basis, the higher the
fares;
2. Airports with congested runway capacity and limited expan-
sion due to majority-in-interest clauses have about 3% higher
fares; and
3. Carriers with a code-sharing agreement at one of the airports
on a route charge fares almost 8% higher than carriers do on
routes on which they do not code share.3 °
Though deregulation proponents predicted competition
would drive airline prices to marginal costs,31 in fact, hub pric-
ing has put the anticipated cost/price relationship on its head.
The least costly of airline operations is nonstop point-to-point
service, as the costs of Southwest Airlines confirm. Though
Southwest flies a relatively short average stage length, by focus-
ing on point-to-point nonstop flights it enjoys superior aircraft,
labor, gate and fuel utilization over its competitors.
Network connecting service is far less efficient from an air-
craft, labor, gate and fuel utilization perspective. Yet high-cost
connecting service typically is priced at a relatively low level vis-A-
vis low-cost nonstop service from a dominant hub. Thus, pricing
in the airline industry under deregulation appears to be driven
more by competition than by costs. Airlines generally face more
vigorous competitors for long-haul connecting traffic (for the
28 DOT, Request for Comments in Docket OST-98-3717 (Apr. 6, 1998).
29 Airline Concentration, Competition Concern Senate Subcommittee, AVIATION DAILY,
Apr. 10, 1990, at 67.
30 Factors Linked With Higher Fares, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 10. 1990, at 67. See
Airline Competition Enhancement Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1741 Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transp., 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 253 (1990) (statement of Kenneth M. Mead).
31 Deregulation architect Alfred Kahn referred to aircraft as "marginal costs
with wings."
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greater distance, the more alternative hubs over which a passen-
ger can connect) than for short-haul nonstop service, particu-
larly to and from a hub it dominates.
Concentration levels often correlate with price levels-higher
concentration tends to equate to higher prices in many markets.
But the identity of the competitor can also have a significant
influence on pricing. The presence of a low-cost/low fare com-
petitor (such as Southwest, Frontier, Vanguard, Reno, Spirit,
Kiwi, or Pro Air, for example) can result in significant competi-
tive discipline and consumer savings. According to the DOT,
fares tend to be $80 higher on average when no low-fare com-
petitor is present on the route. 2 This is reflected in Chart 2,
which shows historical average one-way fares at six airports-
Minneapolis/St. Paul, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Denver, Atlanta, Salt
Lake City, and Kansas City.
At various times, Braniff, Eastern and TWA attempted to es-
tablish a hub at Kansas City. Each failed. The result is that, un-
like most large interior U.S. cities, Kansas City remains relatively
unconcentrated (Southwest is the largest carrier, with 23% of
enplanements), and its consumers enjoy average fares among
the lowest of any city its size. Note that average fares at Salt Lake
City, Atlanta and Denver marched in "lock-step" with fares at
Dallas and Minneapolis until 1994. In that year, Southwest ac-
quired Salt Lake City-based Morris Air. Average fares dropped
by 50% in Southwest's markets, while traffic tripled. By late
1995, average fares in markets served by Southwest were only
one-third the level of fares in other Salt Lake City markets. 3 By
1996, Southwest accounted for 12% of enplanements, and Salt
Lake City's average fares were as low as Kansas City's. At Atlanta,
Valujet's entry has brought fares down, though it only ac-
counted for 8% of enplanements. At Denver, first MarkAir's,
then Frontier's entry brought fares down, though by the end of
the 1990's Frontier accounted for only about 5% of
enplanements3 4
32 DOT Assistant Secretary Patrick Murphy, Address at the ABA Forum on Air
& Space Law (July 8, 1998).
33Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Transp. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,
106th Cong. (May 5, 1998) (testimony of Patrick Murphy, DOT Assistant
Secretary).
34 Market share data are for 1996, the latest year for which data are available,
except for ValuJet, which is 1995. Salomon Bros. Update, supra note 12. 1995
data were used for Valujet because Valujet's fleet was grounded for a significant
portion of 1996 after its tragic crash in the Everglades.
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Contrast these price declines with the relatively higher prices
at Dallas/Ft. Worth. Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport is
dominated by two megacarriers-American (65%) and Delta
(19%). Neither is a vigorous price competitor, though prices
are somewhat disciplined in short-haul markets by the presence
of Southwest at Dallas Love Field. Minneapolis/St. Paul is by far
the worst of the group in terms of exorbitant air fares, because
during the period reflected in Chart 1, Northwest dominated
the hub with an 84% market share, no low-cost/low-fare carrier
accounted for even a 1% market share, and there was no secon-
dary airport at Minneapolis. 5 One study revealed that concen-
tration at the Minneapolis/St. Paul hub caused a 72% increase
in prices from 1988 to 1995, and that by 1995, its residents were
paying ticket prices $693 million above the national average."
In fact, average round-trip fares at Minneapolis since 1994 of
$412 are 72% higher than at Kansas City or Salt Lake City,
where the average round-trip fare is $240. If Denver's fares were
set at Minneapolis' levels (which they might be if United is suc-
cessful at driving Frontier from the market), Denver's 20 million
annual origin-and-destination passengers would pay several hun-
dred million dollars in higher fares per year annually. Con-
versely, if Frontier were to grow to a size comparable to
Southwest at Salt Lake City, consumer savings could total several
hundred billion dollars per year more.
According to the Justice Department, in 1993, American Air-
lines identified low cost carriers as a threat, estimating that $3.6
billion in American's annual revenue was at risk. American esti-
mated potential annual system wide revenue losses caused by
low cost carriers between $586 million to $1.47 billion. It esti-
mated the impact of Valujet's growth at Atlanta cost Delta $232
million annually in lost revenue. According to the DOJ, in 1996,
American adopted the following strategy:
[W]hen an LCC [low cost carrier] entered a DFW [Dallas/Ft.
Worth International Airport] route and it appeared that the LCC
would be economically viable if American simply followed a
profit-maximizing business strategy, American would instead sat-
urate the route with enough additional capacity at low fares to
keep the entrant from operating profitably. American also
would take further steps, such as matching the LCC's connecting
fares with its own nonstop fares, to keep traffic away from the
15 Id.
36 Mike Meyers, Minnesotans Indeed Pay More For Air Fare, DOT Says, MINNEAPO-
LIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 25, 1996, at IA.
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LCC. To evaluate the success of its strategy and determine
whether to intensify its response, American would investigate the
financial resources of LCC's, determine their break-even load
factors, and conduct head counts at the departure gate to moni-
tor their passenger loads....
American recognized that its DFW LCC strategy could prove un-
profitable in the short run. It concluded, however, that "[t]he
short term cost or impact on revenue [of the LCC strategy] can
be viewed as the investment necessary to achieve the desired ef-
fect on market share." Both the purpose and the effect of Amer-
ican's DFW LCC strategy were to drive LCCs out of DFW
markets so that American could subsequently recoup its "invest-
ment" and preserve its monopoly fares.3 7
The problem of airline concentration at major airports and
the monopoly pricing associated therewith is exacerbated by the
predatory practices of large, incumbent airlines. Noting the
need for competitive discipline at Fortress Hubs provided by up-
start airlines, Kevin Mitchell, Chairman of the Business Travel
Coalition, urged the DOT to take firm action to arrest predatory
practices:
Virtually the only discipline on premium prices at fortress hubs
in the recent past has come from the entry of low-fare, point-to-
point airlines. Indeed, most benefits from deregulation in recent
years have come from this segment of the industry....
Unfortunately, applications to the DOT for start-up airlines have
declined from about one every six weeks, just a couple of years
ago, to virtually none in the last 12 months. Investors concerned
about airline strategies of predation have often chosen to dedi-
cate their resources to other business opportunities, leaving con-
sumers with less choice and market-place innovations, and
unnecessarily high airfares.
What can be done? ...
[T]he DOT must implement a strong final policy regarding
predatory anti-competitive practices.3"
B. MEGACARRIER ALLIANCES
Some argue that the anticompetitive practices described
herein will grow worse with consummation of the "alliances" be-
tween United/Delta, American/US Airways, and Northwest/
Continental/America West. Charts 3 & 4 reveal the increase in
37 United States. v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 1999).
38 Kevin Mitchell, Oversight Of Airlines Needed, DENVER Bus. J., May 1, 1998, at
39A.
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market shares attributable to these alliances, essentially allowing
three major "alliances" to control 80% of the domestic market.
The GAO has found that if all three alliances are consummated,
"the number of independent airlines could decline on 1,836 of
the 5,000 most frequently traveled domestic airline routes
(which account for over 90 percent of the total U.S. domestic
traffic) and potentially reduce competition for about 100 mil-
lion of the 396 million domestic passengers last year."39 Critics
assert that alliance partners are not likely to engage in vigorous
competition in their nonstop (hub-to-hub) or connecting mar-
kets. Their ability to bias computer reservations systems against
connections which fail to share a designator code will ensure
that consumer choices in the connecting market will be signifi-
cantly fewer than exist today.
The Department of Transportation has been widely criticized
for approving each of the 21 mergers submitted to it in the
1980s. The DOT has also given major airlines antitrust immu-
nity to form global code-sharing cartels, further concentrating
the market for connecting traffic and depriving independent
airlines the opportunity to compete for it. The major airlines
insist these alliances are consumer friendly. And possums fly,
right? One need only look at the international alliances to see
the impact of diminished competition. The United-Lufthansa
alliance has largely driven its competitors, American and Delta,
out of the nonstop U.S.-Germany market, one of the most im-
portant business markets on the planet. Both had a significant
presence in Germany before United married Lufthansa. Global-
ization is a euphemism for cartelization.
Or take a look at the impact of regional airline alliances,
whereby the megacarriers funnel passengers onto high price/
high cost turboprop carriers flying as "United Express," "Delta
Connection," or some other pseudo-airline. It is the monopoli-
zation of connecting markets via code-sharing alliances that al-
legedly deprives consumers of choices, and result in declining
service and higher prices for medium-size cities from Mobile to
Fargo.
Further consolidation in the U.S. airline industry might well
reduce the level of competition and allow the industry to price
39 GAO, AVIATION COMPETITION: PROPOSED DOMESTIC AIRLINE ALLIANCES RAISE
SERIOUS ISSUES 2 (June 4, 1998).
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in a way that is irrelevant to cost. 40 Prices might rise as indepen-
dent airlines are denied the opportunity to participate in the
connecting market.
Cooperation may have a corrosive impact on competition.
When one considers airline alliances, one should remember
Webster's definition of a cartel: "a combination of independent
commercial enterprises designed to limit competition. ' 41 With
their international airline partners, three vast megacarrier car-
tels will soon rule the world. The farther we march down this
path, the less competition there will be.
C. EXAMPLES OF PREDATORY PRICING By MAJOR AIRLINES
New airline entrants typically bring with them lower fares than
those prevailing prior to their entry. Because of the higher
brand recognition of incumbent airlines, their vast networks
and exclusive alliances with regional feeder carriers, their ability
to bias the computer reservations systems they own against com-
peting interline connections, their ability to bribe travel agents
with commission overrides to steer business their way, and their
frequent flyer programs, they have enormous advantages which
can be overcome only if the new entrant can offer a better price.
Consumers at concentrated airports often are starved for price
relief, for the average fares they pay are well above competitive
levels.
The new entrants typically can offer a lower price because of
their lower cost structure. In a commodity business such as
transportation, a company with a lower cost structure should be
able to take some reasonable share of the market. If both com-
panies price on the basis of cost, then the new entrant will likely
be sustainable. The new entrant may stimulate increased de-
mand among price-elastic travelers, expanding the size of the
pie for all competitors.
But new entry cannot be sustained where the incumbent air-
line is willing to endure significant short-term losses in a below-
cost predatory pricing strategy designed to force the new en-
trant out of the market (or into bankruptcy) so that after the
new entrant leaves, the incumbent can resume its monopoly
price gouging well above competitive levels.
40 Charles Stein, United-Delta Alliance Off For Now, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25,
1998, at El.
41 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1966).
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New airlines emerged shortly after the promulgation of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978-carriers such as Midway Air-
lines, America West and People Express. Their most singular
competitive advantage was their cost structure, which enabled
them to offer significantly lower fares to consumers. Not sad-
dled with the labor agreements of the established major airlines
(which included the generous wage and elaborate work rule
provisions that had evolved under regulation, coupled with a
relatively senior work force), the new entrants enjoyed a signifi-
cant comparative advantage in terms of lower base salaries, an
entry level work force, and greater flexibility in the utilization of
personnel. This enabled the new carriers to 'cream skim' dense
routes, offering low-cost, low-fare, no-frills service, allowing
them to penetrate the market shares of the established trunk,
national and regional airlines.4" Although this first wave of new
entrants never accounted for more than 5% of the total passen-
ger market, and all but America West was liquidated (though it
too, stumbled into Chapter 11 bankruptcy), they put enormous
pressure on the established carriers.43
Established airlines found the consuming public quite fickle,
with little brand loyalty, and willing to purchase air transporta-
tion primarily on the basis of schedule and price. There was
enormous pent-up demand for low-priced service, and little will-
ingness to pay for in-flight amenities. The large carriers found
that the new carriers were diverting traffic, causing load factors
to fall below break-even levels. Determined to preserve market
42 The sharp erosion in carrier profitability led the major carriers to focus on
cost containment, efficiency and productivity. Seat pitch was tightened. Hot
meals became cold meals, then peanuts, on flights of less than 1,000 miles. But
many costs, particularly fuel and equipment costs, as well as interest expenses, are
beyond the control of the airlines. (Nor do airlines have adequate control over
the demand side of the equation when recession curtails discretionary traffic).
Ultimately, management found that it had little choice but to focus on costs that
were conceivably pliable-labor costs, and perhaps more importantly, work rules,
as well as distribution costs, including travel agent commissions. Labor is the
single largest operating expense, accounting for between 34% and 38% of the
total operating expenses. Again, the new entrants, most operating with a rela-
tivelyjunior work force and without labor unions (and those with union contracts
that are significantly less costly and restrictive than those of the established air-
lines) enjoyed a significant cost advantage.
43 The first wave of new entrants collapsed into bankruptcy by the mid-1980s,
with only America West emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy successfully. Even
the pre-deregulation airlines lingered on in bankruptcy and there, largely
shielded from creditors, began to undercut the fares of their competitors. Pan
Am and Eastern were ultimately liquidated, although Continental, TWA and
America West lived through Chapter 11 to see another day.
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shares, the traditional carriers met the low fares, at least on
some seats, which caused significant yield erosion. The estab-
lished carriers attempted to confine the impact of the low fares
with revenue and inventory management, and retain high-yield
traffic with various manipulations of computer reservations sys-
tems display, frequent flyer programs, travel agent commission
overrides, and other practices, many of a predatory nature. By
the early 1990s, more than 100 airlines had found themselves in
bankruptcy, while People Express, Midway and Laker Skytrain
were liquidated.
By the early 1990s, a second wave of new entrants would
emerge-carriers like Kiwi International, Valujet, AirTran,
Reno, Morris Air, Vanguard, and MarkAir, as well as carriers
which borrowed the names of their deceased predecessors, such
as Braniff, Midway and Frontier, for example. These were carri-
ers with ASM costs as low as 6.5 cents, in the case of Western
Pacific, and 6.7 cents in the case of ValuJet.44 The glut of capac-
ity had caused the major carriers to ground 700 jets and lay off
thousands of skilled workers.
The leasing companies were hungry to derive revenue from
their enormous capital investments. By the mid-1990s, a 20-year-
old 737-200 with Dash-9 engines could be leased for less than
$90,000 a month, while a younger, hush-kitted 737-200 with
Dash-17 engines could be leased for about $150,000 per month.
A decade old Stage-3 737-300 could be leased for about
$215,000, while a new one leased for about $280,000 a month.
In the 1990s, laid-off pilots were eager to fly, and willing to take
a salary at a fraction of their prior pay. At Kiwi, pilots were ex-
pected to invest $50,000 in the company's stock,4 5 making com-
mercial aviation perhaps the only industry in which people will
pay for the privilege to work in it. Aircraft and trained person-
nel were abundant, so off they flew, in the fleets of new carriers
with low cost structures and low fares. Table 2 identifies some of
the more prominent post-deregulation start-up airlines.
By the mid-1990s, the non-union, low-cost, low-fare carriers
were the driving force in the industry. Borrowing from the wis-
dom of baseball legend Satchel Paige, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Transportation Patrick Murphy warned the megacarriers,
44 Western Pacific Crows Its Lowest Cost Airline, RoCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 23,
1996, at 9B.
45 Julie Schmit, Small Airline Glides Upward On Loyalty, USA TODAY, Sept. 22,
1994, at BI; Adam Bryant, Kiwi Works to Redefine a Hostile Airline Culture, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 24, 1994, at C-1.
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Scheduled Carriers Emerging Since Deregulation
Air Florida* Air One*
Air South* Air Train
Air21 * Altair*
American International* Arrow Airways*
Best Airlines* Braniff II*
Carnival Air** Discovery Airlines*
es Emerald* Empire Airlines**
Frontier H Frontier Horizon**
Jet America** Jet Blue
nal* Leisure Air* MarkAir*
MGM Grand Air** Midway Airlines*
Midwest Express Morris Air**
National II Nations Air
* Northeastern International Pacific Express*
People Express* Presidential*
Pride Air* Pro Air
Reno Air** Royal West*
Sterling One* Sun Country
TriStar UltrAir*
Valujet (renamed AirTran) Vanguard
erged into another carrier.
"Do not look back. A new airline might be gaining on you."46
In 1993, a record 42 airlines applied for a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity to launch commercial air service.47
From January 1990 until mid-1996, DOT had certificated nearly
50 new airlines.4" By 1996, 25 of the 39 new carriers certificated
since 1993 were still flying (13 were passenger carriers, while 12
were charter and cargo carriers) .41 In 1995, low-cost carriers in-
creased their capacity by 38%.50 Flying high with 51 aircraft
before its 1996 crash in the Florida Everglades, with a $1 billion
order, Valujet became the launch customer for the 100-seat
twin-engine MD-95 aircraft. 51 The major carriers had been fi-
46 AVIATION DAILY, May 9, 1996, at 232.
47 Jonathan Dahl, New Airlines Can Leave Fliers Grounded, WALL ST. J., June 30,
1995, at B7.
48 AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 8, 1996, at 49.
49 AVIATION DAILY, May 9, 1996, at 232.
50 Martha Brannigan & Eleena de Lisser, Delta Air May Thy New "Lite' Service,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1996, at B8.
51 AVIATION DAILY, Oct. 20, 1995, at 111.
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nancially decimated by the anemic profitability deregulation un-
leashed. Faced with a new round of upstart airlines, the major
carriers began to launch widespread price wars to destroy the
new entrants. In some markets, the megacarriers targeted the
upstarts with predatory practices, dumping capacity and engag-
ing in below-cost pricing.
Though some were predicting a 90% failure rate among the
new airline ventures, 52 their yield impact on the majors was real.
DOT estimated passengers flying these upstart airlines paid $54
less per flight.53 Where major carriers maintained their yields,
the new airlines were stimulating new demand. Lower ticket
prices were a direct reflection of the new entrants' lower cost
structure.
Southwest and Valujet had a 6.5 cent cost per available seat
mile [ASM] on 500 mile stage lengths, while American, United
and USAir had costs nearly double that. In the short-haul mar-
ket, Delta's costs were 45% higher than Valujet's, while USAir's
costs were 187% higher than ValuJet.54 In the long-haul (1,400
miles) narrow-body aircraft category, American Trans Air had
costs of 5.4 cents per ASM (only 60% of USAir's). In the long-
haul wide-body aircraft category, American Trans Air had ASM
costs of only 4.1 cents (compared with American and United's
8.5 cents per ASM). 55
And the upstart airlines seemed to be popping up everywhere.
Delta was faced with low-fare carriers on 32% of its routes; by
1994, the low-fare carriers competed on 57% of Delta's routes;
and by 1995, low-fare carriers competed on 60% of its routes.56
American (which had withdrawn from many markets dominated
by low-cost carriers) still had them affecting 40% of its
bookings.57
An incumbent airline can respond to new entry in a predatory
fashion, for example, by matching its low fares on frequencies in
close proximity to the new entrant's departures, meeting the
new competitor's introductory fares and locking them in (i.e.,
refusing to follow the new price leader's fares up after the pro-
motional period), dumping additional capacity (flights) into the
52 AvIATION DAILY, Apr. 22, 1996, at 127.
53 AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 24, 1996, at 139.
54 ROBERTS ROACH & ASSOCIATES, SCORECARD: AIRLINE INDUSTRY Cosi MANAGE-
MENT 2Q 1995 12 (3d. ed. 1996).
5o Id. at 1, 2.
51 DELTA AIR LINES, ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1995).
57 AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 1, 1996, at 1.
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market, or sandwiching the new competitor's frequencies (with
a departure within a few minutes on both sides of the new en-
trant's departure) until the new entrant is financially exhausted
and withdraws.5 8 As Severin Borenstein notes, airport domi-
nance may intensify the retaliatory threat:
Besides the advantage in attracting customers to its flights over a
competitor's, airport dominance might also allow an airline to
deter entry of competitors. This could be done with a threat of
retaliation, possibly made more credible due to airport domi-
nance, or by blocking access to scarce gates or landing slots at an
airport.59
Predatory pricing has been defined as pricing below an appro-
priate measure of cost for the purpose of eliminating competi-
tors in the short-term and reducing competition in the long-
term.6 ° Under neo-classical free market theoretical beliefs,
predatory pricing is irrational, for the dominant firm engaging
in the predatory behavior must be able to recoup the short-term
losses it incurs in the longer term after it has driven the new
entrant from the market; since theoretically, it can never hope
to recover its short-term losses, it will not likely engage in such
predation. Hence, some commentators argue that predatory
pricing schemes are rarely attempted, and even more rarely
successful. 6'
Despite the theoretical opposition to predation based on its
hypothetical irrationality, airline observers have seen numerous
examples of predatory behavior in the airline industry at-
tempted since deregulation, with various degrees of success.
Evaluating the post-deregulation experience, during which he
served as CEO of a small airline (New York Air), Michael Levine
concluded, "I believe predation is possible and that it occurs....
[I] t is possible for an incumbent to impose on prospective en-
trants nonrecoverable costs by pricing in a way that seeks to en-
sure that they do not attract a significant share of passengers
58 See Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALEJ. REG. 393, 417 (1987).
59 Severin Borenstein, The Dominant-Firm Advantage in Multiproduct Industries:
Evidence From the U.S. Airlines, Q.J. OF ECON. 1237, 1248 (1991).
60 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
61 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 149-55 (1978); Areeda &
Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975); Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrate-
gies, 48 U. CiHn. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981). This view was embraced by the Supreme
Court in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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regardless of the incumbent's own costs. '6 2 Dr. Alfred Kahn con-
curred, criticizing Northwest Airlines for its "scorched-earth"
policy of substantially undercutting People Express' price while
simultaneously increasing the number of flights in the market:
If predation means anything, it means deep, pinpointed, discrim-
inatory price cuts by big companies aimed at driving price cutters
out of the market, in order then to be able to raise prices back to
their previous levels. I have little doubt that is what Northwest
was and is trying to do.6"
The Economist summarized the problem in these words:
Predatory pricing. Deregulation left the previously related compa-
nies with advantages and disadvantages .... But the deregulated
companies also entered the new era with substantial patches of
market in their grasp. They could try to defend them by setting
some of their prices below cost, fending off smaller invaders one
by one.
Mr. Kahn recons, for example, that Northwest Airlines tried to
squeeze People Express off its route from Minneapolis/St. Paul
to New York last year. When People started to fly the route,
Northwest cut its regular fare from $263 to $99 (weekdays) and
$79 (weekends and off-peak). That two-thirds cut matched Peo-
ple's fares, and Northwest still ran its traditional high-quality ser-
vice. Evidently the idea was to drive the upstart from the market,
after which Northwest could put its fares back up.64
In its seminal study of airline competition commissioned by
the U.S. Congress, the Transportation Research Board found:
Sharp reductions and price and increases of capacity are "preda-
tory" if designed to drive out or suppress competition to gain
higher future prices and profits through increased market
power. Some economists have postulated that firms employ
predatory tactics not only to strengthen or preserve their monop-
oly position in the markets in which they cut prices, but also to
deter competitive entry in their other markets. Therefore, a
valid concern is that airlines might engage in predation even on
a limited basis, with the broader aim of dissuading entry and in-
creasing market power throughout their networks. 65
62 Michael Levine, Airline Deregulation: A Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 689
(1991). After becoming an executive for a major airline, however, Levine be-
came an apologist for predation.
6 Alfred Kahn, The Macroeconomic Consequences of Sensible Microeconomic Policies,
Soc'v Gov'T ECONOMISTS NEWSLETTER 6 (May 1985).
64 When Free Markets Throttle Competition, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 1985, at 19.
65 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S. AIR-
LINE INDUSTRY: ISSUES AND OI'I'ORTUNITIEs E-6 (1999).
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Though some theorists claim that predation is economically
irrational and therefore does not exist,66 allegations of preda-
tory behavior have been widespread in the airline industry.
Continental Airlines, Northwest Airlines, and America West Air-
lines-three major carriers-alleged American Airlines had en-
gaged in predatory pricing.6 7 UltrAir alleged its demise was
caused by predatory pricing by Continental Airlines.68 Pro Air's
Chairman & CEO Kevin Stamper pointed out that since his air-
line went aloft in July of 1997, it was forced to withdraw from
Milwaukee and reduce service to Indianapolis because of preda-
tory pricing. Said Stamper:
Matching prices is a normal competitive behavior. But it can be
a powerful predatory tactic if its purpose is simply to drive the
new entrant out of business and restore the markets to their
prior monopoly status....
Too much government involvement can stifle innovation and
competition, but too little can have exactly the same effect. Our
concern is that predatory activities on the part of carriers that
already possess many competitive advantages may drive small air-
lines out of the industry and lead to monopolies and market
abuse.6 9
Similarly, Mark Kahan, Vice Chairman & COO of Spirit Air-
lines, testified that after Spirit entered the Detroit-Philadelphia
market, Northwest dropped its yields 54% while increasing its
capacity 15%. Sharply reduced prices coupled with capacity
dumping allegedly forced Spirit to withdraw from the Detroit-
Boston and Detroit-Orlando markets as well. Said Kahan:
It is probable that Northwest sacrificed out-of-pocket lot less than
$10 million because of its fare decreases and capacity increases in
66 It has been argued that a rational firm will not engage in predation because
the cost of predation will almost always exceed the expected pay-back See sources
cited at 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968 n. 2 (1987).
67 Continental Airlines v. American Airlines, 824 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Tex.
1993). Michael Conway, CEO of America West said, "It's my strong opinion that
this action led by American is clearly a predatory action. I think it is clearly de-
signed to further consolidate the industry, which would result in the remaining
carriers, particularly American, being able to capture a greater market share and
being able to raise prices at a later date." Martha Hamilton, Fare Wares: For Some a
Duel to the Death, WASH-. POST, June 4, 1992, at D9.
68 James Ott, UltrAir Suspends Service, Reviews Charter Option, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 2, 1993, at 34.
69 Airline Hubs: Fair Competition or Predatoy Pricing: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Business Rights, & Competition of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. (Apr. 1, 1998) (testimony of Kevin Stamper, Chairman & CEO, Pro
Air).
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the Detroit-Boston and Detroit-Philadelphia markets in the third
quarter of 1996 alone. These actions clearly made no sense un-
less Northwest was confident that Spirit would be obliged to exit
the market .... You will pardon us for believing that Northwest
tried to put Spirit out of business ... ."
Vanguard also complained to DOT about the anticompetitive
practices of Northwest Airlines.71 So too did Sun Country Air-
lines, which transformed itself from a charter to a scheduled air-
line at Minneapolis in 1999. Northwest's response was to
radically lower its fares in city-pair markets in which Sun Coun-
try entered, while increasing flight frequency and seat capacity.
Northwest also allegedly turned its charter subsidiary against
Sun Country, canceled its maintenance and training agreement
and certain airport rentals, refused to sell or loan parts to Sun
Country, and upped its hangar rent. Sun Country's chairman,
William E. La Macchia, concluded, "Rational businesses do not
sell their products below costs, or pay travel agents bonuses to
induce them to book passengers at drastically reduced rates or
cut prices from 40%-60% except in hope and expectation that
competition will be stifled and supracompetitive pricing will
then compensate for losses. '7 2 Ultimately, an exhausted Sun
Country Airlines was forced to cease scheduled operations from
Minneapolis/St. Paul on December 9, 2001.
In 1993, ValuJet complained to DOT that Delta offered below-
cost fares over 40% of its capacity and 300% of Valujet's capac-
ity, saying, "We believe that Delta is pricing its product well be-
low its costs and is embarking on this course of predatory
pricing for the express purpose of driving Valujet out of busi-
ness.'"" Chronicling the alleged efforts of Delta Air Lines to
drive Valujet from its Atlanta base, Professor Fred Allvine
observed:
Government study after study shows that the airline industry is
not perfectly competitive .... These studies show that the major
airlines employ many monopolistic practices that contribute to
70 Aviation Competition Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, of the House
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 105th Cong. 1067 (Apr. 23, 1998) (testimony
of Mark Kahan, Exec. V.P. & General Counsel, Spirit Airlines).
71 Tony Kennedy & Greg Gordon, Government Investigating NWA's Fares, STAR-
TRIBUNE, Feb. 27, 1998, at ID.
72 Hearing on the Status of Airline Competition Before the Subcommittee on Aviation of
the House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 105th Cong. (Oct. 20, 1999) (testi-
mony of William E. La Macchia, Chairman, Sun Country Airlines).
73 Bill Poling, Letter To DO, TRAVEL WEEKLY, Dec. 10, 1993, at 19.
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the market power to raise and maintain prices above the compet-
itive level. In imperfect competitive markets it makes perfectly good
sense for large firms to use predatory pricing to destroy competi-
tion that threatens the monopoly prices charged. 4
Lewis Jordan, President and COO of Valujet, testified:
While Valujet welcomes fair competition and does not seek to be
insulated from such competition, we believe that no airline
should be subjected to pricing actions designed to force it our of
markets with the attendant likely consequence of fares immedi-
ately being restored to unnecessarily high levels. We urge a vig-
orous enforcement of the antitrust laws and reexamination of
the predatory pricing doctrine to ensure fair competition for big
and small carriers alike. 75
After Valujet announced it was surrendering the Atlanta-Mo-
bile route to Delta, Delta raised its fares from $58 to $404, al-
most 600%.76 In October 1995, ValuJet reached an agreement
with TWA to lease its slots at LaGuardia Airport so that Valujet
could inaugurate Atlanta-New York service. Delta made a pre-
emptive strike to acquire those slots. Valujet brought an anti-
trust action against Delta for such anticompetitive behavior,
which resulted in an out of court settlement. In July 1998,
Valujet announced its inauguration of Atlanta-Newark Service;
within a week, Delta announced plans to increase flight frequen-
cies in the market by 78%. 77
Continental Airlines sued United Airlines for predatory con-
duct, receiving $77 million in an out-of-court settlement.7
Laker Airways filed a $1.7 billion lawsuit alleging predatory prac-
tices by six large airlines drove it out of business. 79 The suit set-
tied two years later for $60 million."' Gulf Air filed an antitrust
suit against Continental, Eastern and other Texas Air carriers
74 FRED ALLVINE & JOHN LINDSLEY, INCREASING MONOPOLIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT AND
DEFENSE OF FORTRESS HUBS (Apr. 1997).
75 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Transp. & Infrastructure
Comm. (Mar. 23, 1995) (testimony of Lewis Jordan, President, ValuJet Airlines).
76 United Denies Engaging In Predatory Pricing, Despite Study Claiming Otherwise,
AIRLINE FINANCIAL NEWS, Feb. 10, 1997.
77 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. & Infra-
structure, 106th Cong. (Oct. 18, 1999) (testimony of Joseph Leonard).
78 Trial Date Set in Pacific Express vs. United Airlines Suit, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 23,
1990.
79 International News, REUTERS, Nov. 24, 1984.
80 Martha Hamilton, Three Airlines Settle in Laker Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 18,
1986, at B3.
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alleging they had engaged in predatory business practices.8 Pa-
cific Express filed suit against United Airlines for alleged preda-
tory activity. 2 Alaska Airlines filed suit against United Airlines
for monopoly leveraging and violation of the essential facilities
doctrine. TACA International Airlines has filed complaints
against United Airlines, American Airlines and Continental Air-
lines for predatory pricing." Virgin Atlantic brought suit
against British Airways for predation. Valujet filed suit against
TWA and Delta for monopolization. USAirways filed suit
against British Airways and American Airlines on antitrust
grounds.8 4 And most recently, Reno Air filed suit against North-
west Airlines for predation following its entry into the Reno-Min-
neapolis market.
If there is no fire, what is causing all the smoke?
The DOT has observed:
[T]here have been instances in which a new, small carrier has
offered low price service between a major carrier's hub and a
spoke city, only to find the major carrier cutting its own airfares
and increasing the number of seats-or even airplanes-on that
route and sacrificing short term profits with only one goal in
mind: to drive the new entrant out of the market and then raise
its own fares to their original level or higher, and cut back its
service.8 -
An established carrier that finds its spokes assaulted by a new
entrant typically will cut prices to meet the competition. Both
will lose money, but large carriers have the ability to cover short-
term revenue losses from profits derived from less competitive
markets.86 Typically, the major airlines offer the low fare only
on local O&D traffic on flights in close time proximity to the
new entrant's, extracting higher yields from passengers connect-
81 Gulf Air Sues Lorenzo, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 9, 1987.
82 Trial Date Set in Pacific Express vs. United Airlines Suit, Bus. WIRE, Mar. 23,
1990.
83 United Charged With Engaging In Predatory Pricing, AVIATION DAiLY, May 19,
1992, at 302; American, Continental, Pan Am Accused of Predatory Pricing, AVIATION
DAILY, Oct. 10, 1990, at 66.
84 These cases are summarized in PAUL DEMPSEY, AIR TRANSPORTATION: FOUN-
DATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 283-86 (Coast Aire 1997).
85 Press Release, DOT, DOT Releases Airline Competition Policy Statement
(Apr. 6, 1998).
86 Peter Cartensen, Evaluating 'Deregulation' of Commercial Air Travel: False Dichot-
omization, Untenable Theories, and Unimplemented Premises, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
109, 126-26 (1989); Russell Klingaman, PREDATORY PRICING AND OTHER EXCLU-
SIONARY CONDUCT IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, 4 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 281 (1992).
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ing to the assaulted spokes. This revenue advantage may neu-
tralize the new entrant's cost advantage and will deleteriously
impact its staying power.87 Levine notes, "The ability of an in-
cumbent to respond rapidly and cheaply to the prices and out-
put of new entrants contradicts perhaps the most critical
assumption of contestability theory."8
If contestability theory applied to the airline industry as der-
egulation proponents had anticipated, the need for actual entry
to protect the consumer interest would be nil. The theory of
contestability posits that the absence of barriers to entry and
economies of scale will allow potential entrants to discipline mo-
nopolists from earning supra-competitive profits. While many
deregulation proponents of deregulation originally embraced
this theory, most have since rejected it based on the empirical
behavior of airlines in the post-deregulation period, and the ex-
istence of economies of scale, scope and density, as well as the
significant costs of and barriers to successful entry.8 9
Most empirical studies have demonstrated that deregulated
airline markets are not perfectly contestable, ° and that there is
a positive relationship between concentration and fares. 91
While ticket prices in city-pair markets with two competitors
were about 8% lower than in monopoly markets, and markets
with three competitors were another 8% less still, a potential
competitor has one-tenth to one-third the competitive impact of
an actual competitor. 2 The exit of a competitor results in a
10% average price increase for the remaining incumbents.9 3
Other studies reveal that the number of competitors is not
nearly as significant as their identity (e.g., Southwest's presence
in a market creates deeper pricing competition than, say,
87 Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy,
and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. REG. 393, 451 (1987).
88 Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy,
and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. REG. 393, 452 (1987).
89 For a survey of these conclusions drawn from the economics literature, see
PAUL DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 71-84 (1997).
90 The first article to cast doubt on the applicability of contestability theory to
the airline industry was D. Graham, D. Kaplan, and D. Sibley, Efficiency and Compe-
tition in the Airline Industry, BELLJ. ECON. 118 (1983).
91 See sources cited in James Brander, Dynamic Oligopoly Behavior In the Airline
Industry, 11 INT'LJ. INDUS. ORG. 407, 409 (1993).
92 Severin Borenstein, The Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition, 6J. ECON. PER-
SPECTIVES 45, 53 (1992).
93 Id. at 54.
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Delta's) .9 Some have insisted that the airline industry is "imper-
fectly contestable. 95 Without doubt, imperfection is an appro-
priate adjective to describe airline economics.
The three most prominent architects of airline deregula-
tion-Alfred Kahn, Elizabeth Bailey, and Mike Levine-all have
jettisoned the notion that contestability theory explains market
behavior in the airline industry. For them, market reality
trumped economic theory. According to Kahn, "I bear some re-
sponsibility for promulgating the notion, before deregulation,
that because the industry's capital equipment is physically mo-
bile, neither destructive competition nor significant monopoly
power were likely to emerge; but I had long since ceased to do
so after it became very clear that contestability is in fact very
imperfect, at best."" Although an early proponent of the appli-
cation of contestability theory to the airline industry, deregula-
tion advocate Elizabeth Bailey has concluded that airline "...
markets are not perfectly contestable, so that carriers in concen-
trated markets are able to charge somewhat higher fares than
carriers in less concentrated markets."97
Michael Levine, another of deregulation's principal archi-
tects, said it even more strongly: "Unfortunately, those theories
turned out to be wrong as they applied to the airline indus-
try...,"9 and "airline markets cannot be modeled by any reason-
ably pure version of contestability theory."99  Levine
acknowledged that:
[E] conomists committed to a high degree of airline market con-
testability have historically maintained that predation is doomed
to failure and is therefore unlikely because the capital assets in-
volved in airline production are mobile .... This contestability
analysis is unfortunately inconsistent with much observed behav-
94 See sources cited in William Evans & Loannis Kessides, Structure, Conduct, and
Performance in the Deregulated Airline Industiy, SOUTHERN ECON. J. (1991).
95 Steven Morrison & Clifford Winston, Empirical Implications and Tests of the
Contestability Hypothesis, 30 J.L. & ECON. 53 (1987).
96 Alfred Kahn, Market Power Issues In Deregulated Industries, 60 ANTITRUST LJ.
857 (1991).
97 ELIZABETH BAILEY, DAVID GRAIAM & DANIEL KAPLAN, DEREGULATING THE AIR-
LINES 153 (1985).
98 Michael Levine, Airline Deregulation: A Perspective, 60 ANTIrRUST L.J. 687
(1991).
99 Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy,
and Public Policy, 4 YALE j. REG. 393, 405 (1987).
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ior since deregulation . . .large holdover incumbents are not
easily susceptible to predation, but smaller new entrants are.100
Levine concluded that new industrial organization theory bet-
ter describes the airline industry than the perfect competition/
contestability model. 1 ' Assistant Attorney General Charles Rule
concluded, "Most airline markets do not appear to be contesta-
ble, if they ever were.... [D]ifficulties of entry, particularly on
city pairs involving hub cities, mean that hit-and-run entry is a
theory that does not comport with current reality."' 0 2 DOT Assis-
tant Secretary Pat Murphy has declared contestability theory
"deader than dead" in its ability to describe the market reality of
commercial aviation. 10 3
The consensus among economists (outside the Washington,
D.C. laissez faire think tanks) today is that the airline industry
does not reflect theoretical notions of perfect competition or
contestability. The high degree of pricing discrimination be-
tween consumers and markets suggests that the industry may
better reflect economist Joan Robinson's theory of "imperfect
competition"'0 4 or Edward Chamberlin's theory of "monopolis-
tic competition."' 105 The literature lends strong support to the
conclusion that, if airline industry is to be competitive, the com-
petition laws must be applied with full force to it.
1. Major Network Airline Competitive Response to Entry by Another
Major Network Airline
The following charts (derived from DOT historical data) re-
veal how such predatory conduct has manifested itself in several
markets upstart airlines have attempted to enter. But before we
discuss the markets in which new entrant airlines have faced pre-
dation, let us examine how one major network carrier responds
to the competitive entry of another major airline into a market
it dominates. We take, as an example, Denver-Philadelphia, the
latest entry by a major carrier into a Denver market United
dominates, and Minneapolis/St. Paul-Cleveland.
loo Id. at 472-73.
101 Id. at 418.
102 Charles Rule, Antitrust and Airline Mergers: A New Era 15, 18 (speech before
the International Aviation Club, Washington, D.C., Mar. 7, 1989).
103 DOT Assistant Secretary Patrick Murphy, Address at the ABA Section on Air
& Space Law (July 10, 1998).
104 JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933).
105 EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933).
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Major airlines tend not to engage in predatory pricing against
other major airlines, for they learned in the 1980s that the likeli-
hood of success in driving them from the market is remote, and
that the competitive battle will be economically painful. Major
network carriers also tend not to invade other major airline's
dominant hubs, except as limited entry spokes from their own
hubs. A major carrier will tolerate entry into its hub by another
major airline so long as the spoke radiates from the other air-
line's hub. In such circumstances, the etiquette of competition
among major airlines seems to be "live and let live." As a thor-
ough study on airport hub concentration by Lehman Brothers
concluded, "in early 1995, the era of aggressive forays by the
hub-and-spoke carriers into one another's market strengths
came to an end."10
6
a. Denver-Philadelphia: United vs. USAir
Chart 2 reveals United Airlines competitive response to
USAir's entry in the Denver-Philadelphia market. In 1994,
United was the dominant carrier at Denver (with a 70% market
share), and US Air was the dominant carrier at Philadelphia
(with a 60% market share). 10 7 USAir entered the Denver-Phila-
delphia nonstop market in June 15, 1994 with an average fare
37% below prevailing levels. United responded to USAir's entry
by dropping its average fares by 7%. Prior to USAir's entry,
United had a monopoly in the Denver-Philadelphia nonstop
market. Within a year, USAir had a 26% market share. USAir
has generally flown two flights a day in the market, to United's
five. United's response to USAir's entry was not to slash fares below cost,
but to raise fares. During the first quarter of 1996, United's aver-
age fares were 116% higher than USAir's. United's fares have
averaged 62% higher than USAir's since USAir (now US Airways)
entered the Denver-Philadelphia market.
106 BRIAN HARRIS, AIRLINES: 1998 Huii FACTBOOK 4 (Lehman Bros. 1998).
107 Maldutis, Salomon Bros.Update, supra note 11.
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- Cleveland: Northwest vs.
Continental Airlines inaugurated service in the Minneapolis/
St. Paul-Cleveland market in the third quarter of 1995. North-
west responded by dropping its fares 4%, then another four per-
cent in the fourth quarter. But in the first quarter of 1996,
Northwest raised its average fares 30%. After that, Northwest
charged average fares 18% higher than Continental.
717
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Chart 3 - Minneapolis/St. Paul-Cleveland Average Fares
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A carrier with a significantly larger market share enjoys an S-
curve relationship between capacity (or frequency) along one
axis, and yield (or revenue) on the other. A carrier with a signif-
icantly larger number of frequencies in a city-pair market will
generate more high-yield business traffic (for business travelers
prefer schedule frequency), and therefore can charge a pre-
mium for it. "8 Typically, when a major carrier competes with a
major carrier, the carrier with the largest number of frequencies
reaps a significant revenue premium over its non-stop competi-
tors, and an ever greater premium over its one-stop and con-
necting competitors. But as we shall see, when a major carrier
competes with an upstart airline, it sacrifices this premium to
wage war with the new entrant.
2. Major Network Airline Competitive Response to Entry by
Southwest Airlines
Southwest Airlines is a low-cost affordable air carrier. But
since its birth preceded deregulation, and because it has been
consistently profitable for more years than any airline in the his-
tory of commercial aviation, it has achieved sufficient "mass"
and economic strength to ward off competitors. According to
Robert Rowen at Reno Air, "We see major airlines tailoring their
108 PAUL DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 36-40 (Coast Aire 1997).
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competitive response depending on who enters the market. If
it's a long-term player with a strong balance sheet like South-
west, they react moderately compared to a Kiwi or Reno Air."'""°
The Department of Transportation has correctly concluded:
In some instances, a major carrier will choose to coexist with the
low-fare competitor and tailor its response to the latter's entry
accordingly. For example, at cities like Dallas and Houston, the
major carriers tolerate Southwest's major presence in local mar-
kets by not competing aggressively for local passengers. Instead,
they focus their efforts on carrying flow passengers to feed their
networks. 1 "
A few major airlines have taken Southwest on in competitive
battles, only to be bloodied in the process. For example, United
Airlines launched "Shuttle by United" as a competitive weapon
to fight Southwest in the California and West Coast markets,
only to cede certain airports to Southwest and withdraw to air-
ports of strength."' US Airways fought to oust Southwest from
Baltimore/Washington International Airport, only to withdraw
from the battle once it realized Southwest could not be driven
out. Most major network carriers have learned that Southwest is
too strong to beat, and do not enter into competitive battles
with it. Let us examine two such markets.
a. St. Louis-Cleveland: TWA vs. Southwest
Southwest Airlines entered the St. Louis-Cleveland market in
early 1992. TWA then controlled 67% of St. Louis enplane-
ments. 112 As Chart 4 reveals, TWA responded to Southwest's en-
try by dropping its fares to remain competitive in the market,
though not to levels lower than Southwest's. In fact, since
Southwest entered, TWA's average fares ($72) have been about
42% higher than Southwest's ($51) in the nonstop market.
109 David Kribb, Fair or Foul?, AIRLINE Bus., Oct. 1, 1997, at 40.
110 DOT Docket No. OST-98-3713, Notice of Proposed Policy Statement (Apr.
6, 1998).
11 PAUL DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 245 (1997).
112 Salomon Bros. Update, supra note 12, at 27.
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Chart 4 - St. Louis-Cleveland Average Fares
calendar quarter
b. St. Louis-Detroit: Northwest vs. Southwest
The same is true in the St. Louis-Detroit market, where TWA
maintains a hub at St. Louis and Northwest maintains a hub at
Detroit. As Chart 5 reveals, both TWA and Northwest have
ceded the low-fare market to Southwest, consistently charging a
significant premium above Southwest. TWA's average fares
($69) have been 53% higher than Southwest's ($45) from 1990-
1997, while Northwest's fares ($62) have been 37% higher than
Southwest's. Since Southwest is too large and well capitalized to
be driven out of the market, the incumbent major airlines have
priced at a level which, while disciplined by competition, seeks
to maximize revenue. The allegation by the major airlines that
they must meet and march in "lock step" with the new entrant's
fares in order to remain in the market is therefore specious.
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3. Major Airline Predatoiy Response to New Entrant Airlines
We now turn to situations in which a major airline is faced
with new competition with a low-cost/low-fare new entrant, one
less well capitalized than Southwest. Here we see instances of
sharp price reductions with the apparent intent of driving the
new entrant out of the market. The incumbent has greater fi-
nancial resources than the new entrant, has monopoly routes to
cross-subsidize losses in competitive markets, and knows the
smaller entrant does not have the financial means to withstand
the assault, and therefore has a lower pain threshold than does a
major carrier The Department of Transportation has correctly
observed:
[A] Ithough many major airlines appear to engage in peaceful co-
existence with Southwest Airlines, often] the major carrier will
choose to drive the new entrant from the market. It will adopt a
strategy involving drastic price cuts and flooding the market with
new low-fare capacity (and perhaps offering "bonus" frequent
flyer miles and higher commission overrides for travel agents as
well) in order to keep the new entrant from achieving its break-
even load factor and thus force its withdrawal.... After the new
entrant's withdrawal, however, the major carrier drops the added
capacity and raises its fares at least to their original level. By ac-
cepting substantial self-diversion in the short run, the major pre-
vents the new entrant from establishing itself as a competitor in a
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potentially large array of markets. Consumers thus lose the bene-
fits of this competition indefinitely. 13
We now examine several markets where this has occurred.
The target carriers in this sample are Valujet, Kiwi Interna-
tional, Vanguard Airlines, Western Pacific Airlines, MarkAir,
Frontier Airlines, and Reno Air.
a. Atlanta-Memphis: Northwest vs. Valujet
Though Northwest Airlines charges average fares 37% higher
than low-cost/low-fare Southwest Airlines from its Detroit hub, it
responded radically differently when low-cost/low-fare Valujet
(now AirTran) entered Northwest's Memphis hub. As Chart 6
reveals, Northwest responded to Valujet's entry into the Atlanta-
Memphis market by dropping its average fares 54%, from $122, in
the quarter immediately preceding Valujet's entry, to $56 in the
quarter following its entry. From the fourth quarter of 1994 un-
til the first quarter of 1997, Northwest's average fares were con-
sistently lower than Valujet's. Since January 1994, Northwest
has offered an average fare of $55.93, lower than Valujet's aver-
age fare of $56.13. Since Northwest offers a 1st Class product
(which during the quarters for which data is available, Valujet-
now AirTran-did not), and since the DOT data includes 1st
Class in the average fare base, Northwest is underpricing Valujet in
its coach product by a significant margin.' 1 4
113 DOT Docket OST-98-3713, Notice of Proposed Policy Statement (Apr. 6,
1998).
114 See FRED ALLVINE & JOHN LINDSLEY, INCREASING MONOPOLIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT AND
DEFENSE OF FORTRESS HUBS 7 (Apr. 1997).
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Chart 6 - Atlanta-Memphis Average Fares
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According to Valujet, not only had Northwest cut its yield to
less than half its level six months prior to Valujet's entry into the
market, Northwest also increased its capacity by more than 50%
in the Atlanta-Memphis market beginning in late 1994.15
Why then, does Northwest charge 37% more than Southwest
in the St. Louis-Detroit market, and less than Valujet in the At-
lanta-Memphis market? The likely answer is predatory intent,
which emerges depending on the perception of economic
strength of the target. Northwest realizes it cannot drive South-
west from the market, but that Valujet might be driven from it.
b. Atlanta-Newark: Continental vs. Kiwi
Kiwi International Airlines entered the Atlanta-Newark mar-
ket in early 1994. Kiwi was attempting to establish a base of op-
erations at Newark, an airport then and now dominated by
Continental Airlines (with 54% of enplanements)." 6 Atlanta, of
course, is the hub of Delta Airlines. As Chart 7 reveals, the re-
sponse to Kiwi's entry was to inflict economic pain on Kiwi by
radically dropping prices. What is interesting is that Continen-
tal responded much more harshly than did Delta. After Kiwi
entered, Continental's average fares ($120) were only 10% higher
115 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S.
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES, C-2 (1999).
116 Salomon Bros. Update, supra note, at 12..
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than Kiwi's ($109), while Delta's ($150) were 38% higher than
Kiwi's. The likely explanation is that by making Newark its base
of operations, Kiwi was far more of a threat to Continental than
it was to Delta. Delta appeared to be responding in the range of
the normal competitive response to the entry of a major airline.
Chart 7 - Atlanta-Newark Average Fares
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c. Dallas/Ft. Worth-Wichita: American vs. Vanguard
Vanguard Airlines attempted to enter the Dallas/Ft. Worth-
Wichita market in 1995, but was driven out within a year and a
half by American Airlines' competitive response." 7 As Chart 8
reveals, though fares were on an upward climb before Vanguard
entered, American dropped its fares 100% from a high of $106 in
the first quarter of 1995, immediately preceding Vanguard's en-
try, to a low of $53 two quarters before Vanguard retreated. By
the end of 1997, American had raised prices 77% to recover the
short-term losses it sustained in driving Vanguard out. Admiral
Robert Spane, President & CEO of Vanguard Airlines testified
before a Congressional Committee about the predatory prac-
tices his airline faced:
In late 1996, we announced that Vanguard Airlines intended to
open several routes between Dallas/Ft. Worth and other Mid-
117 GAO, Aviation Competition: Information on the Department of Transpor-
tation's Proposed Policy 10 (July 1999).
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western cities. We announced that we intended to fly these
routes at substantially lower fares than were in the market at the
time.
Immediately after our announcement, [American Airlines] an-
nounced that they would increase service from Kansas City to
Dallas by 3 flights a day in addition to the 9 they were already
flying. They replaced 3 prop flights to Wichita with 4 larger pure
jets, increasing capacity by approximately 1,000 seats per day
(this was one of our core markets), and they resumed service to
Cincinnati after having withdrawn from that market two years
earlier.
These new flights operated within a few minutes of Vanguard's
proposed schedule and at "new" low fares. The major then
launched a significant amount of market specific advertising that
we were unable to match due to cost.
The result was obvious-we were forced to pull out of the market
or dramatically change our schedule and the prices returned to
pre-Vanguard levels. 1 '
Chart 8 - Dallas/Ft. Worth-Wichita Average Fares
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According to the Justice Department, Vanguard commenced
three daily nonstops between Dallas/Ft. Worth [DFW] and Kan-
sas City in January 1995. American responded by reducing its
118 Airline Hubs: Fair Competition or Predatoy Pricing: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Antitrust, Business Rights & Competition of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. (Apr. 1, 1998) (testimony of Admiral Robert Spane, President & CEO,
Vanguard Airlines).
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average one-way fare to $80 by April 1995, at which time Van-
guard reduced its daily frequencies to one. From May to June
1995, American added six additional frequencies (in addition to
its existing flight) according to DOJ in order "to drive [Van-
guard] from the market." By December 1995, Vanguard aban-
doned the route. American responded by reducing its
frequencies from 14 to 11 daily round trips in February, then to
10 in July, while increasing its average fares as much as 80%
higher than when Vanguard was in the market.
According to DOJ, in September 1996, Vanguard announced
it would resume DFW-Kansas City service, as well as enter the
DFW-Phoenix and DFW-Cincinnati markets. Within days of
Vanguard's announcement, American planned three increased
round trip frequencies (up from 10) in the DFW-Kansas City
market, the substitution of five jets for four of its nine small
commuter aircraft flights in the DFW-Wichita market, three new
round-trips in the DFW-Cincinnati market (a route it had aban-
doned as unprofitable in 1994), and the acceleration of two fre-
quency increases in the DFW-Phoenix market. Additionally,
American matched Vanguard's connecting fairs in the DFW-Chi-
cago and DFW-Des Moines markets on flights that "bracketed"
Vanguard's flights. In response, Vanguard exited DFW-Cincin-
nati and DFW-Phoenix in November, 1996, and DFW-Wichita in
December, 1996, while reducing service in the DFW-Kansas City
market to one daily round-trip.1 19 In response to DOJ's allega-
tions, American Airlines denied that it flooded these markets
with capacity, or that it priced below its viable Costs. 120
d. Dallas/Ft. Worth-Colorado Springs: Delta vs. Western
Pacific
Ed Beauvais had founded the only post-deregulation carrier
to become a major airline, America West. The threat that he
might successfully launch another successful carrier brought a
brisk response against start-up Western Pacific Airlines, based in
Colorado Springs. American Airlines and Delta Air Lines re-
sponded sharply and swiftly to Western Pacific's April, 1995, en-
try into the Dallas/Ft. Worth-Colorado Springs market, dropping
fares 92% from their levels in the quarter preceding Western
Pacific's entry to two quarters after such entry. American added
119 United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 1999).
120 Press Release, American Airlines Response to the Department of Justice's
Allegations of Predatory Practices (May 13, 1999).
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more seats at lower fares, larger aircraft and additional frequen-
cies.12 1 On October 15, 1997, Western Pacific withdrew from its
Colorado Springs hub altogether before collapsing in bank-
ruptcy and liquidation.
Chart 9 - Dallas/Ft. Worth-Colorado Springs Average Fares
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4. United Airlines' Response to MarkAir's Entry at Denver
In 1993, MarkAir filed a complaint with the DOT alleging that
Alaska Airlines was engaging in below-cost pricing in several
Alaska and Pacific Northwest Markets served by MarkAir in or-
der to force it to exit those markets.1 22
In August, 1993, MarkAir announced its intention to abandon
Alaska and establish a hub at Denver. In March 1994, it was
revealed MarkAir intended to move its corporate headquarters
to Denver. In April 1994, it successfully emerged from Chapter
11 bankruptcy. Keep these dates in mind as you look through
the accompanying charts, for they offer profound insights as to
the motivation of United Airlines to sharply attack MarkAir with
predatory pricing in the third quarter of 1994, which resulted in
MarkAir's return to bankruptcy, and liquidation.
121 AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141.
122 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S.
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES C-6 (1999).
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a. Denver-Seattle: United vs. MarkAir
In the Denver-Seattle market, United ignored MarkAir's pres-
ence in the market until it announced it was shifting its base of
operations from Seattle/Anchorage, to Denver. In the first
quarter of 1993, United offered average fares of $203, some
93% higher than MarkAir's $104. In August 1993, MarkAir an-
nounced it intended to shift its hub to Denver. After that,
United dropped its fares to levels lower than those prevailing
before or since in this decade. Note how United targeted
MarkAir in the second quarter of 1994, as it was seeking to
emerge from bankruptcy, dropping fares 42% (from $203 in the
first quarter of 1993 to $118 in the second quarter of 1994).
After MarkAir was driven out of business, United was able to
enjoy recoupment of its short-term losses by raising prices 67%
(to $197 in the first quarter of 1996). Frontier Airlines entered
the market on May 1, 1996, and United again began to lower
fares sharply, pricing below Frontier in the third quarter of
1997.
Chart 10 - Denver-Seattle Average Fares
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b. Denver-San Francisco: United vs. MarkAir
MarkAir entered the Denver-San Francisco market on Sep-
tember 7, 1993. United began to drop its prices steadily to levels
38% below those prevailing before MarkAir entered, until
United priced below MarkAir's average fares in the second quar-
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ter of 1994. Is it a coincidence that this was the quarter that
MarkAir was attempting to emerge from Chapter 11 ,bank-
ruptcy? After MarkAir was returned to bankruptcy, United
raised its fares 84% above the predatory levels, to levels higher
than those prevailing before MarkAir entered. This enabled
United to recoup the short-term losses it had suffered in driving
MarkAir from the market.
Chart 11 - Denver-San Francisco Average Fares
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c. Denver-Atlanta: United vs. MarkAir
One should contrast United's competitive response to
MarkAir's entry in the Denver-Atlanta market with Delta's. Here
again, United made its sharpest attack at MarkAir in the second
quarter of 1994, as MarkAir was attempting to emerge from
bankruptcy. In 1994, United's average prices were only 12%
higher than MarkAir's, while in the second quarter, they are
nearly identical. Note that instead of dropping prices, Delta
ceded the low-fare market to MarkAir, marching away from the
battle, and charging prices 65% higher than MarkAir's. Delta
focused on revenue maximization rather than predation.
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Chart 12 - Denver-Atlanta Average Fares
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5. United Airlines' Response to Frontier Airlines' Entry at Denver
a. Denver-Tucson: United vs. Frontier
United responds aggressively when low-fare carriers attempt
to establish a presence at its Denver hub. From United's per-
spective, new entry threatens its Fortress Hub monopoly.
Frontier Airlines entered the Denver-Tucson market with two
flights a day on September 13, 1994. Continental Airlines had
served the market with two to three flights per day until it with-
drew on March 9, 1994, so Frontier essentially filled the void of
Continental's departure. United's response to Frontier's two
flights was to slash fares 40% (from $172 in the third quarter of
1994, to $104 in the fourth quarter of that year). For the first
two quarters of Frontier's competitive presence, United's aver-
age fares were only 7% higher than Frontier's. Given that the
DOT's average fare data includes First Class fares as well as
Economy Class fares, we can assume the 7% difference reflects
the fact that United sells First Class tickets, while Frontier's air-
craft are configured in single-class Economy configuration. This
means that United likely was pricing its Economy product at
Frontier's level, and well below United's costs. With United's
advantages of more frequency, greater market identity, and fre-
quent flyer loyalty, Frontier was unable to achieve break-even
load factors and was forced reluctantly to abandon the market
on April 16, 1995. After Frontier left, United raised fares as
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much as 93%, to levels higher than those prevailing before
Frontier entered (they reached $186-187 in the first and third
quarters of that year), so as to recoup its short-term losses in
driving Frontier out. The deleterious impact on consumers in
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b. Denver-Phoenix: United vs. Frontier
Frontier began serving the Denver-Phoenix market on Sep-
tember 25, 1995, with two flights a day. This was significantly
less service than the four to five flights a day Continental had
operated in the market until it ceased serving it on October 31,
1994. United's response to Frontier's two flights was to slash its
average Denver-Phoenix fares by 39% (from $146 in the second
quarter of 1995, to $89 in the fourth quarter), a level Frontier is
convinced was significantly below United's costs. Beginning in
the fourth quarter of 1996, United's average one-way fare ($97)
was only 3 % higher than Frontier's ($94). Given that United of-
fers first-class service (and Frontier does not), United's coach
fares must have been lower than Frontier's, for the DOT data
aggregate first and coach tickets into the average fare calcula-
tion. Though relatively few Frontier passengers take Continen-
tal One Pass miles, a large portion of United's passengers take
Mileage Plus points for travel. Frequent flyer mileage is an indi-
r n-- --- --- ---- ONTIER---
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rect form of price rebating. Ed Perkins, editor of Consumer Re-
ports Travel Letter, wrote:
The big lines justify their matching cuts as a good-faith response
to competition. I don't agree. When a big line matches a small
line's fares, dollar for dollar, it's actually undercutting fares.
Why? Simply because, no matter how low the fare, the big lines
give frequent flyer mileage-in effect, a rebate worth two cents a
mile. Thus, for example, when a big line matches Kiwi's $94 fare
from Chicago to Newark, it actually undercuts Kiwi's fare by
about $14-the value of the 714 miles of credit for the flight." 3
Frontier had the temerity to add a third flight to the Denver-
Phoenix market in December, 1995, to replace the elimination
of MarkAir's single flight from the market. On February 10,
1997, United responded by increasing its frequencies in two im-
portant Frontier markets-63% in the Denver-Phoenix market
(from 8 flights per day before Frontier entered, to 13 in Febru-
ary 1997), and 71% in the Denver-Las Vegas market-with its
self-described competitive "weapon"-Shuttle by United. By the
Summer of 1996, United had increased seat capacity in the Den-
ver-Phoenix market by 30%, and in the Denver-Las Vegas mar-
ket by 32%, over Summer averages prevailing a year earlier.
Chart 14 - Denver-Phoenix Average Fares
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12- Ed Perkins, Protect Lower Fares: Save the Small Airlines, BUFFALO NEWS, May 28,
1995, at 5G.
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c. Denver-Las Vegas: United vs. Frontier
MarkAir entered the Denver-Las Vegas market in the second
quarter of 1994. United's prevailing average fare in the 1990s
had been $123. After MarkAir entered, in the third quarter of
1994, United dropped fares 30%, to $86. Frontier Airlines en-
tered the market on January 19, 1995. For the five ensuing
quarters, United's fares averaged less than Frontier's average
fare of $81. United again attacked Frontier with fares 4% below
Frontier's in the first quarter of 1997. All the while, United was
adding capacity, increasing seats 38% from the first quarter of
1995 to the first quarter of 1997. With such below-cost pricing
by United, and United's dumping of capacity into the market
with the introduction of United Shuttle in February 1997 (in-
creasing flight frequency 75% between January and March,
1997), Frontier was forced to withdraw from the market by the
Summer of 1997. United then raised prices to the highest level
they had been since early 1994, before MarkAir entered.
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Though United portrays Shuttle as a consumer-friendly low-
cost/low-fare alternative, the facts suggest otherwise. Although
United still offers low fares in the Denver-Phoenix market
(where it competes with Frontier and America West), United
Shuttle raised fares sharply after Frontier withdrew from the
Denver-Las Vegas market:
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Table 3 - A Tale of Two Cities: United's Lowest Regular Fares
Before Shuttle Introductory Fare February 11,
Feb. 11, 1997 1998
Denver- $98 $98 $168
Phoenix (60
8 miles)
Denver-Las $138 $98 $224
Vegas (649
miles)
d. Denver-Billings: United vs. Frontier
Frontier Airlines entered the Denver-Billings market on Sep-
tember 26, 1994. At the time, United's average fare was $167.
United responded to Frontier's entry by slashing its average fares
45%. By Frontier's first full quarter in the market, United was
charging prices only 8% higher than Frontier's. By Frontier's
second full quarter in the market, United was pricing its product
3% below Frontier's. After Frontier was forced to withdraw from
the market one year after it entered, on September 25, 1995,
United enjoyed significant recoupment of its short-term losses,
raising average fares 150%, to levels never before seen in the
Denver-Billings market
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6. United Airlines' Response to Reno Air's Enty at Denver
Lest one conclude that United Airlines launches predatory
strikes only at airlines which attempt to establish a hub at Den-
ver, consider Denver-Reno, where Reno-based Reno Air entered
on June 6, 1996. Though fares had been marching upward in
that market for some time, United responded to Reno's entry
with a 61 % price drop (from $232 in the quarter before Reno Air
entered to $90 in the first quarter of 1997). In the three
quarters of 1997 for which we have data, United's average fare
($95) was only 4% above that of Reno Air's ($91). Reno had
little choice but to withdraw from the market.
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D. SUMMARY
If major hub-dominant airlines are free to price below cost
and increase capacity or flight frequency significantly, a new en-
trant will find consumer demand for its product eroded below a
break-even cost level. Though the incumbent will lose money in
the short-term, it will recoup those losses in the long-term.
In summary, we have seen that the competitive response of a
major airline to the entry of another major airline into its hub is
generally not to dump capacity or price below-cost, for such a
predatory effort would be futile. But when a less-well-capital-
ized, younger, low-cost new entrant airline attempts to enter, the
competitive response is predatory, with the intent of driving the
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new entrant out of the market. Chronologically, the process is
this:
1. Major airline establishes dominance at airport serving major
city.
2. Dominance allows major airline to price well above competi-
tive levels.
3. When a new entrant attempts to enter a major airline's hub,
dominant airline responds with below-cost pricing, capacity
dumping, and/or a number of other predatory practices until
the new entrant is driven out.
4. Once the new entrant is driven out of the market, dominant
airline raises prices to levels sometimes higher than those pre-
vailing before the new entrant attempted entry.
Predatory behavior can have a chilling effect on new entry. As
Irwin Steltzer observed, a hunter who walks past a field with a no
trespassing sign may ignore it, unless the field is littered with
bodies of previous trespassers. Similarly, Mark Atwood con-
cludes, "Fear of predation shrinks the available pool of invest-
ment capital for upstart airlines and channels their entry away
from the very (monopoly) markets where their competitive pres-
ence would be most valuable" to the consuming public, relegat-
ing them to the small, safe niches of the airline market.'2 4
Reviewing this pattern, which has appeared again and again
over the past two decades, Alfred Kahn concluded:
When I am confronted with that objective sequence of events, I
am prepared to characterize the response of the incumbents...
as predatory, and I see no reason to require any further demon-
stration. I think the most grievous governmental failure in the
recent years has been the failure to prosecute a single case
against new competitors, and I certainly applaud the Department
of Transportation for undertaking a vigorous enforcement
effort....
... The acid test, whether it is framed in terms of a predatory
intent or in terms of the likely objective of anticompetitive conse-
quences .... is whether the incumbent airline is deliberately ac-
cepting financial losses selectively in the markets where it is
subject to competitive challenge, engaging in what Corwin Ed-
wards 50 years ago called discriminatory sharp-shooting.
For the reasons that the DOT clearly expands, a policy of deliber-
ately losing money would not make sense except on the expecta-
tion of driving people out and being able to recover it....
24 Mark Atwood, Refining Predatoy Policy: The Fear Factor and Reduced Funding
for Low-Fare Airlines, ANTITRUsT L. & ECON. REV. 89 (1999).
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The scores of competitors that have entered the industry over the
last 20 years attest to the widespread eagerness of enterprisers to
take the risk of coming in and competing in free markets. But
the history of their entry and demise also demonstrates that we
must have vigorous antitrust-like policies to keep open the op-
portunity for that entry, free of the threat, apparently abundantly
demonstrated by actual practice, of predatory responses.' 2 5
Over the past decade, several studies performed by the U.S.
General Accounting Office have chronicled the plethora of
predatory weapons used by major airlines to thwart these Con-
gressional goals. In a 1996 report, the GAO concluded:
[W] e identified a number of policy options 6 years ago that DOT
could consider to lower these barriers [to entry] and increase
competition. Since then, there has been little progress toward
reducing these barriers, and some ... have grown worse. There-
fore, we believe that DOT must now take positive steps to address
several of the most serious barriers. 126
In its 1996 report on new entrant airlines, The Low Cost Airline
Service Revolution, the DOT expressed concern that hub domi-
nant airlines have an incentive to discourage competitive entry
by engaging in predatory behavior and unfair competitive
practices:
The high fares hub dominant carriers have enjoyed at their hub
cities provides the incentive for those carriers to discourage com-
petitive entry. And allegations of predatory behavior have in-
creased as a result of the recent emergence and growth of a
number of low cost low fare new entrant airlines. Given the in-
centives and the reality of very high prices for local passengers at
certain hub network hubs, we have to be concerned about the
possible predatory behavior or unfair competitive practices....
[W] e will not be indifferent to attempts to exclude or preclude
new entry through predatory activity .... [T]he beneficial im-
pact of low cost new entry-especially in disciplining fares and
filling service voids-is simply too important to permit predation
to undermine it. Anticompetitive activity can take myriad forms,
from sudden and targeted service increases and sharp and highly
selective fare cuts to . . . other "doing business" problems. The
Department will continue to evaluate which actions cross the line
125 Aviation Competition Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, of the House
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 105th Cong. 1067 (Apr. 23, 1998) (testimony
of Alfred Kahn).
126 GAO, AIRLINE DEREGULATION: BARRIERS TO ENTRY CONTINUE TO LIMIT COM-
PETITION IN SEVERAL KEY DOMESTIC MARKETS 22 (Oct. 1996).
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from tough competition to anticompetitive predation and react
accordingly....
[W] e will continue to consider and carefully review allegations of
anticompetitive behavior that are brought to our attention....
[W] here appropriate we will pursue enforcement activity to pro-
hibit any airline from engaging in behavior that may be
anticompetitive. 127
It is for these reasons that the Departments of Transportation
and Justice began to focus on major airlines' predatory and an-
ticompetitive practices at concentrated hub airports and routes
radiating therefrom.
III. MONOPOLIZATION OF DENVER: A CASE STUDY
A. INTRODUCTION
United Airlines is the largest airline in the world. Beginning in
1982, United launched a plan to monopolize the Denver non-
stop and connecting passenger market.
The monopolization of the Denver hub was achieved with sev-
eral deliberative steps. Step one was to eliminate the original
Frontier Airlines as a competitor, which occurred in 1986. Step
two was to drive Continental Airlines out of Denver as a hub
competitor, which occurred in 1994. Steps three and four were
to eliminate Western Pacific Airlines and the new Frontier Air-
lines as low-cost competitors. Western Pacific was liquidated in
1998.
Until the Departments of Transportation and Justice began to
focus on these problems in 1997, the means by which United
Airlines accomplished these goals included: (1) adding seat ca-
pacity and flight frequency in competitors' city-pairs in order to
drive its competitors' load factors to below break-even levels; (2)
dropping prices to levels at or below those of any competitor
which dares to enter its market, even if the price is below
United's costs; (3) refusing any competitor access to its domi-
nant passenger network; (4) biasing its computer reservations
system to dissuade travel agents from selling its competitors' ser-
vices; (5) bribing travel agents with commission overrides to
steer passenger business toward United; and (6) entering into
exclusive dealing arrangements with corporate purchasers. Af-
ter a competitor was eliminated, United's conduct as a monopo-
list was also consistent-raise prices in its monopoly city-pairs to
127 DOT, THE Low COST AIRLINE SERVICE REVOLUTION 31-33 (1996).
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whatever the market will bear. This gave it the economic re-
sources to repeat the cycle whenever a new entrant attempted to
invade its fortress hub.
This section documents the anticompetitive behavior of
United Airlines toward its Denver competitors chronologically,
beginning shortly after airline deregulation.
B. THE DEMISE OF THE ORIGINAL FRONTIER AiRLINES
The original Frontier airlines began service as a "local service
carrier" in 1946. By the beginning of 1982, Frontier Airlines
had more flights at Denver than any other carrier, serving a total
of 85 cities from its Denver hub. Frontier had been consistently
profitable during the previous ten years.'l2 Although the indus-
try as a whole lost money in 1981, Frontier earned $32 million of
profit on revenue of $577 million. 12 It was to be Frontier Air-
lines' last good year.
According to Aviation Daily, in 1982, "United, a major compet-
itor at Denver Stapleton, launched a massive campaign to cap-
ture a bigger share of the Denver market and to become the
dominant carrier at the airport."' ° The 1981 air traffic control-
lers' strike had led the FAA to impose a cap on landing slots. In
1982, as it began its buildup at Denver, United was buying slots
from anyone who would sell them, moving acres of seats to Den-
ver. 3 ' United increased its flights out of Denver by a third,
predominantly adding capacity in Frontier's markets. 13 2 In its
"United's High On Denver" plan, United Airlines executives ex-
plicitly identified Frontier Airlines as its principal target. 133
From May to July of 1982, United increased its flights from 96 to
133 daily departures, becoming Denver's largest carrier, versus
120 daily departures by Frontier and 110 by Continental. 4 This
author's study of the airline industry (published in 1992) dis-
cussed this period as follows:
United, the nation's largest airline, was determined to dominate
Denver. With a deep pocket that could cross-subsidize losses in
competitive markets, a powerful computer reservations system
128 H. Laws & R. Lossee, Frontier (monograph Dec. 2, 1986), at 2.
29 HISTORY OF THE FORMER FRONTIER AIRLINES: 1946-1986.
130 AVIATION DAILY, Sept. 2, 1986, at 348.
I3, Dee Mosteller & Danna Henderson, Denver's Stapleton Airport: A Good Place
To Watch Deregulation, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Nov. 1986, at 64.
132 Id.
"33 United Is Biggest, Best at Denver, FRIENDLY TIMES, Oct. 1982.
134 Id.
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that could discriminate against competitors, and an attractive fre-
quent-flyer program that could lure business travelers (the most
lucrative segment of the passenger market), United, the nation's
largest airline, began to turn up the heat on Frontier.' 5 1982
marked the first time United Airlines was described by the press
as "the 800-pound gorilla.'"
It is a metaphor that has since been almost universally em-
braced by observers of the airline industry. '37
By 1983, United had added over 100,000 seats per week at
Denver since deregulation, and increased its frequencies to 174
departures per day at Denver's Stapleton International Airport.
Frontier had 138 daily departures and 24.3% of the market,
while Continental had 18.5%.' Frontier was being squeezed by
a determined United Airlines. That year, despite a significant
cost-saving labor agreement, an 11.2% increase in passenger
boardings, and an improvement in revenue, Frontier posted a
net loss of $13.8 million, the first in more than a decade.1 39 By
the end of 1983, Continental Airlines collapsed into Chapter 11
bankruptcy.
By 1984, average fares in Denver were the lowest in the
United States. In 1985, they dropped another 8.3%.14 Frontier
was forced to begin liquidating assets, and United seized the op-
portunity. In early 1985, Frontier sold five McDonnell-Douglas
aircraft to United Airlines for $95 million, and in May of 1985,
135 PAUL DEMPSEY & ANDREW GoErz, AIRLINE DEREGULATION & LAISSEZ-FAIRE
MVrTIOLOCY 70 (1992).
1-3 Frank Lorenzo Lures a Co-Pilot, Bus. WK., Dec. 6, 1982, at 42.
137 See, e.g., Steven Lolford, Carriers Moves On Labor Costs Are Viewed As Bold Deci-
sions, TRAVEL WKLY., Sept. 12, 1983, at 1; Douglas Feaver, Airline Charts New Course
After Best Year, WASH. PosT, Feb. 24, 1985, at G1;Joan Feldman, Is There AnyJustice
in Reagan's Airline Merger Policy?, AIR TRANSPORr WORLD, May 1986, at 18; Mark
Hornway, Ferris Loads Up On Debt To Thwart Allegis Buyout, CRAINS CHICAGO Bus.,
June 1, 1987, at 2; MAcNEiL/LEIIRER NEwsHoUR, Nov. 4, 1987; Robert Rose, Tak-
ing Off: United Airlines Begins To Pick Up Altitude, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1988, at 1;
Stanley Ziemba, Sleeping Giant United Wakes Up, C-ncA~o TRIB., Feb. 9, 1992, at
Cl; Paul Betts, Grounded After a Bumpy Flight, FIN. TIMES,Jan. 10, 1994, at 14; Gene
Amole, Blame Romer, Pefia, for DIA Fare Hike, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 31,
1995, at 5A; Colorado Business Stratey, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 12, 1995, at
98A; James Ott, Domicile Issue Divides UAL, Cabin Crews, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Nov. 20, 1995, at 52; Chuck Green, Supporting DIA Tests a Person's Endur-
ance, DENVER POSr, Jan. 14, 1996, at BI; and Robert Moorman, The "New" New
Frontier, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Aug. 1996, at 86.
138 Texas Air Makes Bid for Frontier, AVIATION DAILY, Apr. 5, 1985, at 201.
139 FRONTIER AIRLINES, ANNUAL REPORT (1983).
14) Stapleton Int'l Airport, Average Airline Fares for Selected U.S. Airports
(1988).
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was forced to sell half its remaining fleet (25 of 51 of its Boeing
737s) to United for $265 million. By purchasing more than half
of Frontier, United was able to gradually downsize its competi-
tor. 141 The rest of Frontier was sold to Newark-based new en-
trant airline People Express in November 1985.142
By 1986, United controlled nearly 40% of the Denver market,
followed by Continental at 28% and People Express-owned
Frontier at 18%. 143 (See Chart 16). Fares at Denver fell another
4.6% in that year. 144 Denver was being described as the "fare
wars capital of the world," with the lowest unrestricted fares of
any major hub in the United States. Yields (the amount of reve-
nue charged per seat) were as low as 5 cents a mile, while Fron-
tier's seat-mile costs were north of 8 cents.
145
Below-cost pricing began to take its toll on smaller carriers in
the Denver market. In May 1986, Pioneer Airlines, a long-time
Denver commuter carrier, ceased operations. 146 In addition to
below-cost pricing, United launched a program to bribe Denver
travel agents with $100 every time they told a customer "it'sjust
as easy and just as cheap to fly United."'147
In July 1986, with Frontier still losing money, People Express
agreed to sell Frontier to United, and transferred many of Fron-
tier's most important assets to United while the deal was pend-
ing. United was able to acquire $43.2 million worth of assets
from Frontier, including some of its most valuable properties-
five takeoff and landing slots at Chicago O'Hare, three gates at
Dallas/Ft. Worth, contracts to acquire two MD-80 aircraft, and
two hangars and six gates at Denver.14 By now, United had
spent more than $400 million directly on Frontier's assets, and
hundreds of millions of dollars more in below-cost pricing, in an
effort to eliminate Frontier as a competitor at Denver. Conti-
141 Certain aircraft were leased back to Frontier for short periods of time.
142 Frontier Begins Downsizing Operations, AVIATION DAILY, May 15, 1985, at 83.
143 Stapleton Int'l Airport, Domestic Market Shares (July 1986).
144 Stapleton Int'l Airport, Average Airline Fares for Selected U.S. Airports
(1988).
145 Dee Mosteller & Danna Henderson, Denver's Stapleton Airport: A Good Place
To Watch Deregulation, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Nov. 1986, at 64.
146 Id.
147 Henry Dubroff, Touters of United Rewarded, DENVER POST, Mar. 8, 1986.
148 In re Frontier Airlines, Inc. (memorandum opinion and order on motion
to approve settlement, Case No. 85 B 8021 E, Mar. 23, 1987), at 4.
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nental filed a lawsuit objecting to the monopoly Frontier's ac-
quisition by United would create.'49
Once it had acquired several of Frontier's prized assets,
United began to take a hard line stance in its negotiations over
the acquisition of the rest of Frontier. Although United had
agreed to purchase Frontier, and agreed to "use its best efforts"
to resolve potential labor problems, United balked at consum-
mating the acquisition as its pilots refused to accede to United's
insistence that Frontier's pilots be integrated into United's labor
force at their existing wage levels (in effect, a "C" scale, with
wages 40% below those of United's pilots). Some speculated
that United failed to exercise good faith in the negotiations (for
example, United never negotiated with the other union
groups), because it knew that Frontier's deteriorating cash posi-
tion would soon cause it to collapse in bankruptcy. By walking
away, United could eliminate Frontier without having to con-
clude the purchase agreement with People Express.
Meanwhile, People Express continued to lose money, and was
forced to shut down Frontier on August 24, 1986.150 Frontier
entered bankruptcy two days later. A United Airlines' publica-
tion revealed, "United will benefit from eliminating the instabil-
ity of Denver's three-carrier hub. This will translate into higher
fares and better returns and will ensure that another carrier does not
attempt to build a presence in Denver." 151
But United did not anticipate that Continental would pick up
the pieces of a grounded Frontier. Only a month after People
put Frontier into bankruptcy, Frank Lorenzo's Texas Air offered
to purchase both People Express and Frontier, and by February
1987, they were both folded into Continental (along with New
York Air).152 After a settlement with United over the transfer of
assets from Frontier,' 3 Continental came away with most of
Frontier's aircraft, in addition to three hangars and two con-
courses (C and D) at Denver's Stapleton Airport.'54 With the
acquisition of Frontier, Continental surpassed United with 236
141, Dee Mosteller & Danna Henderson, Denver's Stapleton Airport: A Good Place
To Watch Deregulation, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Nov. 1986, at 64.
150 Agis Salpukas, Frontier Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1986, at D1.
151 Reporters, Analysts Applaud United's Frontier Purchase, FIENDLY TIMES, Aug.
1986, at 2 [emphasis supplied].
152 PAUL DEMPSEY & ANDREW GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION & LAISSEZ-FAIRE
MYIIOLOGY 87 (Quorum 1992).
153 See In re Frontier Airlines, Inc., 74 Bankr. 973 (1987).
154 PAUL DEMPSEY & ANDREW GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION & LAISSEZ-FAIRE
MYriiOLOGY 88 (Quorum 1992).
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daily departures compared to United's 218, and briefly held the
dominant position at Denver from June 1987 to May 1988. 55
The era of three hubbing airlines in Denver was over.
Subsequently, an antitrust action was filed against United by a
large number of former Frontier pilots, flight attendants, and
ticket, reservations and station agents against United Airlines.
In that case, plaintiffs alleged that United engaged in various
anticompetitive activities designed to destroy Frontier. Among
the more prominent allegations was that United: (1) exerted
monopoly power in the computer reservations system [CRS]
market in Denver and also with respect to its Apollo CRS; (2)
overcharged Frontier for its participation in the Apollo system;
(3) caused Apollo to operate unfairly in ticket sales; and (4) pur-
posefully did not go forward with the stock purchase agreement
it had concluded with Frontier, leaving Frontier so weakened
financially that it failed.'5 6 Unfortunately, the court held that
employees lack standing to bring an antitrust claim, and never
reached the merits of the complaint.'57
Another lawsuit brought in 1985 by Continental Airlines ob-
jected to the manipulation and display bias, and suppression of
competitors' fares and schedules imposed by United and Amer-
ican Airlines in their computer reservations systems.' In the
mid-1980s, United's Apollo CRS was used by between 70% and
80% of Denver-area travel agencies.159 A federal district court
"found sufficient evidence that United and American commit-
ted mail fraud and wire fraud in connection with their CRSs to
allow Continental to proceed with a jury trial on its $1 billion
RICO (Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act) claim against the carriers," to allow the case to proceed to a
jury."' Continental claimed United had programmed its CRS
to favor United's flights over those of its competitors, even when
a competitors' flight was more convenient for a customer. Con-
tinental also alleged that United overcharged it and other carri-
ers for participation in its CRS. The court found that United
155 Continental Expects To Operate 250 Daily Denver Departures By Yearend, AVIA-
TION DAiLY, Nov. 3, 1986, at 182.
156 Sharp v. United Airlines, 967 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1992).
157 Id.
158 American, Continental Spar As CRS Suit Heads To Court, AVIATION DAILY, Feb.
27, 1989, at 295.
159 Dee Mosteller & Danna Henderson, Denver's Stapleton Airport: A Good Place
To Watch Deregulation, AIR TRANSPORT WORLD, Nov. 1986, at 64.
160 American, Continental Spar As CRS Suit Heads To Court, AviATION DAILY, Feb.
27, 1989, at 295.
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and American "had specific intent to defraud" when they "de-
ceitfully concealed material facts concerning the manipulation
of the Continental plaintiff's flight information in Sabre and
Apollo."16 ' After 10 weeks of trial, on the eve of jury delibera-
tions, United settled the suit for about $70 million. 16 2
With Frontier and People Express gone, the Denver market
became a duopoly for Continental and United. With Frontier
out of business, United's market share at Denver climbed to
50%. For a short while it resembled more of a "shared monop-
oly," as each carrier attempted to recoup some of the losses in-
curred in the battle with Frontier.163 Accordingly, airline ticket
prices at Denver rose by 17.6% in 1987 and a record 39.2% in
1988.164 Without Frontier, passenger enplanements at Denver
declined sharply, exacerbated by the fare increases.
C. THE DEMISE OF CONTINENTAL AIRLINES' HUB AT DENVER
Founded as Varney Speed Lines in 1934, Continental Airlines'
first route was from El Paso to Denver. From 1937 to 1963, Con-
tinental was headquartered in Denver.'65 After Frontier and
People Express went out of business, and Frontier's gates and
aircraft folded into Continental, for a short while Continental
became Denver's leading carrier. In 1987, Continental ac-
counted for 42% of total enplaned passengers at Denver.166 The
status was short-lived, however, as United quickly regained the
lead in May 1988, a position it never again relinquished. (See
Chart 16). By 1990, Continental was in bankruptcy for the sec-
ond time in a decade.
Former United Airlines' CEO Stephen Wolf said, "I never
fought anything so hard in my life" as the new Denver Interna-
tional Airport [DIA]. 67 Opposition was predicated on cost, and
(though never said by United publicly), the possibility that a
large new airport might have sufficient capacity to attract new
161 Continental Lawsuit Going 7o Trial, DENVER POST, Feb. 24, 1989.
162 Continental Settles Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1990, at D13.
1' PAUL DEMPSEY & ANDREW GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION & LAISSEZ-FAIRE
MYTHOLOGY 89 (Quorum 1992).
164 Stapleton Int'l Airport, Average Airline Fares for Selected U.S. Airports
(1988).
165 Jeffrey Leib, Continental's Denver Departure, Oct. 23, 1994, at Hi.
66 Leigh Fisher Associates Analysis, Prepared for the City and County of Den-
ver (1994).
167 Don Phillips, $3.1 Billion Airport At Denver Preparing for Rough Takeoff WASH.
POST, Feb. 13, 1994, at A10.
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competition. But once Continental jumped on the DIA band-
wagon, United had little choice but to jump aboard too.
Among the last things Frank Lorenzo did as CEO of Conti-
nental was to sign a lease with the city of Denver in the summer
of 1990 for 20 gates at the new Denver International Airport.
Because Continental became DIA's first hub carrier, it was able
to reserve the closest (and therefore most desirable) concourse
(A) to the main terminal building, and the city agreed to build a
pedestrian bridge linking the terminal directly to that con-
course. When United subsequently signed up for Concourse B
(which had no pedestrian bridge to the main terminal), it in-
sisted the city make the glass on Continental's Concourse A
bridge opaque, so that no passenger could see the splendid view
of the Colorado Rocky Mountains from it, for United believed
the bridge offered Continental a competitive advantage. Merci-
fully, DIA engineer Ginger Evans refused, and the city breached
its contractual agreement."" United chose not to press its case,
undoubtedly fearing the public relations fallout once the new
airport opened.
United took several actions to pressure Continental to depart.
For example, United refused to allow DIA to open until its auto-
mated baggage system could deliver 225 bags a minute. DIA's
chief engineer, Ginger Evans, contended DIA could have
opened early in 1994 with the baggage system operating at 40
bags per minute, adequate to allow United to meet its connect
times. 169 "Virtually every design and construction professional
[who] was involved directly or as a consultant ... believed at
that time the project, including the BAE automated *baggage
system, could have been completed by October 21, 1993 [the
originally scheduled opening date] .,"7o If an allegedly malfunc-
tioning baggage system was not the fundamental cause of the
delay, what was? One plausible and widely accepted explanation
has been proffered by former Denver airport director George
Doughty in testimony before Congress:
United Airlines did not want to go to DIA. United could have
cooperated with the City to work out options for manual bag
handling, but they did not.... As to exactly what United's ratio-
168 Woman of the Year Ginger S. Evans, ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD, Feb. 11, 1994,
at 34.
169 See PAUL DEMPSEY, ANDREW GOETZ & JOSEPH SZYuoWicz, DENVER INTERNA-
TIONAL AIRPORT: LESSONS LEARNED (McGraw Hill 1997).
170 GREINER SAYS SEC STAFF CASE AGAINST DENVER CONSULTANTS NOT LEGITI-
MATE, AIRPORTS, Dec. 19, 1993.
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nale [was] one can only speculate, but a few things are clear.
United had no incentive to move in 1994. They had just in-
creased their operations at Denver in order to capture an even
greater market share that would eventually force Continental to
dismantle its hub. It was to their advantage not to move until
that was assured....
In 1992, Continental reached its last high water mark of 285
flights per day (including Continental Express) at Denver. With
38% of the market, Continental was still second to United's
40%. United designated Denver its "major domestic initiative,"
and increased its capacity by 30% over the next several years in
what appeared to be a deliberate move to oust Continental once
and for all.172 UAL's 1992 Annual Report spoke of "an aggressive
plan for expansion" at Denver: "At Denver, United phased in a
dramatic increase in departures during the year, moving from
180 flights last spring to 217 during the summer and, by March
of this year, to 247 departures [plus 105 by United Express carri-
ers]. 173 Its 1993 Annual Report stated, "An aggressive buildup
has made a significant contribution to revenue improvement at
[the Denver] hub. United ended 1993 with 257 daily departures
in Denver, up from 212 a year earlier.... Already the number
one carrier in the Mile High City, United had increased its ca-
pacity over the last two years by nearly 30 percent." 74 United's
aggressive behavior at Denver was clearly targeted at Continen-
tal. United pulled away and never looked back as it steadily in-
creased market share, leading to Continental's decision to pull
out.
Toward the end, Continental was losing $10 million a month
at its Denver hub, and could not face the prospect of continuing
hub operations at the more expensive new airport. Denver air-
port director Jim DeLong described it as a "fierce battle for
dominance of the Denver market."'175 Continental's Annual Re-
port revealed that the company had lost $130 million at Denver
171 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp. & Infra-
structure, 101st Cong. (May 11, 1995) (testimony of George Doughty).
172 Bill Mintz, Denver A Victim of Continental's Fare Strategy, HOUSTON CIIRON.,
July 8, 1994, at 2 ("United Airlines, the dominant carrier in the Denver market,
has been increasing its service to pressure Continental."); see also Paul Dempsey,
Rip United Airline's Hold from DIA, DENVER Bus. J., Aug. 25-31, 1995.
173 UAL CORP., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1993) [emphasis supplied].
174 Id. at 6 [emphasis supplied].
175 Jeffrey Leib, GAO Study Encouraging for DIA 's Financing, DENVER POST, Feb.
14, 1995, at C3.
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in 1993, and lost $500 million at Denver from 1990-1993. 17' Ac-
cording to Continental's CEO Robert Ferguson, "Continental's
losses are at unacceptably high levels in Denver, even with our
reduced flying. ' 177  Continental's Annual Report said, "Al-
though the new facilities [at DIA] will be greatly superior to
those presently serving Continental's Denver passengers, they
also will be much more expensive. ' 78 It was estimated that in-
creased landing fees required to pay off bonds issued to finance
DIA would have added another $50 million to Continental's
costs. 1
79
The advantages Continental gained from signing the first
lease at DIA were never fully realized because Continental ulti-
mately was forced to cry "uncle," in March 1994, and announced
its decision to abandon its Denver hub operations and relin-
quish the market to United. Continental had already downsized
its presence in Denver from a high of 285 flights a day in Febru-
ary 1992, to 165 flights in August 1993, to 148 flights in January
1994, to 107 flights in March 1994. Continental's Denver opera-
tions dropped to 86 flights in July 1994, 59 in September 1994,
and 19 in March 1995.'80 Meanwhile, United increased its
flights to 280.181
Following Continental's announcement that it was scaling
back its Denver hub beginning in the fall of 1993, the with-
drawal proceeded throughout the following year. Continental
dropped 26 routes through August 1994, and an additional 23
on October 31, 1994. By the time DIA opened, Continental was
down to 13 flights a day to three cities.
Passenger traffic, which was increasing since 1990, began to
decline after Continental's pullout. In 1995, only 31 million to-
tal passengers were flown to, from or through Denver, down
176 CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1995).
177 Michelle Mahoney, Denver Exit Costly One for Continental Airlines, DENVER
POST, July 10, 1994, at 2D; Continental To Close Denver Crew Bases This Fall, AVIA-
TION DAiLY, July 8, 1994, at 38.
178 Michelle Mahoney, Denver Costly for Continental, DENVER POST, June 18,
1994, at A23.
179 Bill Mintz, Denver A Victim of Continental Fare Strategy, HOUSTON CHRON.,July
8, 1994, at 2; Michelle Mahoney, Airline's Memo Jolts Morale, DENVER POST, Mar. 31,
1994, at C1.
180 City and County of Denver, Airport System Revenue Bonds, Series 1994
(Sept. 1, 1994); Michelle Mahoney, Airline Changes Buffet Denver, DENVER POST,
Feb. 13, 1994.
181 Leigh Fisher Associates Analysis Prepared for the City and County of Den-
ver (1994).
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from 33 million in 1994. A contributing factor in this decline is
the fare increase strategy that United enacted as it realized more
monopoly opportunities.
United's goal of becoming the dominant carrier in Denver
has been fully realized, as United and its code-sharing affiliates
controlled nearly 80% of the total passenger market at Denver.
By September 1996, United flew to 55 cities from Denver and
Colorado Springs. 18 2 In 1994, United's CEO, Gerald Green-
wald, confessed that United's strategy to dominate the Denver
market had paid off in increased market share and profitability.
Outgoing United CEO Stephen Wolf called Denver the "major
domestic initiative" for the airline over the preceding two years.
According to Greenwald, "United has done a fantastic job of
building strength in Denver and we'd like to take advantage of
that, if anything, and build it stronger."' 18 3
As noted above, United may have purposely delayed opening
of DIA in order to encourage Continental to abandon its Den-
ver hub. Along the way, United also cut several additional deals
with the city to disadvantage its competitors. United insisted it
be allowed to take over the Concourse C automated baggage
system loop, so that only United would have a high-speed bag-
gage system. Ironically, the Concourse C automated system was
the only one operating well before United occupied it. Other
airlines were relegated to traditional tug-and-cart technology.
Further, United insisted that carriers using Concourse A pay a
disproportionate share of the costs of that concourse's auto-
mated baggage system, though the system has never been func-
tional. (On a per-passenger basis, Continental Airlines pays the
highest costs of any carrier at DIA; it absorbs a portion of the
additional costs of its two sub-lessees on Concourse A; but be-
cause of this agreement, half of Concourse A's domestic gates
remain empty.) United's insistence assures that the high cost of
Concourse A's gates will dissuade new carrier entry on that con-
course for years to come, despite its superior location. Unfortu-
nately, DIA's costs have dissuaded many low-fare airlines
(including Southwest Airlines) from entering the market, and
driven low-cost airlines (e.g., Midway and Morris Air) from it.
Finally, United insisted the city build it a hangar directly north
of Concourse C, on land a future concourse is supposed to oc-
182 Jeffrey Leib, United Joins Fare War, DENVER POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at Al.
183 Michelle Mahoney &Jeffrey Leib, UALs Success Key To Denver, DENVER POST,
July 13, 1994, at Cl.
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cupy. No such future concourse can be built without tearing
down United's hangar.
In summary, though unable to stop construction of a new air-
port at Denver, United Airlines was able to ensure its Fortress
Hub dominance of DIA by driving up its costs, withholding per-
mission to open DIA until Continental Airlines had succumbed
to United's below-cost pricing and fully committed itself to elim-
inating its Denver hub, by ensuring Concourse C carriers would
be deprived use of an automated baggage system and that Con-
course A carriers would pay an exorbitant price for its auto-
mated baggage system (though a back-up baggage system was
welded on top of it, thereby denying Concourse A carriers the
automated system whose costs they must pay).
As Continental departed, an airline executive observed, "Den-
ver residents will know the true definition of high fares."'184 By
mid-1995, United enjoyed about 70% of Denver's passenger traf-
fic, and even a higher percentage of DIA's $5 billion travel mar-
ket. 8 5 Continental Airlines, once an airline as large in Denver
as United, accounted for less than 3% of DIA's traffic. Without
a major airline to discipline the monopolist, United could ex-
tract whatever the market would bear.
United raised fares to monopoly levels in virtually every mar-
ket Continental abandoned. For example, United Airlines qua-
drupled its unrestricted coach fare from Denver to San
Francisco (from $238 to $954), and tripled its fare from Denver
to Los Angeles (from $298 to $892).-86 United would boast that
nearly 60% of its seats at DIA are discounted, with approxi-
mately 55% discounted up to 35% or more of the full fare.187
That makes United sound like a benign monopolist until you
compare these statistics with industry-wide data compiled by the
Air Transport Association of America [ATA]. According to
ATA, more than 90% of passengers fly at a discount, and the
average discount is more than 60% of the full fare, and has been
for nearly a decade.8 8 In 1996, 93% of U.S. travelers were flying
on a discounted ticket (compared with 60% on United at Den-
ver), and the average discount was 67.5% off the full fare (com-
pared with only 55% of Denver's United travelers enjoying a
184 Alex Berenson, Continental Fading Away, DENVER POST, July 29, 1994, at Al.
185 Jeffrey Leib, DIA Floats Bid for Southwest, DENVER POST, June 26, 1995, at El.
186 Jeffrey Leib, United Forging 'Fortress Hub', DENVER POST, Aug. 24, 1994, at Cl.
187 United Airlines, 3 The Plane Fax (Apr. 1996) (newsletter by UAL Vice Pres-
ident Roger Gibson).
188 AIR TRANSPORT ASS'N, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1996).
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35% discount off the full fare).' It is remarkable that United
would insist that Denver passengers should be grateful for its
pricing when its Denver discounting was so miserly.
In a study of Denver International Airport, the GAO reported
to Congress that United Airlines raised prices at Denver 38%
from June 1994-95, while the average ticket price nationally in-
creased only 7% over the same period. 190 In August 1995, Amer-
ican Express Travel said its Denver customers were paying 46%
more.' 9 ' However, in September 1995, United insisted average
fares were only up 16%, but included free frequent-flyer tickets
in this calculation. 11 2 Moreover, it is unclear whether United
was calculating fares for all Denver passengers, or only origin
and destination [O&D] passengers (passengers who begin or
end their trips in Denver). One would expect that connecting
ticket prices would be priced competitively, for a consumer trav-
eling east-to-west (or vice versa) has a multitude of airlines from
which to choose and hubs through which to connect, while local
O&D passengers are subject to the monopolist's whim on
pricing.
United contended it also had to raise prices to cover the $210
million in increased costs attributable to Denver International
Airport over the airport it replaced, Stapleton.' 93 Earlier,
United had estimated that its costs of operations at the new air-
port would increase by only $100 million.' 4  But most of
United's fare increases were imposed as Continental downsized
its Denver hub, months before DIA opened. With DIA opening,
and blaming DIA's high costs, United announced it was adding
another $40 round trip to the prices of tickets beginning or end-
ing at Denver.
But because of DIA's efficient runway configuration, terminal
spacing, and triple Cat. III simultaneous landing capability,
United's operating costs at DIA (excluding airport fees) would
189 Julius Maldutis, Airline Update-November 1996 (Dec. 10, 1996), at 11.
190 GAO, DENVER AIRPORT: OPERATING RESULTS AND FINANCIAL RISKS 6 (1996);
Jeffrey Leib, GAO Study Encouraging for DIA's Financing, DENVER POST, Feb. 14,
1996, at C3.
1'9 Ann Imse, United Disputes Air Fare Reports, RoCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 18,
1995, at 53A.
192 Ann Inse, United Targets Fare Gripes, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 2, 1995,
at 74A. United would later claim its fares were up only 15%. See Roger Gibson,
United Airlines Decries Guest Editorial, DENVER BUS. J., Oct. 6, 1996.
'93 United To Raise Fares To Pay for New Denver Airport, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
29, 1995, at A26.
194 News In Brief, AIRLINE FIN. NEWS, Apr. 18, 1994.
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be significantly lower than those at Stapleton Airport. Stapleton
had been plagued by congestion and delays (particularly during
periods of inclement weather), which mutilate efficient aircraft
and labor utilization. Thus, DIA's efficiencies offset a portion of
United's facility fees and landing costs at DIA.
Because of United's poor credit rating, the city had financed
many major facilities for United at DIA-including a hangar
with six aircraft maintenance bays, an 18-bay ground equipment
maintenance building, an air freight facility, kitchens, and a bag-
gage system-many of which are traditionally tenant-financed
facilities, and at other airports would not be included in fees
paid to the airport authority.
Moreover, in Congressional testimony, Denver aviation direc-
tor Jim DeLong identified United Airlines' belated and massive
scope changes as the most significant cause of increased con-
struction costs at DIA. 195 "It is clear that your airline is a signifi-
cant contributor to what you describe as the high cost of
DIA,"' 96 Denver mayor Wellington Webb told United. "It is no
secret that when one air carrier becomes dominant in a market,
that they develop as a fortress hub, and as a result, fares have
always increased."'1 97 Webb was right. United's massive scope
changes negotiated after construction on the main terminal was
well under way, coupled with its insistence on delaying the air-
port opening, contributed to hundreds of millions of dollars in
additional construction and interest expenses at DIA. In order
to avoid DIA's high costs, other airlines were flying over DIA to
reach Colorado ski resorts like Vail and Aspen directly.'98 Low-
cost/low-fare carriers like Midway Airlines and Morris Air de-
parted Denver, MarkAir collapsed into bankruptcy, and South-
west Airlines announced DIA's costs made that airport
prohibitively expensive to enter.
United's market dominance has also been a significant factor
dissuading other new airline entrants at DIA. The city of Denver
launched a campaign to try to recruit new entrants to fill the
competitive void left by the departure of Continental Airlines.
Denver mayor Wellington Webb observed, "every carrier we
195 HeaTing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Transp). & Infra-
structure (May 11, 1995) (testimony of James DeLong).
196 Patrick O'Driscoll, Webb Blasts United, DENVER POST, Jan. 29, 1995, at Al.
197 Kevin Flynn & Burt Hubbard, Webb Berated United for $40 Fare Increase, RocKN'
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 29, 1995, at 4A.
198 See Ann Imse, Vail Gains Link to World With 3 Big Air Routes, ROCKY MOUN-
TAIN NEWS, June 16, 1995, at 68A.
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have spoken with is concerned with United's dominance of the
market." 9 A letter to the editor of the Denver Post put it well:
"Since Continental's withdrawal from this market, United's be-
havior has been that of a monopolist.... The only serious ques-
tion with regard to United Airlines is why the antitrust
regulators have been so quiescent. 2 °0
While United relishes the role of monopolist at Denver, it ob-
jected to a proposed agreement between British Airways and
American Airlines on grounds that the alliance would create a
monopoly, with the two airlines controlling the majority of
routes between the United States and London.2 °" United offi-
cials also complained about "predatory pricing" by smaller rivals
in Denver and Chicago.2 " United was the only major carrier to
support promulgation of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
whose principal purposes included the following:
" The availability of a variety of adequate, economic, efficient,
and low-priced services without unreasonable discrimination
or unfair or deceptive practices.
* Preventing unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive
practices in air transportation.
" Avoiding unreasonable industry concentration, excessive mar-
ket domination, monopoly powers, and other conditions that
would tend to allow at least one air carrier ... unreasonably to
increase prices, reduce services, or exclude competition in air
transportation.
* Maintaining a complete and convenient system of continuous
scheduled interstate air transportation for small communities
and isolated areas.
" Encouraging entry into air transportation markets by new and
existing air carriers and the continued strengthening of small
air carriers to ensure a more effective and competitive airline
industry. 9°3
D. MONOPOLIZATION OF THE CONNECTING PASSENGER MARKET
The new Frontier Airlines, Inc., inaugurated service in the
Summer of 1994. Its strategic plan was to restore jet service
from Denver markets that had recently been abandoned by
19 Jeffrey Leib, Additional Carriers Among Webb's DIA Goals for '96, DENVER POST,
Dec. 31, 1995, at H1.
200 Virginia Anne Housum, Letter to the Editor, DENVER POST, Oct. 6, 1996, at B6.
201 United Requests Inquiry Into American-British Air Alliance, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Oct. 10, 1996, at 4D.
202 Jeffrey Keyes, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 22, 1992, at 3D.
203 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2002).
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Continental Airlines, which was in the process of sharply down-
sizing its Denver hub. Although a high-cost carrier like United
Airlines (which dominates the Denver market) might not be
able to break-even with jet service in thin markets, Frontier, with
its significantly lower cost structure, believed it could. In July
1994, Frontier inaugurated jet service between Denver and four
cities in North Dakota (Bismarck, Fargo, Grand Forks, and Mi-
not). In August and September 1994, Frontier launched jet ser-
vice to four cities in Montana (Billings, Bozeman, Great Falls
and Missoula). As late as 1993 (before Continental's departure)
most of these cities enjoyed two round-trip jet flights a day from
Denver; half still had turboprop service.2"4 In October 1994,
Frontier began service to Albuquerque, El Paso and Tucson.20 5
Most of these markets previously were served by another air-
line by the same name (Frontier), which, as noted above, was
acquired by Continental Airlines in 1986. Many of the new
Frontier Airlines' executives and employees served the old Fron-
tier Airlines, and understood that sufficient traffic flows existed
to support jet service (provided by a low-cost carrier) from Den-
ver to many medium and small-size cities across the Great Plains
and Rocky Mountain regions. Both the original Frontier, and
Continental, had proven that many of these thin markets had
sufficient traffic to provide adequate load factors to support jet
service from Denver. The new Frontier's marketing studies con-
firmed the existence of ample traffic to support two round-trip
Boeing 737s a day. Again, while a large, established major car-
rier, with its high cost structure, may be unable to provide jet
service to such markets, a new entrant carrier, with its relatively
lower cost structure, should be able to. Frontier believed that
passengers in these communities prefer the speed and comfort
of jet service over flying relatively slower turboprop planes with-
out in-flight amenities (such as lavatories or galleys).
Because Frontier flew the only jets in several of these markets,
Frontier enjoyed a disproportionately large share of local origin-
and-destination traffic (e.g., Denver-Bozeman, Denver-Bis-
marck). But United refused to allow Frontier to connect passen-
gers with it. As a consequence, Frontier was deprived of
sufficient connecting traffic to make these flights viable.
From the outset, Frontier began to try to tap the feed traffic
off the huge networks of the dominant hub carriers at Denver-
204 Frontier Airlines, Inc., Prospectus (Apr. 21, 1994).
205 Frontier Airlines, Inc., Annual Report 2 (1996).
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United Airlines and Continental Airlines. Since cooperative
code-sharing and related arrangements were the only means by
which Frontier could tap sufficient connecting traffic to make
thin routes viable, Frontier asked each company for cooperative
joint-fare and code-sharing agreements. United repeatedly
refused.
It may not be immediately apparent why discriminatory joint-
fares and code-sharing, and the related impact of discriminatory
display bias in computer reservations systems, adversely affect
competition and small community service, so let us digress a mo-
ment to explain how these relationships affect connecting traf-
fic. Under deregulation, most of the traffic which moves today
connects between aircraft, usually at a hub, like Denver, Salt
Lake City, St. Louis, Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth, or Minneapolis.
A passenger flying from Grand Forks or Bismarck, North Da-
kota, to Phoenix or San Diego might connect over Denver or
Minneapolis. Without ajoint-fare and code-sharing relationship
with United, it is very difficult for any carrier providing service
from Denver to attract that passenger, even though the routing
and connection over Minneapolis might involve a more circui-
tous and time-consuming journey. Alternatively, a passenger
can take a direct code-sharing routing on a slow, noisy turbo-
prop aircraft to Denver to connect on to ajet headed for Phoe-
nix or San Diego.
JOINT FARES. Typically, the longer the distance flown, the
lower the price per mile. Part of this is a reflection of cost con-
siderations, and part is a reflection of competitive considera-
tions. A passenger flying from A to C via B will usually be given
a lower through fare from A to C than the sum of adding the A
to B fare with the B to C fare. A joint-fare agreement between
two carriers allows a passenger to take advantage of a lower
through rate (prorated on a discount basis between the connect-
ing carriers), as opposed to the higher sum of two point-to-point
fares. But in the absence of a joint-fare agreement between the
connecting carriers, a passenger is charged the individual A to B
fare, plus the individual B to C fare. Without a joint fare agree-
ment between United and Frontier, many passengers attempt-
ing to fly from, say, Bozeman, Montana, to Kansas City, Kansas,
found the more circuitous Delta Air Lines connection over Salt
Lake City or Northwest Airlines connections over Minneapolis
to be the lower ticket price. While several major airlines (in-
cluding Continental, TWA and USAir) entered into joint fare
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agreements with Frontier, United refused. 20 6 It was not until the
DOT intervened that United consented to entering into a ticket-
ing-and-baggage agreement with Frontier.
CODE-SHARING. Code-sharing is a means whereby two carri-
ers agree to be displayed in the airline computer reservations
systems as an "on-line" (Carrier X to Carrier X) connection,
rather than an interline (Carrier X to Carrier Y) connection. At
Denver, United had marketing and code-sharing agreements
with Mesa Airlines, Great Lakes Aviation and Air Wisconsin, fly-
ing mostly turboprop aircraft throughout the Rocky Mountain
and Great Plains region.2 °7 United's connections with Mesa,
Great Lakes and Air Wisconsin were falsely displayed in the CRS
as on-line connections between United and "United Express."
Without a code-sharing agreement with United, the United-
Frontier connection was shown as what it truly was-an interline
connection between United and Frontier. Unfortunately, the
CRS system of which United is principal owner saddles the dis-
plays of all interline connecting flights with the equivalent of an
artificial and astounding 1,440 minutes (24 hours), which is ad-
ded to the true elapsed time of the flight. Zero minutes are
added to the United-Great Lakes or United-Air Wisconsin inter-
line connections, for they are falsely treated as "on-line" connec-
tions, as if it were a United jet connecting to a United jet.
Eighty-five percent of flights are sold by travel agents off the
first page of the computer reservations system screen. By adding
the equivalent of an artificial 1,440 minutes to Frontier's con-
necting flights, they are often shoved off the first page of the
screen, and hence, rarely sold. In other words, a United jet con-
necting to a Great Lakes Beech 1900, 19-seat aircraft, gets supe-
rior retail shelf space to a United jet connecting to a Frontier
jet, even though consumer preferences for speed, convenience
and safety may favor jet-to-jet connections rather than jet-to-tur-
boprop connections. This is fundamentally unfair to small jet
airlines, to small communities seeking competitive jet service,
and to consumers.
For example, Frontier flew from Denver to Bismarck and
Fargo, North Dakota, in 108-seat Boeing 737 jets. Great Lakes
Aviation (United Express) flew Beech-1900 19-seat turboprop
aircraft, without a lavatory or in-flight amenities, requiring flight
206 hl. at 3.
207 Leigh Fisher Associates Analysis Prepared for the City and County of Den-
ver (1994).
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times that took nearly an hour longer than the Frontier flight.
The Wall Street Journal described the United Express flight from
Denver to Bismarck as among the longest commercial com-
muter-flights in the United States. 2 " Now most passengers, if
given a choice, would prefer to fly ajet rather than a turboprop
aircraft. But with code-sharing (combined with the CRS bias de-
scribed above), most of United's connecting passengers were
funneled aboard the Beech-1900s.
Let's pose an analogy. Suppose Frontier was in the bean busi-
ness, and made the best beans money could buy. Suppose also,
that the major supermarket chains in Denver (i.e., Safeway, Al-
bertson's, and King Soopers) were owned by the major bean
companies (i.e., Green Giant, Campbell's, and Libby's). Fron-
tier asks for shelf space to sell its product, and each of its com-
petitors refuses. Frontier would have the option of either
opening its own supermarket chain (impossible), or hawking
their wares from carts on the street. United Airlines owns the
majority interest in the Apollo CRS. In fact, the major airlines
variously control the four major CRSs, and each of them dis-
criminate against non-code-sharing connecting flights.
United Airlines and its code-sharing affiliates controlled
nearly 80% of the traffic at Denver. Without a joint-fare or
code-sharing agreement with United, Frontier could not attract
sufficient traffic to make thin routes viable. Frontier cannot
profitably restore jet service to communities which have lost it,
though in fact, that was precisely its original intent.
Frontier urged United to enter into joint-fare and code-shar-
ing relationships with it for sound business reasons. Convenient
interline connections are a two-way street; they allow passengers
to flow conveniently over the networks of both carriers. Frontier
pointed out to United that it can provide United's passengers
superior and more convenient jet service vis-a'-vis the turboprop
connections which now exist. Frontier emphasized to United
that a large volume of the traffic that now flows over the Salt
Lake City and Minneapolis hubs could be funneled by Frontier
over Denver to feed the United Airlines network. Frontier be-
lieved it made sound business sense for United to do business
with Frontier. But at a meeting with Frontier's executives at
United's Elk Grove Township, Illinois, headquarters, United's
then-Senior Vice President Rakesh Gangwal responded, "Fron-
tier is a low-cost provider. United can never be a low-cost pro-
2- Lisa Miller, Odds & Ends, WALL Sr. J., July 28, 1995, at 9.
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vider. Therefore, we think of you as the enemy. ' 2119 No enemy
would be given either a joint-fare or a code-sharing agreement.
United Airlines is a $15 billion corporation, more than 200
times the size of Frontier.21 ° United perceived Frontier to be
the enemy.
Frontier informed United Airlines that it believed that its re-
fusal to allow Frontier nondiscriminatory access to United's net-
work potentially poses a serious potential antitrust problem for
them. An analogous problem arose in the 1970s and 1980s in
the telecommunications industry with AT&T's refusal to permit
MCI nondiscriminatory access to its network. It took years, but
ultimately MCI won a multi-million dollar verdict against AT&T,
and the DOJ forced divestiture of AT&T into seven regional
holding companies, and one long-distance carrier. Today, fed-
eral regulatory authorities require that all telecommunications
companies be given nondiscriminatory access to the networks of
their competitors. USWest would never be allowed to enter into
preferential connections and rates with, say, Sprint, depriving or
dissuading consumers who preferred AT&T of access. Just as
AT&T was the largest telephone company in the world, United
is the largest airline in the world. Frontier can no more be ex-
pected to replicate the vast United Airlines route network than
could MCI have been expected to replicate the vast AT&T
network.
If such a rule (requiring nondiscriminatory connections be-
tween telecommunications networks) existed with respect to the
transportation networks, Frontier's Montana and North Dakota
service likely would have been profitable, and as a consequence,
Frontier would not have been forced to terminate service to
Montana in September 1995, and to two North Dakota markets
in January 1995, and the final two in September 1996. Frontier
re-deployed those Boeing 737s to markets which already had fre-
quent jet service, such as Denver-Los Angeles, Denver-Chicago,
Denver-San Francisco, and Denver-Phoenix, where sufficient
nonstop origin-and-destination passenger traffic exists to pro-
vide break-even load factors. As a result of the shift in its route
structure, Frontier enjoyed two profitable quarters in 1996, de-
spite its considerable losses in serving these remaining small
209 The meeting was held between United Airlines Senior Vice President
Rakesh Gangwal and Frontier Airlines CEO Sam Addoms and Frontier Vice Presi-
dent Dan Love.
210 Compare the gross revenues of UAL CORPORATION 1995 ANNUAL REPORT with
FRONTIER AIRLINES, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT.
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communities, and the cost of shifting its route structure toward
dense markets.
Of course, passengers in those dense markets to which Fron-
tier has re-deployed its aircraft benefit from new competition.
Fares have fallen dramatically (but as we shall see below, this put
Frontier in United's cross hairs). Nevertheless, large sections of
the nation are wholly excluded from jet service because of dis-
criminatoryjoint-fare and code-sharing arrangements, as well as
computer reservations systems bias which shoves non-code-shar-
ing interline arrangements off the first page of the CRS screen.
That is not to suggest that all small communities have sufficient
traffic to support jet service. But many small communities that
could support jet service from a low-cost carrier are denied it
because of these pernicious code-sharing practices.
United's refusal to enter into joint fare and code-sharing rela-
tionships with domestic jet airlines results in relegating small
communities to inferior and high-cost monopoly turboprop air-
craft. Code-sharing is a way of defrauding consumers into be-
lieving they will be flying a megacarrier's jets, when on most
occasions they are funneled onto a smaller carrier's turboprop
aircraft at the hub, all in a deliberate attempt to steer feed traffic
away from jet competitors.2t'
Even competing turboprop carriers are injured by these dis-
criminatory arrangements. GP Express (formerly Continental
Connection) also suffered from an inability to tap the United
Airlines network. United entered into preferential joint-fare
and code-sharing agreements with select carriers (one per city-
pair market) which gave their interline connections preferred
space on the computer reservations systems. For example,
United code-shared with Mesa Airlines out of Denver to Rocky
Mountain cities like Telluride and Grand Junction. United's in-
terline with Mesa was falsely shown on the CRS as an "on-line"
connection from United to United Express. As a pseudo-on-line
connection, it enjoyed a higher display on the CRS screens. The
United-GP Express interline would be shown as an interline (in
this instance, no deceit), and often shoved off the first page of
the CRS screen. With Continental's departure from Denver,
and unable to tap United's feed at the Denver hub, GP Express
collapsed into bankruptcy in 1995. The net result of these dis-
criminatory and anticompetitive practices is poorer and more
211 United does maintain code-sharing with Air Wisconsin on a carefully lim-
ited number of smaller jets.
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expensive air service to many small communities across
America.
The DOT has found that 34 small communities have lost all
service since promulgation of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978. Many communities which had jet service lost it to turbo-
prop aircraft. Out of 320 small communities, the number
served by major carriers declined from 213 in 1978 to 33 in
1995, and the number of small communities served by multiple
carriers has decreased from 135 in 1978, to 122 in 1995.
The DOT studies severely understate the problem. Of the 514
non-hub communities receiving air service in 1978, by 1987 (a
decade after deregulation began) 313 (60.8%) had suffered de-
clines in flight frequency, and 144 (28%) had lost all service;
only 32 (6.2%) enjoyed the inauguration of new service.2" 2 By
1995, things were even worse. Of the 514 non-hub communities
receiving air service in 1978, by 1995 167 (32.5%) had been ter-
minated, while only 26 (5.1%) gained new service.213
The DOT's studies were unable to comment meaningfully
about pricing of air service to small communities, for commuter
carriers generally do not report pricing data. But the GAO has
found that passengers flying from small-city airports to major
airports paid 34% more if the major airport was concentrated
and 42% more if both the small-city and major airport were
concentrated.
For those small community city-pair markets with sufficient vol-
ume to supportjet service by a low-cost carrier, the code-sharing
phenomenon insures that they will instead be relegated to rela-
tively higher-cost/higher-priced turboprop service. For exam-
ple, one of the nation's largest connecting turboprop carriers,
Mesa Airlines (which in the 1990s operated as a United Airlines
code-sharing affiliate-"United Express"), charged yields of
nearly 35 cents per mile, compared with about 12 cents a mile
by United Airlines. Even USAir, which operates short-haul high-
cost jet service, charges only about 18 cents a mile-about half
that charged by a turboprop carrier.2 4 A low-cost jet entrant
typically charges consumers significantly less than do the major
airlines.
212 Andrew Goetz & Paul Dempsey, Airline Deregulation Ten Years After: Something
'oul in the Air, 54 J. AIR L. & Com. 927, 947 (1989); see also PAUL DEMPSEY &
ANDREW GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION & LAISSEZ FAIRE MI-iOLOGY (1991).
213 Unpublished study by Dr. Andrew Goetz, University of Denver (on file with
author).
214 1996 data from Julius Maldutis, Airline Update-August 1996 (Sept. 8, 1996).
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For most Colorado communities (and many small communi-
ties throughout the Rocky Mountain and Great Plains region),
the result of United's discriminatory and anti-competitive prac-
tices is that they are served from Denver only by a United Ex-
press affiliate flying turboprop aircraft and charging sky high air
fares, even in those markets which have sufficient traffic to sus-
tain jet service.
In 1995, United Airlines controlled 95% of the connecting
passenger traffic at Denver International Airport.2 5 But United
wanted all of it. United's overwhelming dominance of DIA (and
the city-pair markets radiating from it) is attributable to its abil-
ity to fill seats by flowing connecting passengers over the Denver
hub, and to deprive any other competitor of the ability to do
that.
E. SUMMARY OF FRONTIER'S ALLEGATIONS OF
PREDATORY BEHAVIOR
As noted above, Frontier initially sought to restore nonstop jet
service to a number of city-pairs which formerly enjoyed jet ser-
vice prior to the elimination of the Continental Airlines hub at
Denver. Because United Airlines monopolized the feed traffic
necessary to provide adequate load factors in those "thin" mar-
kets, Frontier was forced to amend its route strategy to focus on
large city-pair markets radiating from Denver.
Since inaugurating service in July 1994, Frontier has with-










Denver-Las Vegas, Nev. *
Denver-San Diego, Calif. *
Denver-St. Louis, Mo.
* service subsequently restored
215 Leigh Fisher Associates, Year End Settlement of 1995 Rental Fees and
Charges at DIA, Tab 4, Table 1 (June 28, 1996) [data are for the 10 months of
1995 during which DIA was open].
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Again, Frontier Airlines' original route strategy was to restore
jet service to markets that previously enjoyed it, prior to Conti-
nental Airlines elimination of its Denver hub. Frontier also ini-
tially focused its route structure on city-pairs not served by
United Airlines not wanting to antagonize a carrier with a repu-
tation for engaging in predatory conduct to suppress
competition.
In the summer of 1994, Frontier began service between Den-
ver and four cities in North Dakota, and between Denver and
four cities in Montana. These were markets that had sufficient
local and connecting traffic to supportjet service, particularly at
a cost structure of a new low-cost airline like Frontier. Because
the competing service in most of these nonstop markets was in
high-cost, slow turboprop aircraft (flying as United Express),
Frontier would dominate the local origin-and-destination mar-
ket, for Frontier offered superior jet service at a competitive
price. But United would monopolize the connecting market at
the Denver hub, denying Frontier reasonable access to connect-
ing passengers who might prefer to connect to a Frontier jet
rather than a United Express turboprop aircraft. According to
Frontier, the means by which United would deny Frontier con-
necting traffic were as follows:
United refused to enter into a ticketing-and-baggage agreement with
Frontier, though most other major airlines did enter into such an
agreement with Frontier. This meant that passengers seeking to
connect at Denver between United and Frontier flights would
have to collect their bags from the incoming flight in the main
terminal at Denver International Airport, then check them
again onto their outgoing flight. Such an inconvenience would
dissuade passengers from making the connection. It was not un-
til the Department of Transportation 'jaw boned" United into
giving Frontier a ticketing-and-baggage agreement that United
reluctantly did so.
United refused to enter into a joint-fare agreement with Frontier. Typ-
ically, carriers interlining passengers agree on a discounted
combination of the A-B fare and the B-C fare, so that the passen-
ger pays an overall A-C fare lower than the sum of the two undis-
counted fares. United has joint-fare arrangements with its
United Express affiliates. United (connecting at Denver with
United Express) could therefore offer consumers a lower price
between, for example, Portland, Oregon, and Fargo, N.D., than
could Frontier.
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United refused to enter into a code-sharing agreement with Frontier.
Code-sharing is a means whereby an airline falsely displays and
sells an interline connection as if it were an on-line connection.
Thus, a United Airlines Los Angeles-Denver connection with a
Great Lakes Aviation flight on a Beech 1900 turboprop flight
between Denver-Fargo, N.D., is falsely portrayed as a United
flight connected to a United flight both on the computer reser-
vations systems [CRSs] and the ticket issued to the passenger.
Most tickets are sold via CRSs, the retail distribution center for
the overwhelming majority of flights. United owns a controlling
interest in the Apollo CRS, which is strongly biased against non-
code-sharing interline flights. By using a CRS algorithm
prejudiced against the United-Frontier connection (and all
other interline connections which do not enjoy a code-share),
United assures that such connections will not be displayed on
the first page of the CRS screen, where travel agents sell 85% of
all flights. This allows United to monopolize the connecting
traffic at Denver.
United biased its computer reservations system against competitive
connecting service. The overwhelming numbers of airline tickets
are sold by travel agents. Travel agents sell 85% of tickets from
the first page of their computer reservations screen. The com-
puter reservations systems are owned by the major airlines, and
are strongly biased against independent carrier connections. Al-
though many (perhaps most) consumers would prefer to con-
nect to ajet rather than a turboprop airplane, many at Denver
have been funneled onto small turboprop aircraft operated by
companies like Great Lakes Aviation, Mesa Airlines and Air Wis-
consin, all then operating at Denver as "United Express." Ironi-
cally, jet aircraft have lower available seat mile costs than do
turboprop aircraft. The Apollo computer reservations system,
which United dominates, added the equivalent of 1,440 minutes
(24 hours) to United's connections with Frontier at Denver,
while adding zero additional time to its connections with Great
Lakes, Mesa and Air Wisconsin. Adding such a severe penalty to
independent carrier connections assures that they are not dis-
played on the first page of the CRS screens, and therefore, are
rarely sold, even if consumers would prefer them.
United prohibited its code-sharing affiliates from code-sharing with
Frontier. United has code-sharing partners which feed its Denver
hub-Air Wisconsin and Great Lakes Aviation-both operating
as "United Express." Air Wisconsin (a company over which
United Airlines exercises considerable influence) purchased
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Mountain Air Express [Max], a Denver-based code-sharing part-
ner of Frontier, which provided new traffic to Frontier from
such cities as Kansas City, Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Colorado
Springs and Hayden/Steamboat Springs, and Montrose, Colo-
rado. Because of Air Wisconsin's exclusive contractual relation-
ship with United, Max was forced to cancel its code-sharing
agreement with Frontier. Connecting passengers and cargo
from these cities was lost by Frontier, and gained by United.
All these reasons made it necessary for Frontier to withdraw
from the four cities in North Dakota and the four cities in Mon-
tana, and contributed to its decision to withdraw from the Tuc-
son market as well. These city-pair markets are simply too "thin"
to be served by a competitive low-costjet carrier where the domi-
nant hub carrier monopolizes the connecting traffic. United
Airlines controlled 97% of the connecting traffic at Denver.
Frontier's withdrawals from Denver-Las Vegas, and Denver-St.
Louis were also influenced by United's monopolization of con-
necting traffic, but since they are significantly larger markets, it
was less of a factor. However, Denver-Las Vegas is a market
where United flooded the route with a significant increase in
flight frequencies with its competitive "weapon", Shuttle by
United, and significantly dropped fares (then, of course, raised
them sharply after Frontier left the market). Shuttle also ap-
peared in the Denver-Phoenix and Denver-Salt Lake City mar-
kets, which may have caused the departure therefrom of
another low-fare carrier, Vanguard Airlines. Though United
portrays Shuttle as a consumer-friendly low-cost/low-fare alter-
native, the facts suggest otherwise. United Shuttle raised fares
sharply after Frontier withdrew from the Denver-Las Vegas
market.
Additional predatory practices of United which have driven
Frontier from markets, or caused it financial injury so that it
could not expand its operations, include the following:
United engaged in below-cost pricing until Frontier was driven out of
the markets. Average fare data produced by the DOT reveals that
United often lowered its average fares to Frontier's levels until
Frontier exited the market, then increased fares to levels above
those which preceded Frontier's entry. Since, in some markets,
United offers a first-class product, an average fare which appears
to match Frontier's actually undercuts Frontier's single-class
coach product, for the DOT's average fare data includes all tick-
ets sold, first and coach class. United also refused to raise fares
in Frontier's markets after Congress re-imposed the 10% ticket
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tax in August 1996, though United raised its prices in most non-
Frontier markets radiating from Denver to account for those in-
creased costs. As explained below, Frontier's research revealed
that United was pricing its product in markets in which Frontier
entered about 30% below its costs in the fall of 1996.
United dumped excessive capacity into markets Frontier has entered.
For example, after Frontier entered the Denver-Los Angeles
market, United added 8,600 seats per week in the summer of
1996 vis-A-vis average levels a year earlier. In this period, United
increased its average capacity, year-over-year, as follows:
Denver - Los Angeles +24%
Denver - Salt Lake City +28%
Denver - Phoenix +30%
Denver - Las Vegas +32%
Denver - Omaha +35%
United entered into "exclusive dealing" contracts with corporate pur-
chasers. Frontier attempted to sell its product to corporations in
Denver and other major cities it serves, only to learn that United
has contractually prohibited companies to which it gives a cor-
porate discount from enjoying a discount from a competitor.
United is not alone in such behavior, as Frontier also has en-
countered corporate purchasers in Minneapolis who are tied to
Northwest Airlines' exclusive dealing contracts. In essence,
these megacarriers are saying to corporations, "We'll give you a
discount only if you don't fly Frontier."
United bribed travel agents to book flights on United. A "bribe" is
defined by Webster's as "money or favor bestowed on or prom-
ised to a person in a position of trust to pervert his judgment or
corrupt his conduct," or "something that serves to induce or in-
fluence. 216 Travel agent commission overrides have become in-
creasingly important to agents now that major airlines have
rolled back and capped commissions, reducing agent revenue
by 20% or more. Overrides are earned when travel agents ex-
ceed prescribed quotas on United's flights well in excess of
United's relative seat capacity in those markets. In order to
meet those quotas, agents must sell more of United's product
and less of a competitor like Frontier. To do so, they must
somehow steer purchasers to United's product, even if it is
higher priced or offered at a less convenient departure time.
An airline like Frontier, which offers only a few frequencies per
market, can never provide sufficient capacity to compete with
216 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1966).
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those override quotas. In essence, these megacarriers are say-
ing, "We'll give you a commission override check only if you
don't book too many flights on our competitor."
United refused to sell Frontier access to its Mileage Plus frequent flyer
program. Although United Airlines sells Mileage Plus frequent
flyer miles to its code-sharing partner airlines, car rental agen-
cies, hotels, florists, mortgage companies, clothiers, credit card
companies, and a plethora of other businesses, United stead-
fastly refused to sell Mileage Plus miles to Frontier. An over-
whelming number of Denver's regular air passengers belong to
United's Mileage Plus program. Because they cannot earn Mile-
age Plus miles on Frontier, they are thereby dissuaded from
purchasing Frontier's product. Frontier does offer its passen-
gers Continental Airlines' One Pass miles (for Continental does
not have such an exclusionary policy), but far fewer of Denver's
frequent flyers belong to the One Pass mileage program.
United preempted Frontier's acquisition of aircraft, and entry into the
Denver-Dallas/Ft. Worth and Denver-San Diego markets. On Febru-
ary 2, 1998, Frontier Airlines proposed to the Western Pacific
Airlines [WestPac] Chapter 11 bankruptcy estate that, if Western
Pacific shut down, Frontier be allowed to fly off WestPac's air
traffic liability (tickets sold but not yet flown) on a non-exclusive
basis. Frontier would wet lease between 2 and 4 of WestPac's
Boeing 737-300 aircraft to restore low-fare service between Den-
ver-Dallas and Denver-San Diego, markets in which Western Pa-
cific provided the only low-fare nonstop alternative to United
Airlines.
To digress for a moment, all three carriers-United, Western
Pacific and Frontier-hubbed at Denver International Airport
[DIA]. In December 1997, United and its code-sharing affiliates
operating as United Express controlled 70.9% of the passenger
traffic at DIA (of which United had 64.7% and United Express
had 6.2%), Western Pacific had 5.5%. and Frontier had 3.5%.217
On Wednesday morning, February 4, 1998, United made a
preemptive strike against Frontier, cutting an exclusive deal with
the Western Pacific bankruptcy estate to fly all the air traffic lia-
bility. Without this source of tickets to accelerate the ramp-up
of demand, Frontier could not take on WestPac's aircraft to
open new service to Dallas and San Diego. With Western Pa-
cific's grounding on February 4, this resulted in a situation
where no low-fare competitor operated in either market. With
217 Data: Denver International Airport.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
the demise of Western Pacific, and the preemptive strike against
Frontier's entry, United gained a full monopoly in the Denver-
San Diego nonstop market (untilJuly 1998), faces only two high-
cost competitors (American and Delta) in the Denver-Dallas/Ft.
Worth nonstop market, and effectively took WestPac's 5.5%
market share.
Given United's relatively high load factors in Denver, it was
difficult for United to accommodate many Western Pacific cus-
tomers. By the agreement, they were precluded from using
their Western Pacific tickets on Frontier. Also, given the low av-
erage fares at which the Western Pacific tickets were sold (be-
cause WestPac was having difficulty filling seats while it was in
Chapter 11 bankruptcy), and the fact that United agreed to fly
the tickets for 50% of their face value, the revenue potential of
these tickets could not have been a realistic motivation for
United.
The only reason this made sense for United is that it caused
competitive harm to Frontier, effectively prohibited Frontier
from immediately entering the Denver-Dallas and Denver-San
Diego markets, 2'1 prohibited these Western Pacific customers
from being introduced to the Frontier product, allowed United
to control another 5.5% of the Denver market, limited Fron-
tier's ability to acquire new aircraft, and exacerbated Frontier's
Stage 3 aircraft compliance obligations by December 31, 1998.
Five years after its birth in 1994, Frontier accounted for only
about 5% of the Denver market. United is the largest airline in
the world. United has been engaged in a long-term effort to
suppress competition and monopolize the Denver market via a
plethora of means-capacity dumping, below-cost pricing, ex-
clusive dealing contracts with regional feeder airlines and corpo-
rate purchasers, travel agent commission overrides, computer
reservation systems bias, and discriminatory ticketing-and-bag-
gage, joint-fare, and code-sharing agreements.
F. THE DEMISE OF MARKAIR
As Continental downsized its hub at Denver, United raised
prices sharply in the city-pair markets Continental exited. In
many cases, fares became so high that some Denver travelers
chose to fly out of the Colorado Springs airport located 65 miles
south of downtown Denver. A new low-cost airline, Western Pa-
cific, started hub operations in Colorado Springs in 1995, and
218 Frontier re-entered the Denver-San Diego market on July 23.
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attracted a sizable number of Denver travelers who prefer driv-
ing the extra distance to avoid the high fares at Denver. In sum-
mer 1995, regular shuttle van service to Colorado Springs from
Denver was inaugurated to tap into the growing exodus. As we
shall see below, diversion of some of Denver's traffic to Colo-
rado Springs put Western Pacific in United's cross-hairs.
After Continental folded its hub at Denver, a few (very few)
low-cost, low-fare airlines emerged to serve Denver-MarkAir
(which moved its operations in Chapter 11 to Denver from
Alaska, then collapsed entirely in late-1995), Vanguard (head-
quartered in Kansas City), Reno Air (serving Denver through
Reno, Nevada), and Frontier (a new airline with many of the
same officers as the original airline by the same name). Most
found United engaging in various types of predatory behavior-
pricing at fares at or below those of competitors, dumping ex-
cess capacity in competitors' markets, and paying travel agents
commission overrides to steer business toward United.
MarkAir moved the base of its operations from Anchorage to
Denver in 1993. In 1994, MarkAir provided 17 daily nonstops to
10 cities from Denver.2 ' The question was whether MarkAir
could stay off United's radar screen. MarkAir CEO Neil Bergt
described his strategy as "bottom fishing," trying to expand the
market with low fares without upsetting competitors.220 One air-
line analyst predicted that "as soon as the industry hits a bump,
Denver's resident giant, United Airlines, will force MarkAir out
of Denver. ' 22' Another accurately predicted, "As soon as United
decides that they've had enough, then it's all over for
MarkAir. ' 222 In markets where it had a monopoly, United
charged monopolistic prices ($1,064 round-trip for a walk-up
ticket from Denver to San Francisco, for example). But where
MarkAir competed with United, United met its fares on a capac-
ity-controlled basis (both United and MarkAir charged $160
round-trip for a walk-up ticket from Denver to Los Angeles) on
flights in close proximity to MarkAir's. 223 United's employee-
219 Leigh Fisher Associates Analysis, Prepared for the City and County of Den-
ver (1994).
220 Aldo Svaldi, Can MarkAir Stay Aloft?, DENVER Bus. J., Oct. 22, 1993, at IA.
221 Helen Jung, MarkAir Red Ink Runs Deep, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 20,
1995, at C1.
222 Helen Jung, MarkAir Cuts Anchorage Lower 48 Link, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 20, 1995, at Al.
223 Ann Imse, Frontier Will Fly To West Coast, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Sept. 22,
1995, at 58A.
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owner pilots took credit for derailing a deal which would have
allowed the city of Denver to guarantee $30 million of MarkAir's
debt to retain MarkAir's competitive presence at Denver.2 4 Af-
ter MarkAir moved its headquarters from Alaska to Denver,
United also launched a promotion to wound MarkAir in Alaska,
matching its promotion "ticket-for-ticket" to trade books of
travel coupons for Alaska residents' "permanent fund" $980
dividend.225
MarkAir collapsed into bankruptcy and liquidation in 1995.
MarkAir's demise resulted in "dramatically higher prices for un-
restricted, or walk up, tickets to certain cities" including Atlanta
(United's $1,066 compared to MarkAir's $376), Seattle
(United's $1,296 compared to MarkAir's $342), and San Diego
(United's $1,002 compared to MarkAir's $304).226
G. THE AFTERMATH OF MARKAIR
After MarkAir's demise, Frontier announced it would fill
some of the void of the MarkAir departure (and the earlier Con-
tinental departure) by inaugurating service to several of the
most popular travel destinations from Denver, beginning with
Chicago and Phoenix. 227 As noted above, without joint fares
and code-sharing with the dominant hub carrier at Denver,
Frontier could not hope to fill sufficient seats in thin markets to
break even. In 1995, Frontier terminated service to four cities in
Montana, two in North Dakota, and one in Arizona, and began
service from Denver to Omaha, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Chicago
(Midway), Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Salt Lake City, and San
Francisco. In 1996, Frontier terminated service at Bismarck and
Fargo, North Dakota, and began service to Seattle, St. Louis, and
San Diego. By the end of 1996, Frontier flew 10 Boeing 737
aircraft to 13 cities from Denver, accounting for slightly more
than three percent of the Denver passenger market. Each of
these markets had undergone significant capacity constriction
224 Alex Berenson, UAL Pilots Fought MarkAir, DENVER POST, Nov. 24, 1994, at
D1.
225 United, MarkAir War Heats Up, DENVER POST, Oct. 11, 1994, at C1. The "per-
manent fund" dividend is paid by the state of Alaska annually to each state resi-
dent based on oil royalties earned by the state from oil production at Prudhoe
Bay.
226 Ann Imse, MarkAir Demise Costly for DIA, ROCKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 1,
1995, at 42A.
227 Steve Caulk, Frontier Ste)s Up Expansion, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 3,
1995, at 50A.
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with Continental and MarkAir's departures, many of which had
become a United nonstop monopoly.
Going head-to-head with United was a risky strategy, for as the
world's largest airline, United had the power to crush an airline
as small as Frontier. But Frontier had little choice but to make a
"midcourse correction" in its route strategy. Without an ability
to connect with the United network, Frontier could do nothing
but lose money serving small communities. It needed to serve
markets with sufficient origin-and-destination traffic to provide
adequate load factors. Frontier hoped that by offering no more
than two or perhaps three round trips per market, the "800-
pound gorilla '22 1 would sleep. The gorilla slept soundly until
Frontier posted its first two quarterly profits in Jan.-Mar. and
Apr.-June 1996. Then the gorilla awoke in a foul mood.
Meanwhile, there had been a profound change in Washing-
ton. As DOT Secretary, Federico Pefia had championed the
cause of new entrant airlines. Early in the Clinton Administra-
tion, the DOT and Justice Department 'jaw-boned" Northwest
Airlines into backing off its predatory capacity dumping and
pricing practices targeted at Reno Air, which had just opened a
route from Reno, Nevada, to Minneapolis (Northwest's hub).
The facts were these. In February 1993, Reno Air announced
plans to serve Minneapolis with three daily flights beginning
April 1. Northwest countered by announcing it would serve the
Reno-Minneapolis market, for the first time, also with three
daily flights beginning April 1, as well as new flights from Reno
to Los Angeles, San Diego and Seattle, three of Reno Air's most
important markets. Northwest also matched Reno Air's fares in
these markets. Nevada Senators Richard Bryan and Harry Reid
urged the DOJ to investigate Northwest's alleged antitrust viola-
tions. Northwest succumbed to the pressure, and withdrew
from the Reno markets.
In 1996, Secretary of Transportation Federico Pefia an-
nounced, "In the past year, American consumers have saved an
estimated $6.3 billion in airline fares because of the competition
brought about by the new low cost, low fare airlines. '29 But by
the end of President Clinton's first term, it was clear that Pefia
would not be DOT Secretary in his second term. This political
228 See, e.g., Gene Amole, Frontier Airlines Needs Your Business, RocKV MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Nov. 14, 1996.
229 Id.
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vacuum gave United the freedom to move brazenly against com-
petitors in the city he once served as mayor.
The Denver market is estimated to be about a $5 billion reve-
nue prize. With approximately 300 daily departures and service
to 62 cities, United has the market power to influence passenger
choices through its schedule frequency and frequent flyer pro-
gram. United also controls the regional distribution channels
through the use of a large corporate discount program and the
payment of commission overrides to key travel agencies.
However, United is a relatively high-cost airline when mea-
sured in industry terms of Cost per Available Seat Mile
[CASM] .23 Airlines enjoy a significant cost taper over distance.
Using second quarter 1995 data (the most recent data we could
find) produced independently by Roberts Roach & Associates,
when adjusted for stage length (the length of the flight),
United's system-wide operating costs are as follows:
Table 4 - United Airlines Domestic Boeing 737-300 Available
Seat Mile Costs231






















21 See ROBERTS ROACH & ASSOCIATES, SCORECARD: AIRLINE INDUSTRY COST MAN-
ACMENT (3rd ed. 1996).
231 ROBERTS ROACH & ASSOCIATES, SCORECARD: AIRLINE INDUSTRY COST
MANAGEMENT 51 (3rd ed. 1996). The costs in this study have not been adjusted
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These data assume 100% break-even load factors (selling a suf-
ficient number of seats to cover fully allocated costs). But be-
cause of hourly, daily, seasonal and directional cycles in
demand, no carrier achieves 100% break-even load factors
(most major airlines achieve annual average load factors of be-
tween 65% and 70%). Thus, these data understate, by about a
third, the actual Revenue per Available Seat Mile [RASM]
needed to achieve break-even load factors. In other words,
United's average prices should be about a third higher than
these ASM costs in order for it to break-even. For this reason,
the following analysis errs on the side of conservatism.
Comparing Frontier's ASM costs to United's requires an ap-
ples-to-apples comparison of stage-lengths. In the second quar-
ter of 1995, Frontier's average stage length was 407 miles;
Frontier's ASM costs were 9.29 cents per mile. As Table 4
reveals, United's ASM costs at a 400 mile stage length were 13.35
cents per mile. Thus, Frontier's costs are about 30% lower than
United's. Operating costs at Denver are likely higher than
United's system-wide averages revealed in Table 4, somewhere
in the neighborhood of an additional one cent per ASM. This
suggests the difference in Frontier's vis-A-vis United's costs is
even greater than 30%.
Despite the fact that United's costs are significantly higher
than Frontier's, United priced not only below its costs, but be-
low Frontier's as well. In several instances, United lowered
prices below Frontier's lowest price. United is pricing signifi-
cantly below its true operating costs in order to disrupt, disable
or destroy its low-fare competitors.
As Table 5 below reveals, the sale fares announced by United
Airlines in December 1996 averaged 99.47% of United's unit
costs. But in city-pair markets radiating from Denver in which
Frontier competed, United's prices were only 68.85% of cost,
and in markets where Frontier does not compete, United's
prices were 109.04% of costs. Stated differently, in markets in
which Frontier competes, United prices its product an average
of 31% below its costs. United cross-subsides these losses with
revenue derived from non-competitive and international
markets.
for specific Denver operating costs. They are based on system-wide costs. Some
upward adjustment should be made to reflect the higher operating costs of
Denver International Airport to more accurately reflect United's true cost of
operation at the Denver hub.
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Table 5 - Comparison of United Airlines' Costs vs. Prices
(Dec. 9, 1996)212
Cities Served
City Pair Miles Aircraft type Cost Excise Total UAL UAL Frontier Non-
Boeing Boeing per seat Tax $ UAL Actual Fare as markets Frontier
737-300 757 $ Cost Fare $ % of markets
(ASM costs in per seat Cost
cents per mile) $
DEN/LNK 442 x 12.68 =56.05 +6.23 =62.27 81.00 130.07 130.07
DEN/OKC 500 12.15 60.75 6.75 67.50 69.00 102.22 102.22
DEN/DSM 602 I 1.04 66.46 7.38 73,85 93.00 125.94 125.94
DEN/GEG 10.02 83.37 9.26 92.63 80.001 86.37 86.37
DEN/IND 987 9.75 96.23 10.96 106.93 99.00 92.59 92.59
DEN/WAS 1473 7.43 109.44 12.16 121.60 130.00 106.90 106.90
DEN/BWI 1500 7.43 111.45 12.38 123.83 163.00 131.63 131.63
DEN/NYC 1626 7.28 118.37 13.15 131.53 197.00 149.78 149.78
DEN/EWR 1626 7.28 118.37 13.15 131.53 81.00 61.59 61.59
DEN/BDL 1680 7.24 121.63 13.51 135.15 193.00 142.81 142.81
DEN/BOS 1763 7.15 126.05 14.01 140.06 166.00 118.52 118.52
CHI/TPA 1006 9.64 96.96 10.78 107.75 80.00 74.24 74.24
CHIIPDX 1745 7.19 125.47 13.94 139.41 14900 106.88 1 106.88
CHI/LAX 1746 7.19 125.54 13.95 139.49 183.00 131.20 131.20
SEA/WAS 2318 6.87 158.83 17.65 176.48 197.00 II 1.63 II 1.63
DEN/OMA 485 12.15 58.93 6.55 65.48 63.00 96.22 96.22
DEN/PHX 983 9.75 95.84 10.65 106.49 77.00 72.31 72.31
DEN/LAX 845 10.17 85.94 9.55 95.49 63.00 65.98 65a98
DEN/CHI 907 9.88 89.61 9.96 99.57 63.00 63.27 63.27
DEN/SFO 954 9.75 93.02 10.34 103.35 6100 60.96 60.96
DEN/SEA 1017 9.64 1 1 98.04 10.89 108.93 63400 57.83 57.83
AVERAGE FARE AS PERCENTAGE OF COSTS 
99.47 68.85 19.4
The city codes am as follows
BDL = HARTFORD GEG SPOKANE PDX = PORTLAND
BS = BOSTONI IND= INDIANAPOLIS PHX = PHOENIX
BWI = BALTIMORE LNK = LINCOLN SEA = SEATLE
CHI = CHICAGOI LAX =LOS ANGELES SFO = SAN FRANCISCO
DEN = DENVER NYC = NEW YORK TPA = TAMPA
DSM = DES MOINES IIOKC = OKLAHOMA CITY WAS = WASHINGTON, D.C.
EWR=NEWARK IOMA=OMAHA I
For three reasons, these data understate the differential be-
tween United's costs and prices by a significant margin. First,
given that most major airlines fill only about 65% to 70% of
their seats annually, these data understate the United's break-
even revenue requirements by about one-third. Second, the sig-
nificant increase in the cost of aviation fuel has not been in-
cluded. Fuel cost between 52-54 cents a gallon in the second
quarter of 1995; by the fourth quarter of 1996, it had increased
23%, to more than 70 cents per gallon.2 3  Third, the above cal-
culations are based on United's system-wide costs which are
lower than operations from DIA, for Denver International Air-
port's fees account for about one cent per ASM higher than
other airports. In other words, the difference between United's
!32 This analysis was prepared by Frontier Airlines CEO Sam Addoms. Cost
data are based on ROBERTS ROACIH & Assoc., SCORECARD: AIRLINE INDUSTRY COST
MANAGEMENT (3d ed. 1996).
2-13 Julius Maldutis, Airline Update-November 1996 (Dec. 10, 1996), at 11.
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costs and its prices is significantly greater than these calcula-
tions. Finally, these prices are United's lowest. Frontier does
not have the proprietary data to determine the size of the inven-
tory over which these seats have been spread. However, Fron-
tier's booking and sales data suggest that United's low-fare seat
buckets were opened wide after Frontier announced quarterly
profits.
Even before entering Denver's largest air passenger markets,
Frontier had already brought down United's fares here and
there. For example, before Frontier's entry into the Denver-
Omaha market, United's lowest walk-up fare was $460 round-
trip. Frontier entered with a $140 fare, which United promptly
matched. According to DOT data, in the first quarter of 1994,
United's average one-way fare in the Denver-Albuquerque mar-
ket was $187; in the fourth quarter of 1994, as Frontier entered
the market, United's average one-way fare dropped to $87. In
the Denver-Bismarck market, United dropped its average $310
fare to $104 after Frontier entered.
Beginning in 1995, Frontier began entering Denver's largest
nonstop markets. In the Denver-Los Angeles market, United's
average one-way fare dropped from $163 in the third quarter of
1995, to $122 as Frontier entered in the fourth quarter of 1995.
In the Denver-Phoenix market, United dropped its average one-
way fare from $147 in the second quarter of 1995, to $89 in the
fourth quarter of that year.
American Express reported that Denver's cheapest fares fell
44% in November 1996 (compared to a year earlier) for 10
routes out of Denver in which Frontier competed. In contrast,
United's business fares increased 21%.2"4 The unrestricted busi-
ness fare also becomes a revenue source with which to cross-
subsidize below-cost pricing against competitors. In a letter to
the editor of the Denver Post, one consumer summarized what
more and more Colorado residents are experiencing:
I travel extensively on business, and it is my experience that
United is deliberately manipulating prices to put its competitors
out of business.
A recent round trip to Boston on United cost $1,667. The follow-
ing week, I flew to Minneapolis, again on United, at a cost of
$146. The difference is because Frontier flies to Minneapolis.
United is charging excessive fares on some routes and using the
profits to undercut competition where it exists.
24 RocKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Dec. 23, 1996.
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This unethical behavior would be bad enough on its own. But
United is using the taxpayer-supported airports, and the tax-
payer-funded air traffic control system in its anti-competitive
efforts. 35
United's pricing in markets Frontier was forced to abandon
was even more remarkable. In the Denver-Billings market,
United's average one-way fare was $168 before Frontier entered
(in the third quarter of 1994); United dropped it to $92 after
Frontier entered (in the first quarter of 1995), then increased it
to $208 after Frontier departed. United's average one-way fare
in the Denver-Tucson market was $178 in the second quarter of
1994, dropped to $104 after Frontier entered, then rose to as
high as $186 after Frontier departed. United offered high
prices before and after low-fare competitors entered its markets,
but not while it was trying to drive them out of its markets. In-
deed, United used the high prices it extracts from its monopoly
markets to cross-subsidize below-cost predatory pricing in mar-
kets in which low-cost carriers dare to enter.
All airlines suffered higher costs in the second half of 1996.
Fuel costs increased between 18% and 25%. Congress re-im-
posed a 10% excise tax in late August of that year. Frontier at-
tempted to raise its prices modestly to recover these costs on six
different occasions. United matched only one of those price in-
creases in markets in which Frontier offers service, but raised
prices significantly in many markets in which Frontier does not.
Of course, Frontier had no choice but to reduce its prices to
United's level, even though United set them at levels below
Frontier's costs, and well below United's.
Taking advantage of this unique intersection of two poten-
tially unfavorable events (the double whammy of sharply higher
taxes and fuel costs), United appeared to have initiated a delib-
erate effort to suppress prices at the lowest end of their pricing
scale. Simultaneously, year over year, coinciding with the end of
Frontier's first two profitable quarters, United dramatically ex-
panded seat and flight capacity available at these lower prices so
that Frontier's profitability would turn south.23 6
235 Michael Reilly, Letter to the Editor, DENVER Pos, Dec. 26, 1996, at 10B.
236 Unfortunately, while the actual fare data is public, only United Airlines
knows the actual number of seats it offers at the lowest price. Moreover, actual
cost data and actual fare data for the last quarter of 1996 will not be known until
about mid-April of 1997.
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This had the effects of eroding Frontier's market share, caus-
ing a decline in Frontier's load factors, eroding Frontier's yield,
and creating a higher break-even load factor requirement for
Frontier precipitated both by lower average fares and higher
unit costs. Frontier's seven consecutive months of profitable op-
erations turned into significant monthly losses.
Until May 1996, United matched Frontier's lowest fares only
on flights in close departure proximity to Frontier's flights.23 7
That month, United matched Frontier's fares on all flights,
spreading its lowest fare buckets across square miles of seats. To
add insult to injury, by the fall of 1996, United was under-pric-
ing Frontier on many routes in which they competed, despite
United's significantly higher cost structure. 38 United then be-
gan to add flight frequencies in several of the markets in which
Frontier competed.
For example, United increased its frequencies in the nonstop
Denver-Los Angeles market from 14 daily round-trips in August
1994, and 15 in August 1995, to 20 in August 1996. That in-
creased United's share to more than 90% of the flights in that
city-pair market. The Denver-Los Angeles market is the sixth big-
gest market in United's system,239 and United was determined to
increase its monopoly position in the market. Comparing Au-
gust 1995 to August 1996, United also added a new daily round-
trip flight in the Denver-San Francisco market and the Denver-
Salt Lake city market, and two in the Denver-Las Vegas market.
Again, flights were added in these markets after Frontier
entered.
For example, comparing 1996 with 1995, in the Denver-Las
Vegas Market, United increased its seat capacity up to 71% and
flights 37%; in the Denver-Los Angeles market, United in-
creased seats up to 34% and flights 33%; in the Denver-Phoenix
market, United increased seats up to 38% and flights 27%; and
in the Denver-San Francisco market, United increased seats up
to 19% and flights 16%. At cities Frontier departed, United
tended to reduce seat capacity and flights, year over year. For
example, in the Denver-Billings market, United reduced seats
and flights by as much as a third.
237 Jeffrey Leib, Frontier joins Discount Fray, DENVFR POST, Aug. 15, 1995, at C1.
238 Ann Imse, Frontier Exec Calls United Predatory, RocK' MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov.
9,1996, at lB.
239 AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 9, 1996, at 392.
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In late 1996, United announced it was adding capacity from
Denver to 12 cities, 11 of which were cities in which either Fron-
tier or Western Pacific competed. Even though United had con-
fessed that it was losing money in the Denver-Las Vegas and
Denver-Phoenix markets (in both of which Frontier competes),
United announced sharp increases in frequencies in these mar-
kets with Shuttle by United to operate low-fare high-frequency
service. 24" According to one source, "The Shuttle is United's
weapon against a growing swarm of low-cost airlines that are win-
ning fliers with low fares. ' 241 A United spokesman described
United's Shuttle in these terms, "Shuttle by United was created
by the employees to be a competitive tool against low-fare, short-
haul carriers. 242
Originally launched in West Coast markets to discipline
Southwest (an airline which, United learned, was too large to
destroy), United turned the Shuttle toward Frontier and West-
ern Pacific. Beginning February 11, 1997, United flew 13 round
trips in the Denver-Phoenix market (up from 9), and 12 round-
trips in the Denver-Las Vegas market (up from 7). Vanguard
Airlines announced it was exiting the Denver-Phoenix mar-
ket.243 United insisted that one of the reasons it was losing
money in these markets was the equipment-its DC-10s would
be replaced by the Shuttle's 7 37s.244 The Available Seat Mile
[ASM] costs of a wide-bodied aircraft like a DC-10 are typically
lower than the ASM costs of a narrow-body aircraft like a 737,
even though the pilots in the cockpit of a wide-bodied aircraft
are paid significantly more than those of a narrow-body aircraft.
United refused to reveal the Shuttle's costs. But operating from
Denver, any legitimate accounting methodology would likely
place United's Shuttle costs significantly higher than Fron-
tier's.2 45 Even with the Shuttle, United's system-wide 737 costs
rose 4%, year-over-year. Shuttle by United accounted for 45%
1!40 Ann Imse, Frontier Exec Calls United Predatoy, Rociy MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov.
9, 1996, at lB.
241 Julie Schmit, West Coast Showdown, USA TODAY, Sept. 30, 1994, at lB.
242 Penny Parker, United Taps Low Fares To Launch Its Shuttle, DENVER POST, Nov.
20, 1996, at C3.
243 Jeffrey Leib, Vanguard Cancels Flight Before Shuttle Debuts, DENVER POST, Nov.
9, 1996, at 3D.
244 Jeffrey Leib, Low-Fare United Shuttle DIA-Bound, DENVER POST, Nov. 7, 1996,
at 1C.
245 ROBERTS ROACH & ASSOCIATES, SCORECARD: AIRLINE INDUSTRY COST MANAGE-
MENT (3rd ed. 1996).
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of United's total Boeing 737-300 operations. 246 Thus, the above
chart revealing United's 737-300 system-wide domestic cost
structure probably reflects costs which approximate those of the
Shuttle, particularly given that DIA's fees and charges add about
one cent per mile to carrier costs.
Why, then, did United bring the Shuttle to Denver? Former
Denver airport director George Doughty offered this
explanation:
[I] t is clear that United is not doing this because it wants to pro-
vide a low-fare product at its fortress hub. You can bet if there
were no low-fare competitors, there would be no shuttle. It goes
counter to its pricing philosophy, which is to maximize fares.
You need only compare fares available in markets where United
has a monopoly or competes only with another Big Seven carrier
to markets where there is a competing low-fare carrier.
247
United also offered major travel agencies commission over-
rides in various city-pairs radiating from Denver, several in
which Frontier competed. With agent commissions capped at
$50 by the major airlines in 1994, overrides have become a far
more important, if not essential, stream of revenue for agents.
Agencies only earn overrides if they book an extremely high per-
centage (e.g., 90%) of flights on the carrier which offers them.
Thus, agents are incentivized to book their customers on United
even when Frontier (or any other competitor) has a more desir-
able schedule or better service. Earlier in this study, travel agent
commission overrides [TACOs] were referred to as "bribes." Ac-
cording to Webster's dictionary, a bribe is defined as "money or
favor bestowed on or promised to a person in a position of trust
to pervert his judgment or corrupt his conduct." Though not
yet declared illegal, TACOs satisfy this definition. Agents also
rely on computer reservations systems which, as we have seen,
are biased against non code-share connections.
United Airlines also included a contractual provision in its
corporate discount contracts with Denver businesses prohibiting
them from entering into similar agreements with other carriers.
Typically, it provides: "During the Term of this Agreement, Cus-
tomer will not enter into any similar agreement with any other
airline under which air transportation is provided to Customer
in return for any incentive on the air routes serviced by United."
246 Id. at 18.
247 George Doughty, Smart Business Travelers Can Invest In Fare Competition, DEN-
VER Bus. J., Nov. 29, 1996, at 27A.
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United's combined strategy of (1) dumping excess capacity in
Frontier's markets; (2) lowering prices to or below Frontier's;
(3) bribing agents with commission overrides to steer business
toward United; (4) refusing to enter into joint-fare or code-shar-
ing agreements with low-costjet competitors; (5) biasing its CRS
against interline flights; and (6) imposing "exclusive dealing" re-
quirements with corporate accounts, began to take its toll. Al-
though Frontier was profitable in the first two calendar quarters
of 1996, it lost money in the third, and continued to lose money
until the Departments of Justice and Transportation began to
investigate Frontier's allegations of anticompetitive activity by
United at Denver. By October and November 1996, Frontier
was filling only 50.7% and 52.7% of its seats, respectively (com-
pared with 58.4% and 61.1%, respectively, a year earlier).2 4 8
United's market share continued to grow.
Table 6249 reveals that in 1996, United Airlines had 100% of
the capacity (measured by departures or seats) in 30 of its 52
non-stop markets radiating from its Denver Fortress Hub, and
more than 70% in 9 additional city-pairs radiating from Denver.
Coupled with its code-sharing affiliates, United controlled 100%
of 71 non-stop city-pairs radiating from Denver.
248 Jeffrey Leib, Frontier's Passenger Traffic DIips, DENVER Pos'r, Nov. 1996, at C1;
Frontier Fills Fewer Seats, DENVER PosT, Dec. 12, 1996, at 2C.
249 These data were derived from the August 1996 Official Airline Guide.
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Table 6 - United Airlines and Affiliates Market Share in
Denver City-Pairs
MARKET-- AIRLINES UNITED UNITED COMMENTS
DENVER TO & DEPARTURE SEATSHARE
FROM: SHARE
ALBUQUERQUE F9/UA 72.4% 75.6%
ALLIANCE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
AMARILLO UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
ANCHORAGE UA 100.0% 100.0%_
ASPEN UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
ATLANTA DUUA 40.0% 34.9%
AUSTIN UA 100.0% 100.0%
BALTIMORE UA 100.0% 100.0%
BILLINGS UA 100.0% 100.0%
BISMARCK UA* 85.0% 55.0% UNITED EXPRESS
BOISE UA 100.0% 100.0%1
BOSTON UA 100.0% 100.0%
CASPER UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
CEDAR RAPIDS UA 100.0% 100.0%
CHADRON UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
CHEYENNE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
CHICAGO F9/AA/UA 58.6% 68.8% UA ORD
CORTEZ UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
CLEVELAND COUA 50.0% 45.7%
COLUMBUS UA 100.0% 100.0%
CODY UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
COLORADO SPRINGS UA 100.0% 100.0%
DALLAS AA/DL/UA 33.3% 27.9%
DES MOINES UA 100.0% 100.0%
DETROIT NW/UA 57.1% 55.1%
DICKINSON UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
DURANGO UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
EUGENE UA 100.0% 100.0%
FARMINGTON UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
FORT COLLINS UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
GILLETIE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
GARDEN CITY UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
GRAND ISLAND UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
GRAND JUNCTION UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
GUNNISON UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
HARTFORD UA 100.0% 100.0%
HOUSTON COUA 49.4% 43.4%
INDIANAPOLIS UA 100.0% 100.0%
JACKSON HOLE UAIUA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED & UNITED
EXPRESS
KANSAS CITY NJ/UA 71.0% 78.0%
LARAMIE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
LAS VEGAS F9/HP/UA 66.3% 75.0%
LIBERAL UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
LINCOLN UA 100.0% 100.0%
LOS ANGELES F9/UA 90.4% 92.7%
LUBBOCK UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
MCCOOK UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
MIAMI UA 100.0% 100.0%
MIDLAND UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
MILWAUKEE UA/YX 60.0% 67.7%1
MINNEAPOLIS F9/NW/UA 50.5% 45.1%1
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MOLINE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
MONTROSE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
NASHVILLE UA 100.0% 100.0%
NEW ORLEANS UA 100.0% 100.0%
NEW YORK CO/UA 60.0% 66.5%
NORTH PLATTE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
OAKLAND UA 100.0% 100.0%
OKLAHOMA CITY UA 100.0% 100.0%
OMAHA F9/UA 73.9% 84.7%
ORLANDO UA 100.0% 100.0%
PALM SPRINGS UA 100.0% 100.0%
PHILADELPHIA UA/US 85.7% 85.0%
PHOENIX F9/HP/UA 47.8% 54.3%
PEORIA UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
PIERRE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
PORTLAND UA 100% 100.0%
PUEBLO UA* 100.0% 00.0% UNITED EXPRESS
RAPID CITY UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
RENO QQ/UA 60.6% 58.1%
RIVERTON UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
ROCK SPRINGS UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
SACRAMENTO UA 100.0% 100.0%
ST. LOUIS F9/TW/UA 33.8% 26.6%
SALT LAKE CITY DL/F9/NJ/ 33.6% 32.0%
TW/UA
SAN ANTONIO UA 100.0% 100.0%
SAN DIEGO F9/UA 87.5% 89.3%
SAN FRANCISCO F9/UA 88.8% 92.3%
SAN JOSE UA 100.0% 100.0%
SANTA BARBARA UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
SANTA FE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
SCOTTSBLUFF CO*/UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
SEATTLE F9/UA 84.6% 90.9%
SHERIDAN UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
SIOUX CITY UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
SIOUX FALLS UAIUA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED & UNITED
EXPRESS
SPOKANE UA 100.0% 100.0%
SPRINGFIELD UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
STEAM BOAT UA/UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED & UNITED
SPRINGS EXPRESS
TAMPA UA 100.0% 100.0%
TELLURIDE UA* 100.0% 100.0% UNITED EXPRESS
TUCSON UA 100.0% 100.0%
TULSA UA 100.0% 100.0%
WASHINGTON DC UA 100.0% 100.0%
WICHITA NJ/UA/UA* 80.0% 77.9% UNITED & UNITED
EXPRESS
CO = Continental Airlines
DL = Delta Air Lines
F9 = Frontier Airlines
HP = America West
NJ = Vanguard Airlines
NW = Northwest Airlines
TW = Trans World Airlines
QQ = Reno Air
UA = United Airlines
US = US Airways
XY = Midwest Express
The above data may be summarized as follows:
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Table 7 - Summary of United Airlines and Affiliates Market
Share at Denver
CITY-PAIR MARKETS 100% market share > 70% market share Total Markets
UNITED 30 39 52
UNITED EXPRESS 38 39 39
SHARED 3 4 4
TOTAL 71 82 95
By the fall of 1999, United flew 305 daily jet departures from
Denver to 59 destinations. Its code-sharing affiliates (i.e., Air
Wisconsin and Great Lakes) flew an additional 184 daily depar-
tures from Denver to 52 destinations.
Denver is perhaps the nation's most geographically isolated
airline hub. Denver is about 400 miles from Salt Lake City, 600
miles from Phoenix, 650 miles from Dallas, 700 miles to Minne-
apolis, 800 miles to St. Louis, and 900 miles to Chicago-all po-
tentially competing hubs. Because most passengers prefer the
shortest connecting flights (and CRS algorithms prioritize
flights, inter alia, on elapsed time from origin to destination),
sales of circuitous connections are relatively infrequent. For ex-
ample, most passengers flying from the state capitals of
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, to Laramie, Wyoming, would not
likely fly via Dallas or St. Louis. They would instead fly via Den-
ver-on United, which has 100% of the flights from Oklahoma
City to Denver, and United Express, which has 100% of the
flights from Denver to Laramie. Similarly, most passengers fly-
ing from the state capitals of Albuquerque, New Mexico, to Des
Moines, Iowa, for example, would likely fly directly via Denver
on United rather than circuitously through the competing hubs
of Minneapolis, Chicago, St. Louis or Salt Lake City. Thus, the
geographic scope of United's monopoly domination is vast.
Moreover, in the Albuquerque-Des Moines example, Frontier
ordinarily would not be allowed to participate as a viable com-
petitor in the market (though it has two flights a day between
Albuquerque and Denver), because United denied Frontier a
joint-fare relationship, a code-sharing agreement, Mileage Plus
participation, and saddled Frontier's connecting flights with the
equivalent of 24 hours in the CRS algorithm so as to shove its
flights off the first page of the CRS screen, where 85% of flights
are sold by travel agents. 250
250 PAUL DEMPSEY, UNFRIENDLY SKIES OVER COLORADO: UNrrED AIRLINES' FOR-
TRESS HUB MONOPOLY AT DENVER 12-18 (1997).
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This "dead zone," devoid of significant competition is broader
than the circumference described in the preceding paragraph.
Generally speaking, the operational economics of jet aircraft
with more than 100 seats make them best suited for flights of
more than 400 miles. The zone of less than 400 miles is domi-
nated by turboprop and relatively small jet commuter aircraft.
Moreover, most passengers prefer jets to turboprop aircraft.
Thus, the turboprops generally serve relatively small cities (for
larger cities are served by larger jet aircraft). That makes the
United-dominated zone for connecting traffic in the Great
Plains/Rocky Mountain region extend beyond the perimeters
described above. Even a 500 mile stage length poses a signifi-
cant cost penalty for established major airlines: 25'
Table 8 - Distance-Based Costs for Dominant Airlines at
Selected Cities
Western Distance Dominant Average System- ASM 500 mile
Hub from Airline Domestic wide costs costs as % of
Denver Stage costs per @ 500 system
(miles) Length ASM miles
(miles) (cents)
Salt Lake 400 Delta 687 8.61 9.57 111%
City
Phoenix 600 America 733 7.19 8.13 113%
West
Dallas 650 American 1,032 8.43 14.29 170%
Minneapolis 700 Northwest 718 8.66 11.51 133%
St. Louis 800 TWA 752 8.16 12.10 148%
The point is, United's dominance of the connecting market
in the Rocky Mountain/Great Plains region encompasses a
broader geographic area than the straight-line distances be-
tween Denver and these competing hubs. According to Leh-
man Brothers, Denver's catchment area is one of the largest in
the nation, and the largest by far in United's system.252
H. THE DEMISE OF WESTERN PACIFIC AIRLINES
Western Pacific began serving Colorado Springs Airport
(about 75 miles south of Denver) in 1995. In September 1995,
United "counterattacked an upstart Colorado Springs airline...
and sharply cut ticket prices on tickets from Denver to 16 cities
251 Data are derived from ROBERTS ROACH & ASSOCIATES, SCORECARD: AIRLINE
INDUSTRY COST MANAGEMENT 41 (2Q 1995), except for domestic stage length,
which are taken from DOT Form 41 (August 1996).
252 BRIAN HARRIS, AIRLINES: 1998 HUB FACTrBOOK 20 (Lehman Bros. 1998).
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[in 13 of which WesternPacific competed]." 25 3 Despite its signif-
icantly higher cost structure, United began matching or beating
WestPac's fares.
By late 1996, WestPac was serving 20 cities with fifteen 138-
seat Boeing 737-300 aircraft.254 WestPac's lowest walk-up fare to
San Francisco was $417, while United's was $1,080.255 United's
management described WestPac as a "nuisance," taking several
actions to clip its wings.25 6 First, United began matching
WestPac's fares on a capacity controlled basis. For example,
United dropped its Colorado Springs-Washington (Dulles)
round-trip fare to $228, though flying the same aircraft out of
Denver cost consumers $1,138.257 Then United began matching
WestPac's fares from Colorado Springs on a "seat-for-seat" ba-
sis. 258 By replacing 737 service from Colorado Springs to Chi-
cago with DC-10s, United increased its capacity by 20%.259
Pricing below cost and dumping capacity are two of the consis-
tent tactics United has used to drive competitors from markets it
seeks to dominate.
A December 1996 cover story of the Wall Street Journal summa-
rized the predatory behavior targeted at small airlines like West-
ern Pacific and Frontier by megacarriers like United. After the
Valujet crash in the Everglades caused a temporary drop in new
entrant airlines' bookings,
Big carriers, sensing vulnerability, aggressively matched fares and
added flights on routes flown by small airlines .... 260
[B]ig carriers such as United . . . were increasing pressure on
Western Pacific and other start-ups. Trying to win back custom-
ers, UAL Corp.'s United, for example, increased its flights be-
tween Denver and Colorado Springs and even added a DC-10 on
253 Jeffrey Leib, United Cuts Fares To Meet, Beat Springs Deals, DENVER POST, Sept.
22, 1995, at Al.
254 Carriers Suffer With Rising Fuel Prices, Reduced Traffic and Taxes, AIRLINE FIN.
NEWS (Oct. 14, 1996).
255 Ann Gottlieb &Jeffrey Leib, Competition Would Cut Fares, DENVER POST, July
16, 1996, at A10.
256 United Airlines Chief: WestPac's a Nuisance, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE TELE-
GRAPH, Jan. 10, 1006, at Dl.
257 Ann Imse, Computer Helps You Find Lowest of the Low Fares, ROCKy MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Mar. 24, 1996.
258 United Airlines Chief: WestPac's a Nuisance, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE TELE-
GRAPH, Jan. 10, 1996, at Dl.
259 Bill Vogrin, United Makes Denver Flights a Big Deal, COLO. SPRINGS GAZETTE
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 5, 1996, at Al.
260 Scott McCartney, Start-Ups Still Suffer From Valujet Crash and FAA's Missteps,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1996, at 1.
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the short hop. The carrier more aggressively matched the fares
of Western Pacific and Frontier, and announced plans to bring
its low-fare Shuttle by United from the West Coast into
Denver.26 1
In 1997, the Colorado state legislature approved $5.5 million
in loan or loan guarantees for Western Pacific Airlines to move
to Denver International Airport.2 2  Fearing competition,
United Airlines attempted to torpedo the deal.263 United Air-
lines President John Edwardson said his carrier would "vocifer-
ously" protest any attempt by Denver officials to lure WestPac to
DIA a4 Issuing a "blistering attack" on what he described as
"parliamentary chicanery, '265 United Airlines spokesman Tony
Molinaro decried it as "blatantly not a fair deal. '266 United Air-
lines spokesman John Philp said, "Our position is that airlines
shouldn't be asked to subsidize a competitor. ' 26 7 Subsequently,
he took the position that the fund "should be equally available
to all the operators here in the state of Colorado, '268 and that
United might seek economic incentives for expanding its Den-
ver training center.269 (Actually, at United's insistence, the Den-
ver City Council had earlier agreed to pay United up to $1.25
million as an incentive to expand its training center at Stapleton
International Airport.) 27' At another point, Philp said that
Western Pacific should not need the "artificial crutch" of loans
or loan guarantees, 271 though why the world's largest airline
needed to regularly feed at the public trough was not explained.
261 Id. at A10.
262 Richard Williamson & Dan Luzzader, WestPac Lands $5.5 Million, RocKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 26, 1997, at lB.
'263 Michelle Johnston & Jeffrey Leib, WestPac Aid Gets Speedy OK, DENVER POST,
Apr. 25, 1997, at Al.
264 Jeffrey Leib, United Will Oppose Aid For WestPac, DENVER POST, Apr. 23, 1997,
at Cl.
265 Jeffrey Leib &Jim Mallory, WestPacJoins DIA In Big Way, DENVER POST, May
1, 1997, at 12A.
266 United's Double Standard, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, April 28, 1997, at 40A.
267 Richard Williamson, Western Pacific Wants City To Make DIA More Attractive,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Apr. 22, 1997, at 6B.
268 Richard Williamson, United Might Want Denver To Show It Some Money, Too,
RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 3, 1997, at 3B.
269 Richard Williamson, Airline Passes the Hat, DENVER POST, May 7, 1997, at 2B.
270 United To Pay $9.5 Million For Its Flight Training Center, RocKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS, Dec. 5, 1996, at 3B; Arthur Hodges, Denver Offers Cash To Keep United Train-
ing Center, DENVER POST, Nov. 21, 1996, at B3; Kevin Flynn, United Getting $1.25
Million In Incentives From Denver, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov. 21, 1996, at 37A.
271 Jeffrey Leib, WestPac Makes Aid Pitch, DENVER POST, May 7, 1997, at 8C.
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Ironically, the Colorado Business Incentive fund was created
in 1991 from a jet fuel tax, designed to lure United Airlines to
build a heavy maintenance base at Denver International Air-
port.272 In 1991, United asked the state of Colorado for an "arti-
ficial crutch" of $600 million-not in loans-but in outright
grants as an incentive to build its heavy maintenance facility at
DIA.2 73 Colorado Governor Roy Romer proposed between $427
million and $609 million in tax credits to build United's heavy
maintenance facility at DIA.2 74 The Colorado legislature and
Denver city council approved tax incentives worth between $228
million and $318 million275 over a 30-year period.276 United in-
stead shopped the offer, and built that base in Indianapolis,
lured there by $270 million worth of incentives.277
In constructing DIA, the airport financed many traditionally
tenant-provided facilities, including loading bridges, commuter
facilities, aircraft docking systems, communications equipment,
baggage and mail sorting equipment, flight display monitors,
and ticket and service counters. 278 At United's insistence, the
city installed an airport-financed automated baggage system at
DIA, well after construction had begun, which required major
redesign of the main terminal building and contributed to mas-
sive cost increases. As a quid-pro-quo, in 1991, United promised
to build a reservations center in Denver employing some 2,000
reservationists. 271 But by 1994, United persuaded the city to re-
lieve it of that commitment.2"' United, the world's largest air-
line, which has enjoyed hundreds of millions of dollars in public
assistance, had the audacity to attempt to derail a $5.5 million
272 Jeffrey Leib, United Will Oppose Aid for WestPac, DENVER POST, Apr. 23, 1997,
at Cl.
273 Editorial, DENVER POST, Apr. 29, 1997, at B8.
274 Colorado Has Plan To Entice United Air To Set Denver Project, WALL ST. J., May
13, 1991, at 5C.
275 No Decision, United Says, On New Facility, CrICAGO TPB.,June 14,1991, at 3C.
276 Robin Mead, Denver's Jumbo Airport Gamble, THE INDEPENDENT, July 23, 1991,
at 21.
277 Scott Thurston, How Dispute Over hangar Started For City, ATLANTA CONST.,
Nov. 10, 1992, at F9.
278 PAUL DEMPSEY, ANDREW GOETZ & JOSEPH SZYLIOWICZ, DENVER INTERNA-
TIONAL AIRPORT: LESSONS LEARNED (1997).
279 Dyan Zaslowsky, Some Small Signs of Optimism for Denver's Office Market, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1991, at D20.
280 A] Knight, Will Someone Go By City Hall And Wake Up the City Council?, DENVER
POST, Apr. 3, 1994, at El; Patrick O'Driscoll, City Lets United Off Hook for Center,
DENVER POST, Mar. 4, 1994, at A18; Dyan Zaslowsky, Some Small Signs of Optimism
for Denver's Office Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1991, at D20.
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loan to a new entrant airline which had the audacity to move to
the Fortress Hub it dominates.
Western Pacific Airlines moved the base of its operations to
Denver without public assistance, and ceased operations in Feb-
ruary 1998.
I. THE PRICE OF MONOPOLIZATION
As it drove competitors out of markets, United raised prices
sharply. For example, before Frontier entered the Denver-Bill-
ings market, United's lowest round-trip fare was $384. After
Frontier entered, United lowered its fare to $198. After Frontier
departed, United raised its fares to $345281
The Denver-Boulder metropolitan area is the largest center of
business activity in the Rocky Mountain Region, an oasis of pop-
ulation isolated from other business centers in North America.
For example, the distance from Denver to Phoenix is nearly 600
miles, to Dallas nearly 650 miles, to Minneapolis 700 miles, to
Los Angeles 850 miles, to Chicago 900 miles, and to Seattle
1,000 miles.28 2 Amtrak rail service exists to some of these cities,
but it is extremely slow. Interstate highways make these cities
accessible by automobile, but the distances and driving times are
vast. These features make Denver and Colorado more reliant
on air transportation than most other American cities. As a con-
sequence, an unusually high proportion (58%) of passengers at
Denver International Airport are origin-and-destination [O&D]
passengers. 28 3 It is these passengers upon whom a monopoly
fare can be placed by a dominant airline.
A 1990 study by the GAO comparing pricing between concen-
trated and unconcentrated hub airports found that O&D fares
were 27% higher at the concentrated hubs.28 4 A separate study
performed that year by the DOT found that average yields were
18.7% higher at single-carrier hubs.28 5 A 1996 study by DOT
281 Ann Imse, Frontier Exec Calls United Predatory, RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, Nov.
9, 1996, at lB.
2112 Leigh Fisher Associates Analysis, Prepared for the City and County of Den-
ver (1994).
283 GAO, DENVER AIRPORT: OPERATING RESULTS AND FINANCIAL RISKS 18 (1996).
28 GAO, AIRLINE COMPETITION: INDUSTRY OPERATING AND MARKETING PRAC-
TICES LIMIT MARKET ENTRY (1990).
215 DOT, SECRETARY'S TASK FORCE ON COMPETITION IN THE U.S. DOMESTIC AIR-
LINE INDUSTRY: AIRPORTS, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, AND RELATED CONCERNS (1990).
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concluded that the presence of low-cost competitors produce a
40% fare savings to consumers at dominated network hubs.28 6
A 1994 study of airline pricing at Denver prepared for the city
estimated 16.5 million enplaned passengers, of whom 8.25 mil-
lion were O&D. Average airfares of $362 multiplied times 8.25
million O&D passengers produced $3 billion in gross revenue.
Assuming a 15% increase in air fares attributable to the hub mo-
nopoly of United Airlines, the annual cost to Denver consumers
from monopolization of the Denver hub was $450 million. As-
suming a 27% increase, the annual consumer cost of monopoli-
zation was $810 million in 1994 terms. The airport itself loses
$10 million in revenue because higher prices translates into
fewer passengers. Thus, in a relatively short time frame, United
could recover the losses it incurred in its below-cost fare wars
with its competitors at Denver.
These are highly conservative estimates. By 1996, the consen-
sus was that DIA produced $5 billion in gross revenue for the
airlines which serve it, that 58% of the traffic was O&D, and that
a monopoly airline could charge fares 42% higher than in com-
petitive markets. This suggests a potential direct negative im-
pact on Colorado consumers of several hundred million dollars
a year. Much of that increase is attributable to United Airlines'
dominance of virtually all spokes radiating from Denver.
These are the minimum costs imposed on the Colorado econ-
omy by monopolization of DIA. They do not account for the
ripple effect on business, particularly travel-related business,
such as hotel, convention and tourism. In Colorado, the ski in-
dustry does nearly $2 billion in retail activity, while tourism is a
$6 billion industry. The success and well being of both indus-
tries is directly tied to the reasonableness of air fares to Colo-
rado. A perception that Colorado is an expensive tourism
destination will send tourists elsewhere. United's monopoly will
siphon tens of billions of dollars of revenue out of the Colorado
economy over the long term, significantly dampening discre-
tionary traffic demand in an economy strongly dependent on
tourism.
It has been proven statistically that a 15% increase in air fares
results in a 4.5% decrease in passenger traffic; a 27% increase in
fares results in about an 8% decrease in passenger traffic.28 7 In
1994, it was estimated that the tourism economic impact of Sta-
2186 DOT, THE Low COST AIRLINE SERVICE REVOLUTION 9 (1996).
287 Julius Maldutis, Airline Update - August 1996 (Sept. 9, 1996), at 2.
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pleton International Airport was $892 million (comprised of
$622 million in winter tourism, $222 in summer tourism, and
$48.4 million in business travel and conventions). A decline in
passenger traffic of between 4% and 8% attributable to monop-
oly air fares translates directly into a loss of tens of millions of
dollars in lost income for these industries. The aggregate im-
pact of higher ticket prices imposed by United Airlines upon
O&D passengers, plus the loss of revenue sustained by the Colo-
rado tourism industry and Colorado business more generally,
plus declining DIA revenue attributable to dampened passenger
demand, may be well over $1 billion annually.
The only thing that stands between a consumer's wallet and a
wealth-maximizing monopolist is a competitor.
As 1996 drew to a close, United Airlines and its code-sharing
affiliates controlled nearly more than 95% of the connecting
traffic, and nearly 80% of the total passenger traffic at the Den-
ver hub. In December 1996, speaking before about 300 Denver
business leaders, when asked how large a market share the car-
rier seeks at DIA, United Airlines Vice President Roger Gibson
responded, "I'd like all of it."'2 18
Predation does not manifest itself solely in terms of the major
airline pricing below cost and flooding the market with capacity.
Anticompetitive weaponry designed to suppress competition
and monopolize the market include a plethora of activities.
Frontier alleged the following anticompetitive activities by
United Airlines at Denver:
" United bribed large travel agencies with commission overrides
to book United at levels higher than its capacity in the market.
* United entered into "exclusive dealing" contracts with large
corporate purchasers forbidding them from entering into simi-
lar discount arrangements with competitors such as Frontier.
" United entered into "exclusive dealing" contracts with its com-
muter affiliates prohibiting them from code-sharing with
Frontier.
" United biased its computer reservations system in a manner to
monopolize the connecting travel market at Denver; it adds
the equivalent of 24-hours to the display of Frontier's interline
connections at Denver.
* United used its influence with the city of Denver to ensure that
Concourse A rents are higher than those charged United on
Concourse B at Denver International Airport.
288 United Airlines Vice President Roger Gibson, Statement before the Denver
Rotary Club breakfast meeting at the Denver Athletic Club (Dec. 12, 1996).
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Although United, the world's largest airline, concluded an
agreement to code-share with Delta, the third largest airline, it
refused to enter into a code-sharing agreement with Frontier,
which sought code-sharing with United at its Denver Fortress
Hub.
The impact of predation on smaller, less well capitalized air-
lines is profound. Predatory behavior can dissuade new entry.28 4
Predation can cripple a small airline once it entered by denying
it break-even load factors and revenue. 29
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PREDATION
In this section, we examine the legal basis for imposing legal
sanctions against predatory behavior in the airline industry
aimed at harming smaller competitors. Though the emphasis of
the DOT's policy statement is aimed at predatory pricing, other
predatory conduct is also harmful to competition.
A. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
Congress promulgated four separate competition laws to en-
courage competition and punish anticompetitive behavior in
the U.S. economy: (1) the Sherman Act; (2) the Clayton Act; (3)
the Robinson-Patman Act; and (4) the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. Each addresses a somewhat different problem and has
differing statutory thresholds. Because the latter two do not ap-
ply to the airline industry (Robinson-Patman applies to the sale
of goods, not services, and the Federal Trade Commission Act
explicitly excludes air carriers from its reach), Congress has
promulgated specific legislation to govern unfair and deceptive
practices and unfair methods of competition in the airline in-
dustry. Moreover, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, which
amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, explicitly provides
that deregulation was not designed to condone unfair methods
of competition, or deceptive, anticompetitive and monopolistic
practices.
Section 41712 (formerly section 411) of the Federal Aviation
Act provides:
289 Mark Clouatre, Comments: The Legacy of Continental Airlines v. American Air-
lines, 60J. AIR L. & CoM. 869, 900 (1995); Alfred Kahn, Deregulatory Schizophrenia,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 1059 1063 (1987).
290 Alfred Kahn, Thinking About Predation-A Personal Diary, 6 REv. INDUS. ORG.
137, 141 (1991).
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On the initiative of the Secretary of Transportation or the com-
plaint of an air carrier ... and if the Secretary considers it is in
the public interest, the Secretary may investigate and decide
whether an air carrier ... has been or is engaged in an unfair or
deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition in air
transportation .... If the Secretary, after notice and an opportu-
nity for a hearing, finds that an air carrier ... is engaged in an
unfair or deceptive practice or unfair method of competition,
the Secretary shall order the air carrier ... to stop the practice or
method."291
This statutory provision is modeled after, and indeed mirrors,
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.292 According to
Judge Posner, "Although the language of the corresponding sec-
tion of the two sections is not identical, none of the differences
seem deliberate, let alone material .... [S]ection 411 is essen-
tially a copy of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. ,,)23
In March of 1938, Congress empowered the Federal Trade
Commission [FTC] to prohibit "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce," and "unfair methods of competition in
commerce." Three months later, it promulgated the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 (which was later folded into the Federal Avi-
ation Act of 1958), including section 411 thereof, which gave
the nascent Civil Aeronautics Board [CAB] jurisdiction to pro-
hibit unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of com-
petition. Having given the prevailing aeronautical agency
jurisdiction to enforce the unfair and deceptive practices/unfair
methods of competition prohibition, Congress saw no need to
have the FTC replicate the CAB's oversight. Thus, section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act explicitly excludes "air carri-
ers and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Aviation Act"
from its reach. 294
With the sunset of the Civil Aeronautics Board on January 1,
1985, jurisdiction under section 411 was transferred from the
291 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2002).
292 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2002). See United Air Lines v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 766
F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1985).
293 United Air Lines, 766 F.2d at 1112.
2 4 The Federal Trade Commission Act provides, "The Commission is hereby
empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, ex-
cept... air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 ... from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(2) (2002).
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CAB to the DOT. Noting that the CAB had issued rules under
section 411 since 1960, Judge Posner studied the legislative his-
tory of the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984 and con-
cluded, "Congress, looking forward to the period after abolition
of the Board, was very concerned to preserve (in the Depart-
ment of Transportation) authority to enforce section 411....
And Congress was well aware that the Board had used rulemak-
ing to enforce the section. '2 9 5 In that case, Posner, speaking for
the Seventh Circuit, upheld the jurisdiction of the CAB to
"make antitrust-like regulations by means of informal
rulemaking. 2 9
6
The legislative history of the Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset
Act of 1984 emphasized the DOT's need to arrest anticompeti-
tive practices:
There is also a strong need to preserve the Board's authority
under Section 411 to ensure fair competition in air transporta-
tion.... Although the airline industry has been deregulated, this
does not mean that there are no limits to competitive practices.
As is the case with all industries, carriers must not engage in prac-
tices that would destroy the framework under which fair competi-
tion operates. Air carriers are prohibited, as are firms in other
industries, from practices which are inconsistent with the anti-
trust laws or the somewhat broader prohibitions of Section 411 of
the Federal Aviation Act (corresponding to Section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act) against unfair competitive
practices.297
Unless the DOT enforces the statutory prohibition against un-
fair and deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition,
airlines will be in the unique position among American indus-
tries of being absolutely free to engage in such anticompetitive
practices, contrary to the explicit wish of Congress in promulgat-
ing the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, and the Civil Aero-
nautics Board Sunset Act of 1984. Every other industry in our
economy is subject to the oversight of the Federal Trade Com-
mission. Airlines are not. Nor are airlines subject to the decep-
tive practices regulation of the states, under the broad
construction of the preemption provisions of the Airline Der-
egulation Act of 1978.21' Therefore, it is imperative that the
295 United Air Lines, 766 F.2d at 1112.
296 United Air Lines, 766 F.2d at 1120.
297 H.R. REP. No. 98-793, 98th Cong, 2d Sess. 4-5 (1984).
298 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
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DOT fulfill its legislative mandate to prohibit unfair and decep-
tive practices, as well as unfair methods of competition.
Again, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is es-
sentially the equivalent of section 411 [now section 41712] of
the Federal Aviation Act. The Supreme Court found that the
"paramount aim" of Section 5 is to protect the public against
evils likely to result from destruction of competition or restric-
tion of it in substantial degree, 2 9 and that Section 5 is intended
to combat, in their incipiency, trade practices that exhibit strong
potential for stifling competition. ' . According to the Supreme
Court, the fundamental question is whether the methods com-
plained of are 'unfair', and whether they produce substantial
injury to the public by restricting competition in interstate trade
and common liberty to engage therein: Public policy is par-
ticularly concerned where unfair practices jeopardize or injure a
present or potential competitor, ° 2 though an adverse effect on
consumers may also trigger the prohibition. °3 The purpose of
the legislation was to combat unfair practices, which if remained
unchecked, would probably result in a violation of the antitrust
laws (the Sherman and Clayton Acts). °
Both the Federal Trade Commission and the DOT may forbid
anticompetitive practices before they become sufficiently serious
to violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts. 5 Indeed, the defini-
tion of "unfair methods of competition" is not confined to those
activities that were illegal under the common law or condemned
by the Sherman or Clayton Acts."' The DOT has acknowledged
299 FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
300 FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223 (1968). It is not imperative, in order to bring
into play the 'prophylactic' action of the FTC, to prove that a monopoly has been
achieved, since one of the purposes of the Federal Trade Commission Act is to
prevent potential injury by stopping unfair methods of competition in their incip-
iency." Hastings Manufacturing Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 253 (6th Cir. 1946).
3l Raladam, 283 U.S. 643.
302 Id.
303 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
304 Butterick Pub. Co. v. FTC, 85 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1936).
305 See Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 367 (1965); Pan American World
Airways, Inc., v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963). If the purpose and practice
of the anticompetitive activity runs counter to the public policy declared in the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, the FTC has jurisdiction to suppress it as an unfair
method of competition. Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
The Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to bolster and supplement the
Sherman and Clayton Acts as well as condemn as 'unfair methods of competi-
tion' existing violations of them. FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Co., 344 U.S. 392
(1953).
304 Motion Picture Adver. Co., 344 U.S. 392.
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that its authority under this provision "allows us to define prac-
tices that do not violate the antitrust laws as unfair methods of
competition, if they violate the spirit of the antitrust laws."
30 7
The Supreme Court has held:
"Unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competi-
tion," as used in § 411 [now § 41712], are broader concepts than
the common-law ideas of unfair competition. The section is con-
cerned not with punishment of wrongdoing or protection of in-
jured competitors, but rather with protection of the public
interest.3118
Section 41712 provides that the Secretary shall take action
against unfair and deceptive practices if he believes such action
is in the "public interest." Congress explicitly defined the "pub-
lic interest" in the Airline Deregulation Act to include the
following:
[T]he Secretary of Transportation shall consider the following
matters, among others, as being in the public interest... :
(4) the availability of a variety of adequate, economic, efficient,
and low-priced services without unreasonable discrimination or
unfair or deceptive practices....
(9) preventing unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompetitive
practices in air transportation.
(10) avoiding unreasonable industry concentration, excessive
market domination, monopoly powers, and other conditions that
would tend to allow at least one air carrier ... unreasonably to
increase prices, reduce service, or exclude competition in air
transportation.
(11) maintaining a complete and convenient system of continu-
ous scheduled interstate air transportation for small
communities ....
(13) encouraging entry into air transportation markets by new
and existing air carriers and the continued strengthening of
307 61 Fed. Reg. 42,208, 42,215. This interpretation is supported by Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1970), which held that under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the FTC could declare conduct
"unfair" if it constituted either (1) a per se violation of antitrust policy, (2) a
violation of the letter of the Sherman, Clayton or Robinson-Patman Acts, or (3) a
violation of the spirit of these Acts. Similarly, the Third Circuit held that the
Sherman Act acts as a guide or declaration of policy for the FTC in determining
what constitutes an unfair method of competition. New Jersey Wood Finishing
Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Manuf. Co., 332 F.2d 346 (3rd Cir. 1964).
308 American Airlines v. North American Airlines, 351 U.S. 79, 85 (1956) [cita-
tions omitted].
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small air carriers to ensure a more effective and competitive air-
line industry." '
Another statutory foundation upon which DOT could base a
prohibition against anticompetitive practices is the continuing
requirement that air carriers holding certificates of public con-
venience and necessity be "fit, willing, and able""' A carrier's
failure to comply with its legal obligations may result in the
amendment, modification, suspension or revocation of its
certificate."1 '
In determining whether a new applicant is fit, the DOT as-
sesses whether the applicant: (1) has the managerial and opera-
tional ability to conduct the proposed operations; (2) has
sufficient financial resources available to commence operations
without undue risk; and (3) will comply with its statutory and
regulatory obligations under the law (or in the regulatory lan-
guage often used, has demonstrated satisfactory "compliance
disposition") .3 2 It is the latter of this three-prong test that is of
relevance here.
The DOT has stated:
In dealing with the issue of compliance disposition, the key ques-
tion is whether the applicant will conform to the provisions of
the Federal Aviation Act and the rules, regulations and require-
ments thereunder. A reason judgment regarding and applicant's
future conduct can only be based on an examination of its past
history, including any evidence of improper conduct.' 13
Further, the DOT has observed, "The Department regards
compliance disposition as an important element in our fitness
process and has not hesitated to act where there was substantial
evidence of a person's lack of disposition to comply with the
law . . ,,."" As important as an evaluation of an applicant's
financial and operational ability is whether the applicant has
demonstrated an ability and willingness to comply with the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, the rules and regulations promulgated there-
under, as well as other federal and state statutory obligations. 1 5
%11: 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2002).
3,, 49 U.S.C § 41110(e) (2002).
,, 49 U.S.C § 41110(a)(2) (2002).
'312 See Application of Air Illinois, Inc., DOT Order 86-2-25 (1986).
"I', Regent Air Corporation, DOT Order 85-6-15 (1985) [citation omitted].
314 Application of Trans World Airlines, Inc. ('TWA') for the Institution of An
Investigation on its Prospective Continuing Fitness Under Section 401 (r) of the
Federal Aviation Act, DOT Order 85-6-16 (1985).
3 15 See Trans-Panama, S.A., Foreign Permit, 97 C.A.B. 161 n.27 (1982).
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Anticompetitive conduct designed to suppress competition
may violate the policy provisions of the Federal Aviation Act
(which prohibit "unfair, deceptive, predatory, or anticompeti-
tive practices" and "unreasonable industry concentration, exces-
sive market domination, monopoly powers, and other
conditions that would tend to allow at least one air carrier...
unreasonably to increase prices, reduce service, or exclude com-
petition in air transportation"), section 41712 of the Federal Avi-
ation Act (which prohibits "unfair or deceptive practice [s]" and
"unfair method[s] of competition"), and as we shall see below,
section 2 of the Sherman Act, and/or section 3 of the Clayton
Act. Therefore, the DOT may use the continuing statutory re-
quirement of a certificated carrier to remain "fit, willing, and
able" under section 41110 of the Federal Aviation Act to impose
whatever certificate amendment, modification, suspension or
revocation may be necessary to force the carrier to abate such
unlawful conduct.
Between 1993 and 1999, the Department of Transportation
received thirty-two informal complaints alleging unfair competi-
tive practices. Half involved complaints of unfair pricing and
capacity responses to new entry - dumping low-fare capacity,
and in some cases adding flights." 6 Since 1996, new entrants
have tended to exit more routes than they entered. According
to Professors Oster and Strong, "the slowdown in route entry
may be due to the nature of responses by network carriers....
[T]he response of incumbents [to the entry of low-fare carrier
Southwest Airlines] appeared to be very mild compared to the
responses [of Northwest] to Reno Air and Spirit ... .""' They
observed that "the decline in entry applications [after 1996],
and in the number of carriers moving from authorized to oper-
ating status, may in part be due to the perceptions of both inves-
tors and prospective new entrants about the nature of likely
entry responses from the incumbent carriers." ' As Alfred
Kahn has observed, "The entry of these new low-fare carriers
keeps the industry honest .... I'm a strong advocate of compe-
tition and I don't want to go back to regulation. But you've got
to distinguish legitimate competition from what is intended to
316 Clinton Oster, Jr. & John Strong, Predatory Practices in the U.S. Airline
Industry, 10 n. 8 (Jan. 15, 2001) (unpublished), at http://ostpxweb.dot.gov/avia-
tion/domestic-competition/predpractices.pdf.
17 i. at 13.
318 Id. at 15.
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drive competitors out and exploit consumers."3 ' As Congress
has observed, "Although the airline industry has been deregu-
lated, this does not mean that there are no limits to competitive
practices. As in the case with all industry, carriers must not en-
gage in practices which would destroy the framework under
which fair competition operates. ' 21
1
John Nannes, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DOJ,
speaking before the International Aviation Club, said:
In the 1980s, the DOT approved a number of transactions involv-
ing carriers with high shares of city-pair traffic, reasoning that
other carriers could easily enter those city pairs and discipline
fares if the merging carriers began to act noncompetitively....
. . •Companies rarely engage in predatory conduct, it [was]
said, because any attempt by the predator to "recoup" the finan-
cial costs of predation in the form of higher prices after the prey
is driven out will be defeated by new entrants undercutting those
higher prices....
The airline industry exhibits certain characteristics that make a
predation theory more than merely "plausible." First, hub carri-
ers dominate hub markets, as demonstrated by market share.
Second, hub carriers appear to be in a position to exact high
fares, as demonstrated by hub premiums. Third, hub carriers
can easily respond to entry by start-up carrier by increasing ca-
pacity and reducing fares in affected markets virtually overnight.
Fourth, hub carriers have an incentive to act before start-up carri-
ers develop a foothold in the hub: it is obviously easier to drive a
carrier out before it gets established in the market. Fifth, a start-
up is likely to have limited capital and is thus vulnerable to preda-
tory practices; this is not an instance [where anyone] has to wait a
long time to see whether competitors can be, or actually have
been, driven out of business. Sixth, a hub carrier "defending its
turf" against encroachment by a start-up carrier in a few markets
can create a "reputation for predation" that deters start-up carri-
ers from entering its many other hub markets; this can signifi-
cantly alter the "cost-benefit" predation calculation for a hub
carrier in a way uncharacteristic of most other industries. In
short, a "recoupment scenario" is not implausible at all.32'
119 Donna Rosato, An Inside Look at DOT's Fight Against Airline Predation, USA
TODAY, Apr. 6, 1998, at 2B.
320 H.R. REP. No. 98-793, at 4-5 (1984).
321 John Nannes, The Importance of Entry Conditions in Analyzing Airlien An-
titrust Issues, Address Before the International Aviation Club (July 20, 1999), at 7-
13, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ptiblic/speeches/2574.pdf.
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The Department of Transportation became so concerned with
the high failure rate of new entrant airlines, the widespread alle-
gations of predatory pricing and capacity dumping, and the inef-
fectiveness of the antitrust laws to arrest it, that in 1998 it
announced a proposed policy statement on unfair exclusionary
practices.3 22 The policy was designed to fill a void in the law
which places the unfair competitive practices of virtually all U.S.
industries, except airlines, under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission. Such jurisdiction instead resides with DOT.
As the Department of Transportation observed:
A major carrier can minimize or even avoid self diversion of
local revenue, for example, by matching the new entrant's low
fares on a restricted basis (and without significantly increasing
capacity) and relying on its own service advantages to retain high
fare traffic. We have seen that major carriers can operate profita-
bly in the same markets as low-fare carriers. Major carriers are
competing with Southwest, the most successful low-fare carrier,
on a broad scale and are nevertheless reporting record or near-
record earnings. Our enforcement policy will not guarantee new
entrants success or even survival. Optimally, it will give them a
level playing field.123
More recently, the Department of Transportation concluded:
The most controversial competitive responses to entry have in-
volved sharp fare cuts, a large increase in the number of seats
sold at low fares, and often an increase in total capacity ....
.... In some cases the incumbent network airline has ... re-
sponded to entry in ways that appear to be economically irra-
322 Under the DOT's proposed guidelines, the DOT would initiate enforce-
ment proceedings when one or more of the following occurs:
the major carrier adds capacity and sells such a large number of
seats at very low fares that the ensuing self-diversion of revenue re-
sults in lower local revenue than would a reasonable alternative
response;
the number of local passengers that the major carrier carries at the
new entrant's low fares (or at similar fares that are substantially be-
low the major carrier's previous fares) exceeds the new entrant's
total seat capacity, resulting, through self-diversion, in lower local
revenue than would a reasonable alternative response; or
the number of local passengers that the major carrier carries at the
new entrant's low fares (or at similar fares that are substantially be-
low the major carriers' previous fares) exceeds the number of low-
fare passengers carried by the new entrant, resulting, through self
diversion, in lower local revenue than would a reasonable alterna-
tive response.
323 DOT, Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the
Air Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919 (Apr. 10, 1998).
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tional unless the entrant exits the market or reduces its service.
In these cases the hubbing airline cuts its fares and increases the
availability of its lowest fares by so much that it obtains much
lower revenues and profits than it would have obtained if it had
chosen a more moderate response. In extreme cases the incum-
bent airline cuts its fares to match the new entrant's fare levels,
eliminates all or most of its restrictions on discount fares, and
greatly expands the availability of discount-fare seats. The in-
cumbent airline often adds flights as well .... [A]lthough the
incumbent carries many more passengers, its total revenues are
well below the revenues realizable through a more moderate re-
sponse to entry.
.... When the incumbent airline responds to entry by slashing
fares and making low discount fares much more available, the
new entrant airline usually cannot obtain enough traffic to sus-
tain its service. The ready availability of low fares on the incum-
bent airline, which offers service features not offered by the new
entrant airline and has an established reputation, dries up the
traffic available to the entrant. The entrant must exit the market,
and the incumbent airline then often increases its fares and
sharply reduces the availability of its lowest discount fares. '24
324 DOT, Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in the
Air Transportation Industry, Docket OST-98-3713 (Jan. 17, 2001). This article
has identified several situations in which major carriers have engaged in price
cuts and/or capacity increases which cause them to forego more revenue than all
the new entrant's capacity in the market could have diverted from it, or results in
substantially lower operating profits (or greater operating losses) in the short run
than would a reasonable alternative strategy for competing with the new entrant.
While the DOT's proposed Policy Statement is a step in the right direction, this
author concludes it does not go far enough. It should go further, and address
more definitively anticompetitive practices other than predatory pricing and ca-
pacity dumping:
In determining whether a major carrier has engaged in predatory
behavior, the definition of a "major carrier" should include not
only a major carrier but also its code-sharing and commuter affili-
ates and alliance partners. The major carrier has considerable in-
fluence over the schedule and pricing practices of its network
affiliates. The importance of this is enhanced as more regional
feeders obtain regional jets.
Because many major carriers walk in "lock step" on issues of capac-
ity and pricing in response to new entrants, it is important that
DOT to view the totality or sum of all major carriers' existing prac-
tices to determine whether they are predatory.
The guidelines speak to exclusionary practices "in response to" en-
try by a new carrier. The exclusionary practices review contem-
plated in the Policy Statement should also apply in circumstances
where the new carrier first enters a market followed by a major car-
rier entry. At present, the guideline apparently only envisions cir-
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cumstances where the new carrier enters an existing market of a
major carrier.
The DOT has made it clear that it does not intend the three scena-
rios of predatory pricing and capacity dumping it enumerated to be
an exclusive list, and that other conduct may constitute unfair com-
petition under section 41712 of the Federal Aviation Act warranting
enforcement action, including hoarding airport gates, using bonus
frequent flyer awards or travel agent commission overrides in ways
that appear to target new entrants unfairly. While the DOT need
not set forth an exhaustive list, it is important that the DOT explic-
itly acknowledge that other practices may lead to a finding of unfair
competition, such as exclusive dealing arrangements with regional
feeder carriers, exclusive dealing contracts with corporate purchas-
ers of air transportation, refusal to sell competitors frequent flyer
mileage at a price at which it sells non-carriers such mileage, refusal
to offer competitors ticketing-and-baggage, joint-fare and code-
sharing arrangements on a non-discriminatory basis to or from its
dominant hubs, and/or biasing its computer reservations systems
against competitive offerings.
The DOT should explicitly recognize that unfair and deceptive
practices and unfair methods of competition include situations
where a market dominant airline enters into exclusive code-shar-
ing, joint-fare or ticketing-and-baggage arrangements at any airport
it dominates, or exclusive dealing contracts with connecting air-
lines for service to or from an airport it dominates, or exclusive
dealing contract with a corporate purchaser of air travel at any city
located near an airport which the airline dominates, or pays com-
mission overrides to any travel agency or travel agents for traffic in
any city-pair which a new entrant has entered, or refuses to sell fre-
quent flyer mileage to its airline competitors for travel to or from a
market dominant airport at a price higher than the lowest available
price offered to any purchaser.
The DOT has the power to issue cease and desist orders against any
carrier it finds is engaging in unfair and deceptive practices or un-
fair methods of competition under section 41712 of the Federal
Aviation Act. In fashioning such cease and desist orders, DOT
should order a carrier engaging in such predatory conduct to pay
restitution to any other carrier which suffers economic injury be-
cause of such anticompetitive conduct.
Even a $10 million fine may not dissuade a major airline with more
than $10 billion in annual revenue from engaging in predatory
conduct. The DOT should make it clear that violations of sections
40101 and 41712 of the Federal Aviation Act, section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, and section 3 of the Clayton Act, may lead to a finding
that a carrier has violated its continuing obligation to be "fit, willing
and able" under 41110 of the Federal Aviation Act, and may re-
quire certificate amendment, modification, suspension or revoca-
tion thereunder to arrest such unlawful behavior. Such a certificate
amendment might, for example, require the carrier to offer new
entrant airlines non-discriminatory joint-fares, code-sharing, and
frequent flyer mileage access, and/or eliminate commission over-
rides at its dominant hubs.
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B. MONOPOLIzATION UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
As noted above, the unfair and deceptive practices/unfair
methods of competition language of both section 5 of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act and section 41712 of the Federal
Aviation Act have been interpreted to include such actions as
assault the public interest, or the spirit of the antitrust laws. In
this section, we examine predatory conduct in the airline indus-
try that violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides that "every person who
shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... any part of the
trade or commerce ... is guilty of a felony. '3 25 A Section 2 claim
can be brought against the use of monopoly power "to foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a
competitor.
3 26
Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude
competition. 27 The creation or maintenance of a monopoly by
illegitimate means is prohibited by section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
The offense of attempting to create a monopoly requires proof of:
(1) a specific intent to control prices or eliminate competition
in a market (objective evidence of intent is sufficient); (2) pred-
atory or anticompetitive conduct aimed at accomplishing this
unlawful purpose; and (3) a dangerous probability of success (a
realistic danger that if the defendant's conduct runs its course, it
would create a monopoly). 2 s Intention can be proven by estab-
lishing either an intent to achieve monopoly power or an intent
Predation should be arrested expeditiously. The DOT should pre-
scribe tight time deadlines for processing a complaint under sec-
tion 41712 of the Federal Aviation Act, and be prepared to devote
the staff resources to resolving the issue quickly.
325 15 U.S.C.S. § 2 (2002). Section 2 has two elements: (1) the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition or main-
tenance of that power, as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. Id.
326 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
.127 United States v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966). Whether monop-
oly power exists or not depends on several factors, including the probable devel-
opment of the industry, consumer demand, and defendant's market share.
Hayden Publishing Co. v. Cox Broadcasting Corp., 730 F.2d 64, 68 (2d Cir.
1984).
328 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993); Swift & Co. v.
United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
800
2002] PREDATION, COMPETITION & ANTITRUST LAW 801
to drive competitors from the market so that the dominant firm
could later charge monopoly prices.
A claim of monopolization requires proof of: (1) the possession
of monopoly power in a relevant market; and (2) the exercise of
one or more impermissible exclusionary practices designed to
strengthen or perpetuate its monopoly position (or put differ-
ently, conduct directed at "smothering competition").29 Mo-
nopolization refers to activities that may be illegal if performed
by the dominant firm in a relevant market.3 0 Thus, practices
which do not in themselves constitute an antitrust violation may,
in conjunction with overwhelming market power, violate section
2.
Monopoly power is a large amount of market power, or the
ability to reduce output and raise prices above marginal costs.
Market share in a relevant market is generally accepted as an
effective surrogate for direct measurement of market power.
Generally speaking, the defendant must have 70% or more of
the relevant geographic and product market.
A relevant geographic market is an area where the dominant
firm can increase its price without large numbers of consumers
turning to alternative supply sources outside the area, or pro-
ducers outside the area can quickly flood the area with substi-
tute products. The relevant geographic market in commercial
aviation is certainly city-pairs; it may also include domination of
a hub airport, where large number of banks of flights from nu-
merous cities enable it to dominate the city's local passenger
market. In terms of the anticompetitive and monopolistic prac-
tices of a major hub airline directed at a new entrant, the rele-
vant geographic market is the hub airport and city-pairs
radiating therefrom.
Extensive studies of the consumer impact of hub monopoliza-
tion conducted by the DOT and the GAO conclude that a domi-
nant airline charges prices between 19% and 27% higher for
passengers beginning or ending their trips at a monopoly hub
airport than prices for similar distances in competitive markets.
The relevant product requires an assessment of the products
that are sufficiently close substitutes to compete effectively in
329 U.S. v. Grinell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak,
603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979).
330 HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 135 (1984);
Lorain Journal & Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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each other's markets.3 31 Scheduled passenger air transportation
is probably the relevant product market in commercial aviation
(the competitive alternatives of rail, bus and automobile trans-
port, or freight transportation, likely can be ignored).
One might argue that the relevant product markets in sched-
uled commercial aviation are non-stop passenger air transporta-
tion to and from a hub, and connecting service to and from
other cities via the hub. One alternative product market to the
non-stop market to and from a hub is connecting service via
other hubs. However, connecting service is viewed by most con-
sumers as an inferior product alternative to non-stop service,
and has only a marginal competitive impact on non-stop service.
One who effectively controls a market may not lawfully use
any exclusionary practice against a competitor, even though it is
not technically a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.33 2 A monopolist may not legitimately deter poten-
tial competitors from entering its market or existing rivals from
increasing their output.333 Under certain market conditions,
the following constitute illegitimate exercises of monopoly
power:




5. refusal to deal with a competitor
6. refusal to share an "essential facility"
7. raising rivals' costs
8. exclusive dealing arrangements
The following analysis examines
under each of these doctrines.
airline monopolization
1. Expansion of Output or Capacity
Professor Hovencamp notes, "excess capacity can be part of
the entry deterrence strategy of a dominant firm. The domi-
nant firm can hold its excess capacity, plus the threat of future
output increases, over the heads of smaller firms thinking about
enlarging output or entering the market."3"4 In the seminal de-
331 Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault of Antitrust,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805 (1990).
332 HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 136-37
(1984).
'133 Id. at 138.
334 Id. at 182.
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cision of United States v. Aluminum Co.,335 Judge Learned Hand
held that Alcoa had actively discouraged new entry into the alu-
minum production industry by expanding its capacity more rap-
idly that the demand for its output warranted. Alcoa's program
of accelerated development effectively foreclosed entry, and was
"exclusionary," because it denied potential competitors a fair
share of the market. Similarly, a major carrier's increase of ca-
pacity in a market entered by an upstart airline, at a time when
passenger demand (measured by passenger enplanements) in-
creased less than the major airline's capacity increase, may be
primafacie evidence of a capacity expansion which unlawfully de-
ters entry.336
The costs of adding capacity to a market are significant. They
include the purchase price or lease on additional aircraft (or
the opportunity costs incurred when re-deploying existing air-
craft), training and salaries of flight crew, fuel, meals, distribu-
tion costs (including travel agent commissions, and computer
reservations systems fees, and advertising), gate leases, aircraft
maintenance, catering, ticketing costs, and so on. The cost of
increasing output by one unit of production (an aircraft) is ap-
proximately 80-85% of fully allocated costs, and higher than that
for a large mature carrier.
Fully allocated costs are used to determine route profitability
and unit costs within the airline industry. These costs are ad-
justed for stage length in order to determine the economics of
flying specific routes as there is a cost taper that occurs based
335 United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
336 After new entrant Frontier Airlines entered the market, United Airlines in-
creased its frequencies in the nonstop Denver-Los Angeles market from 14 daily
round-trips in August 1994, and 15 in August 1995, to 20 in August 1996. That
increased United's share to more than 90% of the flights in that city-pair market.
The Denver-Los Angeles market is the sixth biggest market in United's system
(AVIATION DAILY, Dec. 9, 1996, at 392), and United was determined to increase its
monopoly position in the market. Comparing August 1995 to August 1996,
United also added a new daily round-trip flight in the Denver-San Francisco mar-
ket and the Denver-Salt Lake city market, and two in the Denver-Las Vegas mar-
ket. Again, flights were added in these markets after Frontier entered.
Comparing 1996 with 1995, in the Denver-Las Vegas Market, United increased its
seat capacity up to 71% and flights 37%; in the Denver-Los Angeles market,
United increased seats up to 34% and flights 33%; in the Denver-Phoenix mar-
ket, United increased seats up to 38% and flights 27%; and in the Denver-San
Francisco market, United increased seats up to 19% and flights 16%. At cities
Frontier departed, United tended to reduce seat capacity and flights, year over
year. For example, in the Denver-Billings market, United reduced seats and
flights by as much as a third.
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upon the distance flown. Specifically, short haul flying is more
expensive to fly than longer stage lengths. Because short hauls
require higher fuel burn per mile traveled, less efficient aircraft
utilization, and higher cycle related maintenance and ground
handling costs, the shorter the distance flown, the higher the
cost per mile.
Roberts Roach & Associates, in their definitive work on this
subject, "Scorecard: Airline Industry Cost Management," have
identified by airline, and by aircraft type, the ASM cost of each
major air carrier. Their cost work only addresses fully allocated
costs.
Incremental costs are less understood on an industry wide ba-
sis, as the specific elements peculiar to each airlines incremental
costs are not available to the public. An airline considering the
addition of a specific aircraft to its fleet, uses these costs to deter-
mine the impact of this potential addition to its overall costs and
upon its specific route revenue analysis.
Route decisions and fare policy are not determined by incre-
mental costs but are made on the basis of fully allocated costs.
Similarly, when moving equipment from one route placement
into another, only fully allocated costs are considered with ad-
justments, as appropriate, for changes in stage length.
Each airline would have a set of specific outcomes for each
stage length and aircraft type. But if the relationship of incre-
mental cost and fully allocated cost can be said to remain in the
80%-85% range of fit (as adjusted for specific stage length) then
one can begin to draw some conclusions about fare levels and
their purpose and intent. Given the maturity and size of a major
carrier's fleet, that percentage would likely be higher by a signif-
icant measure.
2. Predatory Pricing
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of preda-
tory pricing and related anticompetitive practices in the context
of a service industry largely driven by network economies of
scale and scope, such as commercial aviation. 37 The courts
have made clear that key elements of antitrust analysis are to be
tailored to fit the unique characteristics of the industry involved.
The DOT has accurately summarized the economic characteris-
337 Aviation Competition Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, of the House
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 105th Cong. 1067 (Apr. 23, 1998) (testimony
of Mark Kahan, Exec. V.P. & General Counsel, Spirit Airlines).
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tics of the airline industry which explain why predation some-
times is the modus operandi of a major carrier when faced with
entry by a low-cost/low-fare airline:
Although the Supreme Court has said that predation rarely oc-
curs and is even more rarely successful, our informal investiga-
tions suggest that the nature of the air transportation industry
can at a minimum allow unfair exclusionary practices to succeed.
Compared to firms in other industries, a major air carrier can
price-discriminate to a much greater extent, adjust prices much
faster, and shift resources between markets much more readily.
Through booking and other data generated by computer reserva-
tions systems and other sources, air carriers have access to com-
prehensive, "real time" information on their competitors'
activities and can thus respond to competitive initiatives more
precisely and swiftly than firms in other industries .... These
characteristics of the air transportation industry allow a major
carrier to drive a new entrant from a local hub market. Having
observed this behavior, other potential new entrants refrain from
entering, leaving the major carrier free to reap greater profits
indefinitely.338
The Supreme Court last addressed the issue of predatory pric-
ing in a 1993 tobacco industry case of Liggett & Myers v. Brown &
Williamson Corp.339 The court re-emphasized that the antitrust
laws were passed to protect competition, not competitors, and
338 DOT, Request for Comments in Docket OST-98-3717 (Apr. 6, 1998).
339 Liggett & Myers v. Brown & Williamson Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). In an
earlier case, Matsushita, the Supreme Court observed:
[T]he success of [predatory pricing] schemes is inherently uncer-
tain: the short-run loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends
on successfully neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not
enough simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing
may breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the
excess profits. The success of any predatory pricing scheme de-
pends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to
recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain.
Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will material-
ize, and that it can be sustained for a significant period of time,
"[the] predator must make a substantial investment with no assur-
ance that it will pay off."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1995) (cit-
ing Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 263,
268 (1981)).
The Matsushita decision involved an alleged conspiracy of Japanese television
manufacturers. The court felt that a conspiracy among several firms to price
below costs was unlikely both because predatory pricing is costly, and success is
dependent on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes more likely to fail
than succeed. Id. at 594. Single firm predation by a monopolist, however, may
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said that to sustain a primafacie case under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, a plaintiff had to prove the following:
1. The prices complained of must be below an appropriate mea-
sure of its rival's costs.
2. The below-cost pricing must be capable of producing the in-
tended effects on the firm's rivals, such as driving them from
the market. This requires an evaluation of the extent and du-
ration of the alleged predation, the relative financial strength
of the predator and its intended victim, and their respective
incentives and will. The issue is whether, given the aggregate
losses caused by the below-cost pricing, the intended target
would likely succumb.
3. The competitor must have a reasonable prospect (or a dan-
gerous possibility) of recouping its short-term investment in
below-cost prices by achieving longer-term monopoly profits.
Once the rival is driven from the market, it must be likely that
the predator will be able to raise prices above a competitive
level adequate to recover the amounts expended on the pre-
dation, including the time value of the money invested in it.
In other words, the predator must be able to obtain sufficient
market power to set its prices above competitive levels for a
sufficient period of time in order to earn excess profits be-
yond those lost during the period of below-cost pricing."
In Brown & Williamson, the Supreme Court sustained dismis-
sal of a $149 million jury award for Liggett, principally because it
had failed to show how B&W, with only a 12% market share,
could recover its investment in below-cost sales.
With respect to the first criterion, some courts have endorsed
the "Areeda-Turner" test, which uses average variable costs as a
proxy for marginal costs. But others have criticized this as an
appropriate indicia of predation. William Baumol notes that:
[T]he threat to competition and to the general welfare is not a
function of the relationship between prices and costs, but rather
a matter of the responsiveness of pricing to changing competitive
developments. Thus, it seems appropriate to look beyond the
Areeda-Turner test, which evaluates matters solely in terms of the
relation between the established firm's prices and its marginal
costs or average variable costs.:"
be more likely to be successful. Recall that antitrust law is to be applied on a case-
by-case basis.
'140 Brooke Group Ltd. V. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 509 U.S. 209
(1993).
341 William Baumol, Quasi Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of
Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1979).
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The problem with the Areeda-Turner methodology is that,
thought it offers a bright line standard by which ostensibly to
measure costs, it does not work well in identifying predatory
pricing in an industry as complex as commercial aviation
(where, for example, pricing is but a single component of pred-
atory strategy, fixed costs bulk large as a percentage of total
costs, and because joint costs must be spread over an array of
origin-and-destination and connecting passengers and freight,
"true" costs are difficult to discern). Fully allocated costs, or in a
situation where a carrier commits additional capacity to a mar-
ket in which a new entrant appears, may well be far superior
proxies for costs in this industry.
The Supreme Court has yet to prescribe which measure of
cost should be used - Areeda-Turner or any other. In fact, the
Court has held that "no consensus has yet been reached on the
proper definition of predatory pricing" and left open the ques-
tion of whether "above-cost pricing coupled with predatory in-
tent is ever sufficient to state a claim of predation. 342 The
Supreme Court has also emphasized that antitrust claims are to
be resolved on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the particular
facts before it.34 3 Clearly, the unique economic characteristics
of commercial aviation have to be taken into account.
3 4 4
The difficulty of using variable costs as a proxy for an airline's
marginal costs is that they are extremely small in the airline in-
dustry, and nowhere near what would be necessary to attain
break-even. An additional passenger on a scheduled flight costs
the airline "peanuts," literally and figuratively. If every airline
priced every seat on the basis of average variable costs, all would
be bankrupt within a year. Because commercial aviation is a
capital intensive industry, with an extremely high ratio of fixed
to variable costs, and some other measure (perhaps fully allo-
cated costs or, as suggested above, incremental costs) is
appropriate.
The Transportation Research Board has recognized that, in
attempting to determine whether behavior is predatory on the
basis of pricing below costs, that an air carrier's marginal costs
in a particular market - even short-run average variable costs -
can be difficult to quantify retrospectively. However, the TRB
341 Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 118 n. 12 (1986).
343 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1991).
344 For a summary of what those unique economic characteristics are, see PAUL
DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR THE 21"
CENTURY 31-93 (Quorum 1997).
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concluded that opportunity cost - the value of the best alterna-
tive response that is foregone - is an appropriate method for
assessing the costs of the alleged predatory conduct. 45
Recognizing the difficulty of determining whether an airline's
price cutting or capacity dumping constitutes an antitrust viola-
tion, because of the industry's obscure cost characteristics, the
DOT has advocated a methodology focused on a firm's fore-
gone revenue, rather than the relationship between price and
cost."' The DOT has recognized that the incremental cost of
adding a passenger to a scheduled flight with empty seats is very
low. The incremental cost of an additional passenger on a full
flight is the foregone revenue lost from the passenger who can-
not be accommodated. If an airline decides to add a flight or
substitute a larger aircraft, the incremental cost would be addi-
tional costs incurred associated with those decisions. 47 Taking
an aircraft from a more lucrative market to a less profitable one
involves incurring lost opportunity costs of the more productive,
and profitable, use of that equipment.
In its antitrust suit against American Airlines, the Justice De-
partment alleged that by increasing flight and seat capacity in
city-pair markets entered by low cost carriers, American in-
curred increased costs in the form of the ownership and operat-
ing costs of additional aircraft allocated to those routes, as well
as labor, fuel, food, sales and other costs which would not have
been incurred absent the capacity increases. DOJ alleged that
the additional revenues generated by the increased capacity
were less than American's costs of allowing the flights as mea-
sured by (a) the flights' variable costs, (b) American's total costs
of serving the routes, and (c) American's own measure of route
profitability.- 48 For its part, American insisted that its prices
matched, but did not undercut, the new entrants' and covered
American's variable costs.34 9
Fares designed to match a lower-cost competitor's fare are a
competitive tool designed specifically to insure that market
share is not lost through competitive air pricing. This is true
345 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, ENTRY AND COMPETITION IN THE U.S.
AIRLINE INDUSTRY: ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES, E-7, E-8 (1999).
346 GAO, AVIATION COMPETITION: INFORMATION ON THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION'S PROPOSED POLICY 12 (July 1999).
347 Id. at 13.
348 United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 1999).
349 Press Release, American Airlines, American Airlines' Response to Depart-
ment of Justice's Allegations of Predatory Practices (May 13, 1999).
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whether or not air fare matching occurs at levels below either
fully allocated cost or incremental cost. (Given a major carrier's
scheduled departure frequency, market dominant frequent flyer
plan and more expansive meal and customer amenities, one
could also argue that a price match is, indeed, a price undercut.
Moreover, mileage awards are a de facto form of price rebating,
and therefore, price undercutting). Lowering prices below cost
and below a competitor's prices may constitute anti-competitive
or predatory behavior.
Moreover, some scholars question whether below-cost pricing
is even necessary to constitute true predation - that it may in
fact be evidenced by the injury imposed on competitors,
whether or not the incumbent monopolist suffers short-term
losses. Concluding that pricing between average variable costs
and average total costs may constitute predation, Paul Joskow
and Alvin Klevorick argue that predatory pricing "may or may
not entail actual short-run economic losses for the alleged
predator; it almost always imposes short-run economic losses on
some or all of the firm's existing competitors. ' 50 They note
that the exit of new entrants from a market increases the per-
ceived long-term risks of entry into the market, and thereby
raises the cost of capital of new entry. 5' William Comanor and
H.E. Frech conclude "the predator need not actually incur
losses in any standard accounting sense. His investment is
rather the lower profit earned due to his conduct as compared
with those that could otherwise be earned. 3 52 Thus, the sacri-
fice of profits to punish or deter new entrants suggest that op-
portunity costs may well be a better measure of predatory
behavior that attempting to measure losses according to a main-
stream accounting methodology. Paul Milgrom and John Rob-
erts observed, "predatory pricing can make excellent theoretical
sense, and yet the predatory prices bear no necessary relation to
marginal costs. 353
With respect to the Brown & Williamson's second criterion
(the potential of below-cost pricing driving the rival from the
350 Paul Joskow & Alvin Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
351 Id.
352 William Comanor & H.E. Frech III, Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of In-
tent, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 298 (1993).
353 PAUL MILGROM &JOHN ROBERTS, NEW THEORIES OF PREDATORY PRICING, IN
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 112 (Oxford Univer-
sity Press 1990).
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market), an upstart airline's bookings plummet when a major
carrier puts the new entrant in its cross-hairs. Because it earns
supra-competitive profits in its monopoly markets, the incum-
bent airline can cross-subsidize below-cost pricing for an ex-
tended period of time in order to drive a smaller competitor out
of business, unless of course, the major carrier is forced to abide
by the antitrust and competition laws.
With respect to Brown & Williamson's final criterion, recoup-
ment by the incumbent of short-term costs incurred in driving
the new entrant out seems likely in many, if not most, situations,
particularly where an incumbent is guarding a Fortress Hub.
Recall the analysis above, where it was revealed that the monop-
oly premium in Denver alone resulted in fares approximately
$750 million per year lower than those charged to O&D passen-
gers in Minneapolis or Dallas/Ft. Worth. According to Joskow
and Klevorick, "The predator expects that its entry-impeding,
exit-inducing strategy will enable it either eventually to raise
prices or to maintain an existing market structure in which
prices are above competitive levels .... The critical question is
whether or not the dominant firm can use that monopoly power
to maintain prices above the competitive level for some signifi-
"1354cant period of time ....
For the first two decades of deregulation, the failure of the
Transportation and Justice Departments to define a rational and
comprehensive view on predatory pricing behavior within the
aviation markets led to consistent abuse of this practice through-
out the United States. Following deregulation in 1978, the pub-
lic suffered the end of competition and even air service in so
many markets that the major carriers responsible for this phe-
nomenon believe themselves insulated from the law and its en-
forcement.35 5 Joskow and Klevorick noted, "Incorrectly labeling
a dominant firm's temporary price decrease as nonpredatory
will result in substantial long-run welfare losses if such a price
drop succeeds in deterring entry or in inducing exit and this
leaves the dominant firm with a substantial degree of monopoly
power. '315"
'354 Paul Joskow & Alvin Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predaory Pricing
Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
:55 PAUL DEMPSEY & ANDREW GOETZ, AIRLINE DEREGULATION & LAISSEZ FAIRE
MYrHOLOGv 221-38 (Quorum 1992).
356 Paul Joskow & Alvin Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
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3. Price Discrimination
Major carriers often charge prices above competitive levels in
their monopoly markets, using these profits to cross-subsidize
below-cost pricing in competitive markets. Persistent or system-
atic price discrimination is possible only if the dominant firm
has a certain level of market power in the markets containing
disfavored buyers. Refusal by dominant hub airlines to enter
into a joint-fare agreement with a new entrant places it in the
position of being a disfavored purchaser, causing it competitive
injury, for in effect, its customers must purchase United's con-
necting product at a non-discounted price.y 7 In United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Co.,358 Judge Wyzanski condemned the de-
fendant for earning a high rate of return in markets where it
had no competitors, and a much lower rate of return where
competition was greater. 151 Joskow and Klevorick observed, "By
sustaining losses in a few geographical markets for a couple of
years, while maintaining monopoly prices in others, the firm
could substantially reduce the rate of competitive entry over the
full range of geographical markets.""36 '
4. Monopoly Leveraging
Monopoly leveraging involves the exploitation of monopoly
power in one market to gain an unwarranted competitive advan-
tage in a second market.36 Monopoly leveraging requires proof
of three elements: (1) monopoly power in one market; (2) use
of that power to foreclose competition or gain a competitive ad-
vantage in a distinct market; and (3) injury amounting to a tan-
gible harm to competition.' 62 Dominant megacarriers can use
the supra-competitive profits earned from monopoly city-pair
357 PAUL DEMPSEY, UNFRIENDLY SKIES OVER COLORADO: UNITED AIRLINES' FOR-
TRESS HUB MONOPOLY AT DENVER 14 (1997).
358 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 340-41 (D.
Mass. 1953).
359 However, the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits anticompetitive price
discrimination, does not apply to the sale of services, so no independent cause of
action may be made under that statute.
3- Paul Joskow & Alvin Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing
Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979).
36, The circuits are split as to whether a monopoly leveraging claim is a valid,
separate cause of action under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Second Circuit
gave birth to the monopoly leveraging doctrine in Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit holds it is not a valid, sepa-
rate claim. See Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
362 Virgin Atlantic Airways v. British Airways, 872 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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markets to cross-subsidize losses in competitive markets in order
to dominate all routes radiating from the dominated hub. A
major carrier can also use the supra-competitive profits earned
from its first class service to cross-subsidize losses sustained in its
effort to monopolize the coach market in city-pairs radiating
from its hub. Several major airlines (including Continental,
Delta, United and US Airways) have also established an "airline-
within-an-airline" as a competitive weapon against low-cost com-
petitors. Costs of these weaponry subsidiaries often are both ob-
fuscated and cross-subsidized by the major airline which
establishes them in terms of direct capital subsidies, managerial
expertise, joint purchases of aircraft, fuel and insurance, and
joint utilization of gates, ticketing and maintenance facilities.
Moreover, by denying jet competitors connecting traffic (with its
refusal to enter into joint-fare and code-sharing agreements,
and biasing its computer reservations system against carriers
which do not have a code-sharing relationship with the domi-
nant carrier), the major airline can also use its domination of
the connecting market to monopolize the local origin-and-desti-
nation market.
Further, a carrier with the locally dominant computer reserva-
tions system, used by more travel agents than any other, can use
this domination of the retail air travel distribution network to
accentuate its dominance of air travel at its hub. For example,
Apollo's display bias against non-code-sharing connecting flights
(adding the equivalent of 24 hours to their display), coupled
with United's refusal to code-share with upstart airlines, gives
their product offerings inferior shelf space in the vertically inte-
grated retail market which United controls. 63 One court sum-
marized the pernicious impacts of CRS display bias:
Display biasing is unreasonably restrictive of competition in that
it restricts competition on the merits in the air transportation
business. When consumers attempt to purchase a ticket on the
best available flight their final decision is not solely based upon
the merits of the particular flight (flight time, price, service,
etc.). Rather, biasing artificially inflates the value of the host air-
line's flights by listing their flights above better flights. The con-
sumer bears the brunt of this practice by getting a less than
optimal flight, and the airline with the better flight has lost a sale
it should have otherwise made. This type of competitive advan-
tage depends upon the perpetuation of a fraud upon the con-
363 PAUL DEMPSEY, UNFRIENDLY SKIES OVER COLORADO: UNITED AIRLINES' FOR-
TRESS HUB MONOPOLY AT DENVER 12-18 (1997).
812
2002] PREDATION, COMPE77TION & AN77TRUST LAW 813
sumer. It is unreasonable and therefore an unwarranted
competitive advantage because it inhibits competition on the
merits. 3
64
According to Alfred Kahn, code-sharing has "hampered com-
petitive entry by smaller unaffiliated carriers, lacking that same
comprehensive feed of traffic; and they have probably also
tended to eliminate potential competitors .... ,,16' According to
the GAO, an airline that owns its own computer reservations sys-
tem stands a significantly better chance of selling its product
through its system than does'a competitor. 6 " A 1990 study re-
vealed that travel agents subscribing to a particular CRS "choose
that airline 41 percent of the time for business travelers and 55
percent of the time for leisure travelers. 3 67 This phenomenon
is referred to as the "halo effect"- a carrier with a dispropor-
tionate number of CRS terminals in a given area enjoys a greater
number of bookings relative to the capacity it offers in the
market.368
The disproportionate number of sales reflects several factors.
Among the most significant problems is the CRS algorithms
which bias CRS displays in favor of the offerings of the large
network carriers and their code-sharing affiliates. Stephen
Breyer put it this way:
[Critics allege that] CRS-owning airlines bias the programs and
displays in their own favor. Carrier A, for example, may use a
computer algorithm that lists all of its own connections before it
lists any connection with other airlines. Or it may list carriers
with which A maintains a marketing relationship before it lists
other carriers, or it may make up a supposedly neutral order for
display-say, "list carriers in order of elapsed time"-but then
use fake elapsed times to make certain the computer displays A
and its friends first. 3 69
Currently, CRS vendors severely penalize the display of off-
line connections. The large network carriers which own the
364 In re Air Passenger Computer Reservations Systems Antitrust Litigation,
694 F. Supp. 1443 (C.D. Calif. 1988).
365 Alfred Kahn, Market Power Issues In Deregulated Markets, 60 ANTITRUST L.J.
857 (1991).
366 GAO, AIRLINE COMPETITION: IMPACT OF COMPUTERIZED RESERVATIONS SYS-
TEMS (1986).
367 GAO, AIRLINE OPERATING & MARKETING PRACTICES 65 (1990).
36- THOMAS PETZINGER, HARD LANDING 242 (1995).
3- Stephen Breyer, Anticipating Antitrust's Centennial: Antitrust, Deregulation, and
the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1005, 1038 (1987) [citations
omitted].
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CRSs, with their vast route structures and ubiquitous code-shar-
ing alliances, are relatively less negatively impacted by such bias
penalties than their smaller rivals, with their less developed
route structures and intercarrier alliances. Code-sharing con-
nections are falsely (perhaps fraudulently) treated as if they
were on-line connections, to which no penalty is added, thereby
often elevating them to the first page of the CRS screen, and/or
shoving their competitors off the first page. Eighty-five percent
of sales are made from the first page of the CRS screen. Because
the largest airlines have the most ubiquitous code-sharing rela-
tionships, the competitive offerings of smaller, independent air-
lines receive poorer display. Moreover, through "dual
designations" many code-sharing flights are listed three differ-
ent times, creating enormous "screen clutter," and again, shov-
ing competitive offerings onto the second or third page of the
CRS display, where they rarely are sold.
The algorithms that determine which flights receive priority
are established by each CRS company. Typically, they involve a
formula consisting of the proximity of a flight to the requested
departure time (displacement time), plus total elapsed time from or-
igin to destination, plus penalties imposed on flights that re-
quire a connection, and those which involve a change in
airlines. Code-sharing interlining connections are falsely
treated as if they were on-line connections, to which no addi-
tional points (the equivalent of minutes) are added. However,
the major CRSs radically penalize interline connections which
do not enjoy a code-share. For example, Galileo adds 1,440
points (the equivalent of 24 hours); Worldspan adds 3,030
points; Sabre adds 999 points. In many instances, this pushes
the competitive interline connection off the first page of the
CRS screen, even where the interline connection is jet-to-jet,
and the CRS preferred code-share alternative is jet-to-
turboprop.
At a concentrated hub airport, the net impact of the enor-
mous penalty imposed by megacarrier dominated CRS vendors
against interline connections is to disadvantage interline con-
nections which have been denied a code-share by the dominant
airline, and thereby deprive independent competitors of suffi-
cient connecting traffic to sustain competition in thin markets
5. Refusal to Deal with a Competitor
Though ordinarily a firm has the discretion to choose those
with whom it will do business, a firm with monopoly power can-
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not refuse to deal with a competitor in the hope of destroying it
or creating a larger market for itself.37° The motive of the domi-
nant firm must be to injure a competitor or substantially drive it
from the market, for a refusal to deal raises antitrust concerns
only when it is an attempt by a dominant firm to create or main-
tain a monopoly. A refusal to deal is also an antitrust violation
where the firm refusing to deal is a monopolist and the refusal
to deal tends to create a monopoly in a second market. 7'I A
major carrier's refusal to enter into joint-fare or code-sharing
agreements with an upstart airline, and a major carrier's refusal
to sell a new entrant access to its frequent flyer program may fall
within this doctrine.
A monopolist must be unable to offer any plausible efficiency
justification for its refusal to deal.3 72 Given that consumers pre-
fer low-priced jet service to high-priced turboprop service, a ma-
jor carrier cannot argue that its customers enjoy better service
or lower prices by funneling its passengers onto turboprop affili-
ates, or refusing to code-share with regional jet carriers outside
the existing network. Major carriers sell frequent flyer points to
companies as diverse as hotel chains, rental car companies,
cruise lines, mortgage companies, florists, telephone companies,
and a variety of airlines. However, they refuse to sell points to
low-cost/low-fare airlines that attempt to compete at their mo-
nopoly Fortress Hubs.
6. Refusal to Share an "Essential Facility"
Related to the "refusal to deal" problem, an essential facility is
a productive asset that cannot reasonably and economically be
duplicated and to which access is necessary if one wishes to
enter the market and compete meaningfully in it. 373 A plaintiff
must prove that it is economically infeasible to reproduce the
facility, and that denial of access imposes a severe handicap on
the market entrant. The doctrine is intended to prevent a mo-
nopolist in one market from using its market power to inhibit
competition in another.374 The essential facilities doctrine
emerged in the Supreme Court decision of United States v. Termi-
370 Eleanor Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1140 (1982).
371 HERBERT HOVENCAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw 275 (1984).
372 Aspen Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
373 See Alaska Airlines v. United States, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991); Hecht v.
Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
374 Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
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nal Railroad,375 where the refusal of a consortium of railroads to
afford a competitor access across a bridge into St. Louis was
deemed to be predatory conduct attempting to monopolize the
trade. Other cases have extended the doctrine to the refusal of
a competing power company to "wheel" electricity across their
lines, 7 6 the refusal of a telephone network to allow a competitor
to have access to its local customers, 77 and the refusal of ski
areas to allow a competitor to market its operations in coopera-
tion with them.3
71
It could reasonably be argued that a dominant airline's vast
route network radiating from the hub constitutes an essential
facility under antitrust law, one that cannot realistically be dupli-
cated. Further, a major carrier's refusal to allow an upstart air-
line nondiscriminatory access to that network under joint-fare
and code-sharing agreements, and denial of frequent flyer plan
participation, may constitute a deliberate effort to discourage
customers from doing business with the upstart airline, monop-
olize the downstream travel market to cities throughout the re-
gion, and disadvantage consumers with inferior service and
higher prices. The Aspen Highlands case suggests a monopolist
can be required to cooperate with its competitors in a joint mar-
keting arrangement, like a frequent flyer program. Other exam-
ples of airline practices which may fall under the essential
facilities doctrine include the refusal to sub-lease underutilized
gates at airports without available gates to a new entrant, or an
incumbent airline's exercise of its "majority-in-interest" clause to
prohibit the airport from expanding gate capacity.
From the narrow perspective of a major carrier's perceived
competitive interests, a refusal to enter into a code-share and/or
joint-fare relationship with a regional jet carrier can enhance its
monopoly position. Any carrier providing jet service presents a
greater potential as a future rival in markets served by the major
carrier. By refusing to enter into cooperative relationships with
such regional jet carriers, the major carrier undermines their
economic viability, and even threatens their very existence. By
dealing exclusively with regional carriers providing only inferior
turboprop service, the major carrier assumes little risk of aiding
a potential rival in its major jet service markets.
375 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
376 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
377 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
378 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
816
2002] PREDATION, COMPETITION & ANTITRUST LAW 817
Such an exclusionary policy can only be practiced by a major
carrier that enjoys considerable monopoly power in the market-
place. While such a practice might appear perfectly rational
from the narrow perspective of the economic interest of the mo-
nopolist, the same might be said of a monopolist's price-fixing,
collusion, and other anti-competitive practices. No less than
these practices, however, exclusionary joint-fare and code-shar-
ing practices do irreparable damage to the competitive environ-
ment of the airline industry, and deter consumers from
receiving the competitive low-priced jet service they prefer.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with a major carrier choos-
ing to code-share or interline with a regional carrier on the basis
that such an agreement will improve the efficiency of service.
Where the decision to enter into such agreements is on the basis
of anti-competitive reasons unrelated to efficiency, however, the
law is very clear. As the United States Supreme Court recognized
in Aspen Skiing vs. Aspen Highlands,"9 "if a firm has been 'at-
tempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency' it
is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory. '"3 0
The law with regard to the "duty to deal" with potential com-
petitors has its origins in the "essential facilities" or "bottleneck"
doctrine first set forth in the Supreme Court case of United States
v. Terminal Railroad3 81 In that case, a railway company combina-
tion gained control of all railway connections across the Missis-
sippi river at St. Louis, making it impossible for any railroad
company to pass through St. Louis without using the facilities
controlled by the railroad combination. This power gave the
combination veto power over use of the facility by a competitor.
The Court held that the exercise of such power was a violation
of the Sherman Act, and ordered a reorganization under which
the combination was required to make its facilities available to
competitors "upon such just and reasonable terms and regula-
tions as will . . .place every such company upon as nearly an
equal plane .... ,,112
This "duty to deal" under the antitrust laws was further devel-
oped by the Supreme Court in Otter Tail Power v. United States. 83
In that case, Otter Tail Power company refused to deal with mu-
nicipalities seeking to establish their own power systems when
37" Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605.
380 Id.
381 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
382 Id. at 410.
383 Otter Tail Power v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
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Otter Tail's retail franchises expired. Specifically, the power
company refused to transport wholesale power to the municipal
systems.
Otter Tail argued that unless it refused to deal with the mu-
nicipalities, the municipalities would eventually turn to public
power and that Otter Tail would suffer economic injury. In
other words, Otter Tail argued that since it was acting in its own
economic interest, it had no duty to deal with the municipali-
ties. The Court sharply rejected this argument, citing United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn Co." 4 for the proposition that "The pro-
motion of self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of reason
to immunize the otherwise illegal conduct."3"5 The Court ob-
served that the Sherman Act assumes that an enterprise will pro-
tect itself by offering superior service, lower costs, and improved
efficiency, and not by anticompetitive uses of its dominant eco-
nomic power.
In the context of exclusionary joint-fare or code-sharing prac-
tices, a similar question must be asked as to whether a major
carrier's refusal to enter into cooperative agreements with a new
entrant is for the purpose of improving the quality of service, or
for other anticompetitive reasons. If given a reasonable oppor-
tunity for choice, most passengers would readily vote with their
feet by opting for jet rather than small turboprop air service to
their ultimate or secondary destinations, the efficiency argu-
ment of connecting with such small, slow turboprop aircraft,
with less cabin room and fewer in-flight amenities (no lavatories
or galleys, for example) would be disbelieved by any objective
observer.
In the case of Otter Tail, the dissenters argued that Otter Tail
had no duty to deal with the municipalities since it had "asserted
a legitimate business interest in keeping its lines free for its own
power sales and in refusing to lend a hand in its own demise by
wheeling cheaper power from the Bureau of Reclamation to
municipal consumers which might otherwise purchase power at
retail from Otter Tail itself."" 6 A similar argument might be
made today by major carriers that they should have no duty to
deal with regional jet carriers that might pose a future competi-
tive challenge. However, such an argument was specifically re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Otter Tail, which concluded that
"s4 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
315 Id. at 379.
3,1 Id. at 385.
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such a refusal to deal constituted a "use of monopoly power...
to foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage. 387
The Court further noted that "use of monopoly power 'to de-
stroy threatened competition' is a violation of the 'attempt to
monopolize' clause of section 2 of the Sherman Act." '388
The long antitrust saga resulting in the break-up of AT&T is
also instructive. MCI successfully employed the antitrust laws to
secure nondiscriminatory access to the vast AT&T network, ulti-
mately resulting in AT&T paying MCI millions of dollars in dam-
ages, and the Justice Department forcing a consent decree
breaking up AT&T into seven regional holding companies and a
single long-distance carrier. Today, it is inconceivable that a re-
gional telephone company would be allowed to enter into dis-
criminatory connections and rate agreements with preferred
long-distance telephone companies. Given the manifest paral-
lels between the communications and transportation networks,
the case law developed on the essential facilities antitrust doc-
trine is directly applicable here and requires nondiscriminatory
ticketing & baggage,joint-fare, and code-sharing agreements be-
tween a dominant carrier with a new entrant which seeks such
relationships.
In MCI v. AT&T,389AT&T declined to enter into an intercon-
nection agreement with its competitor, MCI, to allow MCI to
have nondiscriminatory access to its telephone network. The
Supreme Court held that this refusal to deal with a competitor
was governed by the essential facilities doctrine as set forth in
Terminal Railroad, concluding that "the antitrust laws have im-
posed on firms controlling an essential facility the obligation to
make the facility available on non-discriminatory terms.
90
The Court set forth four elements necessary to establish liabil-
ity under the essential facilities doctrine:
1. control of the essential facility by the monopolist;
2. a competitor's practical inability to duplicate the essential
facility;
3. the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and
4. the feasibility of providing the facility.
387 Id. at 366.
388 Id.
389 MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
39 Id. at 1132.
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All of these elements are satisfied when applied to the current
circumstances of a major carrier refusing to enter into joint-fare
and code-sharing agreements with a regional jet carrier.
First, major airlines and their code-sharing affiliates control
nearly 70% of all passenger traffic at numerous strategic hub
airports, and control more than 90% of connecting passenger
traffic as well. A major airline's vast route system radiating from
a hub is analogous to AT&T's telephone lines or Otter Tail's
electric wires; a major carrier's dominance of a hub is analogous
to Terminal Railroad's railroad switching yard at St. Louis. A
major carrier's frequent flyer program is analogous to Aspen
Skiing's ski card.
Second, it is clearly impractical for a small regional jet carrier
to duplicate the route network resources controlled by one of
the world's largest airlines. Just as it would have been manifestly
impossible for MCI to replicate the AT&T network to reach all
of AT&T's monopoly customers, it would be impossible for a
small regional carrier to duplicate the network of a large airline.
Third, several major carriers have refused to allow upstart air-
lines to enter into joint-fare, code-sharing or Mileage Plus rela-
tionships with them. The only apparent reason for such refusal
to deal on the part of major carriers is the anticompetitive rea-
son of not wanting to in any way aid its potential competition (a
low-cost/low-fare jet carrier which dares to compete at the mo-
nopoly Fortress Hub it dominates)-a reason held to be clearly
unlawful in Otter Tail. Indeed, in MCI the Court held that the
violation of AT&T's duty to deal was analogous to Otter's Tail's
violation, noting that "no legitimate business or technical reason
was shown for AT&T's denial of the requested interconnec-
tions." '' The Court further noted that MCI "was not requesting
preferential access to the facilities that would justify a denial."
Although some major carriers advance a labor-related reason
for declining to enter into such cooperative code-sharing agree-
ments with upstart airlines, no cases can be found which have
accepted a union contract rationale to uphold anticompetitive
behavior antithetical to the antitrust laws. Clearly, there is no
authority for the proposition that a "scope clause" in a union
contract can supersede the antitrust laws. Moreover, the sham
"scope clause" defense is wholly inapplicable to a major carrier's
refusal to enter into a nondiscriminatory joint-fare relationship
with an upstart airline, or sell it access its frequent flyer pro-
391 Id. at 1133.
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gram. Further, the Court in Terminal R.R. emphasized that ac-
cess to an essential facility must be "upon such just and
reasonable terms and regulations as will, in respect of use, char-
acter, and cost of service, place every such company upon as
nearly an equal plane as may be with respect to expenses and
charges as that occupied by the proprietary companies. ''111 2
The essential facilities doctrine has been applied by analogy
to a variety of circumstances similar to those here. Under this
line of cases, the focus is "on the intent and competitive effect of
the refusal to deal; not on whether the facility itself is
'essential.' -393
For example, in Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands,94 a company
operating three out of four skiing mountains in Aspen, Colo-
rado, declined to renew an agreement with an operator of the
fourth skiing mountain for a joint multi-day ski-lift ticket. At
trial on an allegation of monopolization, evidence revealed that
as a result of the defendant's refusal to market a multi-day,
multi-mountain ticket with plaintiff, the plaintiff was severely
damaged from a competitive standpoint, while the defendant,
through its control of three of the four mountains, could con-
tinue to offer such a ticket. The Court held that the multi-
mountain ticket was a "facility," and further held that the defen-
dant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff in issuing a joint multi-
mountain ticket revealed an intent to "create or maintain a mo-
nopoly" in violation of the Sherman Act. 95 The Court found
that "by refusing to cooperate with plaintiff, defendant became
the only business in Aspen that could offer a multi-day, multi-
mountain skiing experience. " '
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, applying the
four MCI factors in finding a violation of the Sherman Act.
First, it found that the defendant's refusal to enter into a joint
ticket agreement was "sufficiently analogous to Terminal Rail-
road to satisfy the element of control of an essential facility. 397
Second, the court found that there was no practical opportunity
for the plaintiff to develop another ski mountain in the Aspen
392 United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912).
393 MCI, 708 F.2d at 1148.
394 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
395 Aspen Highlands Skiiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiiing Co., 738 F. 2d 1509, 1520
(10th Cir. 1984).
396 Id. The jury awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $2.5 million,
which was trebled by the district court to $7.5 million.
397 Id. at 1520.
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area. Third, there was no dispute that defendant denied the use
of the joint ticket "facility" to plaintiff. Fourth, there was no evi-
dence that it was not feasible for the defendant to provide the
plaintiff with access to the joint ticket "facility" or that there was
a legitimate service or efficiency reason for refusing to deal with
the plaintiff.
In affirming the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the non-competitive purpose in refusing to deal, holding
that "if a firm has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some
basis other than efficiency' it is fair to characterize its behavior
as predatory." '98
The Supreme Court restated that while there is no "general"
duty to engage in a joint marketing program with a competitor,
"the absence of an unqualified duty to cooperate does not mean
that every time a firm declines to participate in a particular co-
operative venture ... that it may not give rise to liability. 3 9 9 The
Court characterized the lack of any "general" obligation as sim-
ply the counterpart of the "independent businessman's cher-
ished right to select his customers and his associates. "400
However, "the high value that we have placed on the right to
refuse to deal with other firms does not mean that the right is
unqualified.'"41
In LoraineJournal, the Supreme Court found a newspaper to
be in violation of the Sherman Act for refusing to sell advertis-
ing to persons that patronized a competing radio station. The
Court stated that:
The publisher claims a right as a private business concern to se-
lect its customers and to refuse to accept advertisements from
whomever it pleases. We do not dispute that general right. But
the word "right" is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so
easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an un-
qualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified....
The right claimed by the publisher is neither absolute nor exempt from
regulation. Its exercise as a purposeful means of monopolizing interstate
commerce is prohibited by the Sherman Act. '40 2
Although the violation found in Loraine Journal was an "at-
tempt to monopolize," the Supreme Court cited United States v
'19,1 Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 605.
,99 1(. at 599.
400 Id.
411 Id. (citing Loraine Journal v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951)) [emphasis
supplied].
402 Id. at 153 [emphasis supplied].
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Aluminum Co.4" 3 for the proposition that "no monopolist mono-
polizes unconscious of what he is doing", and Judge Bork for the
proposition that "improper exclusion (exclusion not the result
of superior efficiency) is always deliberately intended. 4 4
The Court also defined what was meant by "exclusionary" be-
havior. This term "comprehends at the most behavior that not
only 1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also 2)
either does not further competition on the merits or does so in
an unnecessarily restrictive way. '"405 The question is therefore
whether United Airlines' exclusionary joint-fare and code-shar-
ing practices 1) limit the opportunities of regional jet carriers,
and 2) unnecessarily limit competition for anticompetitive pur-
poses unrelated to providing the highest quality of jet service to
air travelers.
The most important finding of the Supreme Court in Aspen
was that "it seems appropriate to infer that [the joint skiing tick-
ets] satisfy consumer demand in competitive markets".4 6 An
analogous inference with regard to the circumstances relevant
here would be that air travelers in a free competitive market
would, given an equal fare, choose to travel on a carrier offering
jet service rather than a relatively small commuter turboprop
aircraft to an ultimate destination from a transfer point.
Certainly a policy of refusing to deal on a non-discriminatory
basis with regional jet carriers is not a policy with a legitimate
business objective, nor is the desire to inhibit or suppress com-
petition a valid business reason for such a policy. Indeed, the
burden would be on a carrier to rebut the presumption that an
airline policy of deliberating denying its customers the option of
economical and efficient jet interline service is not a valid busi-
ness reason.
As we have seen, the refusal to deal with a competitor has
been held to constitute predatory behavior and an unlawful use
of monopoly power to foreclose competition under Aspen Skiing
v. Aspen Highlands, United States v. Terminal Railroad, Otter Tail
Power v. United States, and MCI v. AT&T,
403 United States v Aluminum Co.,148 F. 2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945).
404 Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 601.
405 Id. at 605 (citing AREEDA AND TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 78 (1978)).
406 Id. at 603.
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7. Raising Rivals' Costs
Evaluating the post-deregulation experience, during which he
served as CEO of a small airline (New York Air), deregulation
architect Michael Levine concluded, 'I believe predation is pos-
sible and that it occurs .... [I] t is possible for an incumbent to
impose on prospective entrants nonrecoverable costs by pricing
in a way that seeks to ensure that they do not attract a significant
share of passengers regardless of the incumbent's own costs."4 °7
In a thorough treatment of the subject, Professors Krat-
tenmaker and Salop introduced a new analytical model into situ-
ations like these, where a larger firm attempts to injure a smaller
firm by raising its costs of operation. Krattenmaker and Salop
suggest proper antitrust analysis involves a two-pronged test: (1)
does the challenged conduct unavoidably and significantly in-
crease the cost of its competitors; and (2) if so, does raising the
rivals' costs enable the excluding firm to exert monopoly power
to raise prices above, or restrict output below, a competitive
level?408
Since sunk costs are not trivial, and an incumbent can re-
spond in price and quantity as quickly as a new competitor can
enter the threat of hypothetical new entry materializing appar-
ently has little effect on an incumbent's pricing, contrary to the
essential tenet of contestability theory.40 9
Although many neo-classical economists continue to cling to
the notion that predation is irrational and therefore highly un-
likely to exist, modern economics literature has developed a the-
oretical model which supports the notion that dominant firms
may attain monopoly power by placing their competitors at a
competitive cost disadvantage.4"' In the airline industry, this
may be reflected in vertical agreements between major airlines
and their commuter feeders, which make replication of the con-
necting network prohibitive, or vertical ownership of computer
reservations systems, which charge rivals prices far above any
reasonable measure of costs. Raising rivals costs may also be re-
flected in a dominant hub carrier's refusal to enter into ticket-
ing-and-baggage, joint-fare, and/or code-sharing with smaller
407 Michael Levine, Airline Deregulation: A Perspective, 60 ANTrrRUST L.J. 687, 689
(1991).
408 Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Ri-
vals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209 (1986).
409)
4111 Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Ri-
vals' Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986).
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regional jet carriers, and other violations of the "essential facili-
ties doctrine." As Professors Krattenmaker and Salop note:
There have been a number of criticisms made of the plausibility
of predatory pricing, but these arguments do not apply to the
exclusionary strategies we analyze. Raising rivals' costs can be a
particularly effective method of anticompetitive exclusion. This
strategy need not entail sacrificing one's own profits in the short
run; it need not require classical market power as a prerequisite
for its success; and it may give the excluding firm various options
in exercising its acquired power.4 '
In one sense, barriers to entry appear deceivingly small, and
were deemed inconsequential by deregulation's architects. As
former Assistant DOT Secretary Matt Scocozza said, "in 1978 we
envisioned that there would be a hundred airlines flying to every
major hub."'4 12 A large used aircraft leasing market and a large
number of skilled workers (individuals who had been laid off by
the major airlines or lost their jobs because of major carrier liq-
uidation) were available in the early 1990s. Despite their finan-
cial collapse, airlines remain a glamorous industry. Coupled
with investor and lender enthusiasm for new airline ventures,
this led to the emergence of a number of new airlines in the
early 1990s. But entering and surviving are two entirely differ-
ent things.4 13 More than a hundred new airlines have emerged
since deregulation, and the overwhelming majority have col-
lapsed in bankruptcy. 14 Moreover, even entering a single mar-
ket where the incumbent enjoys supra-competitive profits is
difficult, given that the overwhelming number of nonstop city-
pair routes appear able to support only a single airline, and that
new entry must manifest itself inflexibly in plane-load lots.415
Barriers to entry have been defined as "any factor that pre-
vents a new firm from competing on a equal footing with ex-
isting firms. '4 16 These factors are numerous in the airline
industry, ranging from the refusal of major carriers to allow
smaller jet competitors nondiscriminatory access to their vast
411 Id. at 223.
412 The Frenzied Skies, Bus. WK., Dec. 19, 1988, at 70, 71.
413 WILLIAM O'CONNOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIRLINE ECONOMICS 7 (5th ed.
1995).
414 For a list, see PAUL DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT:
STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 115-18 (1997).
415 MELVIN BRENNER, JAMES LEET & ELIHU SCHOTT, AIRLINE DEREGULATION 50
(1985).
416 EDWIN DOLAN, ECONOMICS 602 (4th ed. 1986).
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connecting network monopolies, to computer reservations
systems.
Economies of scale, scope and density also appear to exist in
the airline industry, although the fact that new entrant airlines
have lower ASM costs than established major airlines might sug-
gest the contrary to those who do not look more deeply. Infor-
mational economies are associated with incumbency-a small
carrier must invest in relatively higher advertising, marketing
and ramp up costs in introducing its service to a city-pair mar-
ket, while a large established carrier adding that city-pair to its
existing hub network has relatively lower start-up costs. Econo-
mies of scale and scope are achieved as a carrier increases fre-
quency in a market (spreading more customers over its station
costs, for example), as well as the impact enhanced frequency
has on demand for its product (because of the S-curve relation-
ship between frequency and capacity on one axis, and revenue
and yields on the other) the carrier with more frequency enjoys
a disproportionately larger share of passengers and higher-yield
revenue.417 A hub carrier also enjoys network economies by ad-
ding a spoke to an existing hub network, offering a vast increase
in the number of city-pair products it can offer. According to
Levine, "We have seen the creation of a large number of hub
monopolies because of the economies of scale and scope at the
hubs."4 18 Kahn has insisted, "We advocates of deregulation were
misled by the apparent lack of evidence of economies of
scale. 41 9 Add to network economies the vast increase in prod-
uct lines that are added when large networks are joined together
in code-sharing relationships, relationships from which new en-
trants are generally excluded. Anticompetitive behavior by air-
line monopolists exacerbates these economic and structural
barriers to entry.
Then there are the "induced" scale and scope effects, includ-
ing frequent flyer programs (for which larger network carriers
have a manifest advantage vis-A-vis their smaller competitors)
which attract higher-yield business travelers, and travel agent
commission overrides, which essentially bribe agents to steer
business toward the carrier which offers them. These have been
417 PAUL DEMPSEY & LAURENCE GESELL, AIRLINE MANAGEMENT: STRATEGIES FOR
TH E 21ST CENTURY 36-38 (1997).
418 Michael Levine, Airline Deregulation: A Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 693
(1991).
419 Alfred Kahn, Surprises from Airline Deregulation, 78 AEA PAPERS & PROCEED-
INGS 316, 318 (1988).
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described in the literature as the "principal-agent" problem. z
As Levine has noted, "by constructing incentive commission pro-
grams and by inventing frequent flyer programs, big airlines
learned to create economies of scope and scale that are not pre-
sent in the basic technology. '4 2' Alfred Kahn has recognized,
"computerized reservation systems and frequent flyer pro-
grams . . . have contributed to [major carrier] dominance of
their respective hubs, increased their ability to exploit the inelas-
ticity of demand for their services by frequent business travelers,
and erected obstacles to competition by smaller rivals. '422 The
GAO found:
Practices such as frequent flyer programs and travel agent com-
mission overrides encourage travelers to choose one airline over
another on the basis of factors other than obtaining the best fare.
Such practices may be most importation if an airline is already
dominant in a given market or markets. Ultimately this may lead
to higher fares than would exist in the absence of these market-
421ing programs.
Levine cataloged the multitude of developments not antici-
pated by the pro-deregulation economists-mergers and consol-
idations, vertical integration, hub-and-spoke systems,
complicated fare structures, frequent flyer programs, travel
agent commission overrides, computer reservations systems
[CRS], slot and gate monopolies, predation, and the high mor-
tality rate among new entrants. From these developments, he
concluded:
[T] hese unanticipated effects of deregulation seem to stem from
the economics of information and from related economies of
scope and scale, and from production indivisibilities (such as the
problems of providing frequent and convenient service in city-
pair markets with small traffic flows) .... Frequent flyer pro-
grams, the importance of travel agents and travel agent incentive
programs, computer reservations systems, and hub and spoke sys-
tems all are techniques of utilizing economies of scale and scope
to take best advantage ... of the costs of communicating a com-
420 See Ross, The Economic Theoy of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 63 Am. ECON.
REv. 134 (1973).
421 Michael Levine, Airline Deregulation: A Perspective, 60 ANTrRUST L.J. 687, 690
(1991). See Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALEJ. REG. 393, 419 (1987).
422 Alfred Kahn, Market Power Issues In Deregulated Industries, 60 ANTIRUST L.J.
857 (1991).
423 GAO, International Aviation Alliances and the Influence of Airline Market-
ing Practices, GAO/T-RCED-98-131 (Mar. 19, 1998).
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plex web of service and service attributes to consumers .... The
information and transaction costs are real .... 424
Major carrier CRS fees are a source of significant distribution
costs on smaller rivals. Several observers of the airline industry
have expressed concern about CRS fees, unilaterally imposed by
CRS vendors, and undisciplined by competition among the
members of the CRS oligopoly. Said one, "even if airlines own-
ing the systems do not discriminate, they can exact a supra-com-
petitive price for access to the reservation system if the market
for the systems is not competitive. '4 25 The GAO concurred:
CRSs earn profits exceeding those that could reasonably be ex-
pected to be earned in a competitive market. They therefore un-
fairly transfer millions of dollars of revenues annually from
airlines that do not own CRSs to those that do, making the for-
mer less competitive in the marketplace....
These excessive booking fees, in combination with the incremen-
tal revenues earned by CRS vendors, resulted in the transfers of
millions of dollars per year from non-vendors to vendors.4 26
Because of the dearth of competition in the CRS industry,
United and American earn more than $300 million per year
from weaker airlines beyond the cost of providing the service,
according to the GAO.427 The DOT has concluded that booking
fees charged other airlines were approximately double Ameri-
can's or United's average costs.4 28 These carriers enjoy rates of
return on their CRSs of between 60% to 100% a year. 429 Ameri-
can's Sabre earned a 20% operating margin in 1993, and a 24%
operating margin in 1994.43o Critics have argued that CRSs pro-
duce extraordinary profits for their owners, far beyond the rents
that could be exacted in a fully competitive market. For exam-
424 Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strat-
egy, and Public Policy, 4YALEJ. REG. 393, 423 (1987).
425 Jerome Ellig, Computer Reservations Systems, Creative Destruction and Consumer
Welfare, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 287, 288 (1991).
426 GAO, AIRLINE COMPETITION: INDUSTRY OPERATING AND MARKETING PRAc-
TICEs LIMIT MARKET ENTRY 63 (Aug. 1990).
4'27 Intelligence, AvIATION DAILY (Feb. 11, 1991), at 269.
428 The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry and the Adequacy of Competition:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works &
Transp., 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. XVII (1991); DOT, STUDY OF COMPUTER RESERVA-
TIONS SYSTEMS 110 (1988).
429 The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry and the Adequacy of Competition:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works &
Transp., 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. XVIII (1991).
410 AMR CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1994).
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ple, they have asserted that Sabre gives American Airlines fees in
excess of costs of approximately $215 million a year, and an ad-
vantage of $328 million a year as a result of the "halo" effect."'
CRS vendors impose a charge (approximately $3.10) based on
each and every booking made on an airline, irrespective of
whether a ticket is sold or segment flown reflecting that book-
ing. CRS vendors insist airlines pay high fees based on reserva-
tions booked, rather than segments flown, and incentivize travel
agents to maintain high booking levels via productivity rewards
conferred on the basis of increased CRS usage. Under the CRS
productivity pricing contractual provisions, rent payable by an
agent is reduced if the travel agent maintains a certain volume
of bookings per month.432 Of course, additional bookings result
in additional revenue to the CRS. But from the perspective of
the airline whose product is booked, where an agent books,
cancels, and re-books a reservation several times, the aggregate
CRS fees can erode or eliminate profit on its sale, even if the
ticket which corresponds to the reservation is sold. False book-
ings increase distribution costs for airlines, exacerbate the reve-
nue transfer problem from smaller to the larger airlines that
own CRSs, and result in inventory spoilage. Such increased
transactions costs serve no legitimate market purpose, and result
in a regressive wealth transfer from small to large airlines (which
own CRSs).
Passive segments are bookings made by a travel agent for any
flight any time, whether the desired class of service is sold out or
not. The bookings are nefariously not communicated to the in-
ternal reservations system of the carrier whose flights are
booked. Sometimes agents issue a ticket with an expired date.
Delays are experienced when these passengers arrive at the air-
port because the airline has no record of them. Legitimate pas-
sengers are inconvenienced, and sometimes denied boarding.
Thus, consumers also are ill-served by passive bookings.
CRSs also give the major airlines which own them access to
real-time market demand information with which to engage in
yield management-expanding or contracting the low- or high-
fare buckets as demand falls or rises, respectively. CRSs allow
the accumulation of exceptionally detailed information on con-
431 The Financial Condition of the Airline Industry and the Adequacy of Competition:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works &
Transp., 102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1991) (statement of Edward R. Beauvais).
432 Mia Wouters, The Hybrid Relationship Between Computer Reservations Systems
(CRSs) and Airlines, AVIATION Q. 346, 348 (1997).
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sumer travel patterns between any conceivable pair of city-pairs
on the planet. DOT regulations do require marketing, booking
and sales data must be made available to all participating carri-
ers on a non-discriminatory basis.4"' However, the exorbitant
fees charged by CRS owners for the data tapes are cost prohibi-
tive for small airlines. The North American tapes cost approxi-
mately $10,000 per month per CRS, for a total annual cost for
the data of the four CRSs of $480,000. In fact, some estimate
the cost at $2 million per year. These figures are well beyond
the economic reach of a small airline. As a consequence, the
megacarriers have detailed real-time data on small carrier sales
through their CRSs, while the small carriers are effectively de-
nied access to the same sales data of the major carriers, and even
if they can afford it, can not have the real-time access CRS own-
ers do. One wonders whether Wal-Mart would have been snuf-
fed out in its infancy had Sears and Montgomery Ward had
proprietary data concerning its sales, offering to divulge their
sales data only at a price beyond the ability of their competitors
to pay. The extraordinary data access fees charged by major car-
riers' computer reservations system also may fall under the "rais-
ing rivals costs" doctrine.
As Michael Levine, now Senior Vice President at Northwest
Airlines, observed:
An airline that controls the system on which travel agents make
bookings on itself and its competitors gains market intelligence
because it receives real-time information about market prefer-
ences and the success of marketing initiatives. An airline without
access to the information generated by such a system knows only
the travel patterns of those who buy its tickets....
In contrast, an airline whose CRS is used by travel agents has ac-
cess to a very accurate picture of both its own and its rivals' busi-
ness patterns .... A CRS owner can then use this information to
distort market signals to its rivals, leading them to make incorrect
decisions. When a CRS owner sees travel agents making book-
ings on a rival airline's flights, it can intervene through targeted
secret incentive programs in an attempt to switch business. By
responding selectively, it can temporarily distort signals the mar-
ket sends to competitors, in order to persuade the rival to aban-
don fares, schedules, or even routes where, absent these secret
interventions, its offerings would be preferred by consumers.
4 34
411 14 C.F.R. § 255.10 (2002).
434 Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theoy, Firm Struc-
ture, and Public Policy, 4 YALEJ. REG. 393, 461-62 (1987).
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Finally, equal access to technology essentially exists on the op-
erations side of the equation-if it has adequate financial re-
sources, a new airline can buy or lease a 737 or an MD-80 nearly
as easily as an established airline can (albeit not at the same
price). But on the distribution side of the equation, the largest
airlines, which own the computer reservations systems, through
which the vast majority of flights are sold, are incentivized to
display their competitors' flights more poorly, and earn signifi-
cant supra-competitive profits from their competitors' CRS
bookings and sales.435 In this way, major airlines raise their ri-
vals' costs so as to cause them economic harm.
8. Exclusive Dealing Arrangements
An exclusive dealing arrangement is a contract whereby the
buyer promises to purchases all its product from a particular
seller. An exclusive dealing claim requires proof of: (1) an
agreement; and (2) an unreasonable restraint of trade or com-
merce (such as the foreclosure of competition in a substantial
share of the line of commerce affected).436 Such arrangements
are analyzed both under section 1 of the Sherman Act (which
prohibits collusive anticompetitive activities which restrain trade
or commerce)"' and section 3 of the Clayton Act (which pro-
hibits tying arrangements). The 1985Justice Department guide-
lines state that exclusive dealing arrangements may be
anticompetitive when they exclude rivals from the market. A
major airline's exclusive agreements with corporate purchasers
and their requirement that travel agents book the incumbent's
product disproportionately in order to earn commission over-
rides may fall under this doctrine. Alfred Kahn has recognized
that override commissions "amount to an inducement to exclu-
sive dealing" at odds with Clayton § 3.4"8 Michael Levine found
"Incentive commission programs attempt to induce the agent to
breach his responsibility to travelers in favor of a particular
airline.""3 9
435 PAUL DEMPSEY, UNFRIENDLY SKIES OVER COLORADO: UNITED AIRLINES' FOR-
TRESS HUB MONOPOLY AT DENVER 12-18 (1997).
436 International Distribution Centers v. Walsh Trucking, 812 F.2d 786, 793 (2d
Cir. 1987).
437 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2002).
438 Alfred Kahn, Market Power Issues In Deregulated Industries, 60 ANTITRUST L.J.
857 (1991).
439 Michael Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strat-
egy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. REG. 393, 462 (1987).
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A major carrier's requirements of exclusive dealing by its re-
gional code-sharing turboprop feeder carriers also fall within
the "exclusive dealing" prohibition.
A 1996 GAO report entitled "Barriers to Entry Continue to
Limit Competition in Several Key Domestic Markets"
concluded:
[A]irlines sometimes choose not to enter new markets because
certain strategies of the established airlines make it extremely dif-
ficult for other carriers to attract traffic. These marketing strate-
gies include bonus commissions paid to travel agents, frequent
flyer plans, airline ownership of the computer reservation sys-
tems used by travel agents, and code-sharing partnerships with
commuter carriers. Taken together, these new marketing strate-
gies deter new as well as established airlines from entering those
markets where an established airline is dominant. As a result,
competition suffers, leading to higher airfares.44 °
V. POLICY ANALYSIS
Major airlines have alleged that new entrant airlines advocate
re-regulation of the airline industry. 4 ' That allegation is pa-
tently absurd. New entrants are airlines born of deregulation.
They ask that the existing competition laws, applicable to every
other industry in the United States, also be made applicable to
the world's largest airlines. One must recall the admonitions of
Alfred Kahn, the father of deregulation, who repeatedly in-
sisted, "When we deregulated the airlines, we certainly did not
intend to exempt them from the antitrust laws."'4 42 According to
Kahn, "Manifestly, withdrawal of the regulatory protections en-
tails a correspondingly accentuated reliance on vigorous anti-
trust enforcement. 443
Yet in the two decades of deregulation, the antitrust and com-
petition laws have not been applied with full force to the airline
industry. According to Paul Hudson, Executive Director of Avia-
tion Consumer Action Project:
[T] he major carriers have been very busy undermining free mar-
ket competition, while the DOT and the Justice Departments
440 GAO, AIRLINE DEREGULATION: BARRIERS To ENTRY CONTINUE TO LIMIT COM-
PETITION IN SEVERAL KEY DOMESTIC MARKETS 2 (Oct. 1996).
441 See Roger Gibson, Controls Could Turn Clock Back 20 Years, DENVER POST, May
4, 1997, at El.
442 Melanie Pickett, The Air Fare Puzzle, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1989, at D3.
443 Alfred Kahn, Market Power Issues In Deregulated Industries, 60 ANTITRUST L.J.
857 (1991).
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have been distracted or asleep. How major airlines do this is
complicated, but in essence it involves use of unfair competition
that limits consumer access to low cost air transportation, re-
frains from vigorous price competition, engages in various forms
of commercial bribery and coercion, limits consumer access to
price information, and utilizes discriminatory pricing, and decep-
tive advertising to the maximum. 444
Re-regulation of the airline industry would require a substan-
tial legislative overhaul of the Federal Aviation Act. New en-
trants do not believe that will be necessary if the Airline
Deregulation Act is applied as written, particularly its provisions
prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices and unfair methods
of competition.
To the extent new entrants perceive a need for legislative
change, they see it in the arena of further deregulation in order
to enhance competition-deregulating the buy-sell slot rule,
deregulating the airport perimeter rule, deregulating exclusive
airport gate agreements and majority-in-interest clauses, and
stripping major airlines of the ability to regulate computer reser-
vations systems in a manner which distorts competition, or to
bias travel agents with consumer overrides. That's not re-regula-
tion. That's eliminating anticompetitive barriers to entry that
suppress competition. Eliminating barriers to entry was among
the fundamental purposes of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978. Allowing the largest airlines to monopolize gates, slots,
and the computerized distribution system is nowhere listed
among deregulation's objectives.
Ironically, the major airlines have been vigorous proponents
of competitive access in foreign markets. Testifying before a Sen-
ate Judiciary Subcommittee on April 22, United Airlines Vice
President Cyril Murphy said, "It would be irresponsible for gov-
ernments not to protect their citizens against the possibility of
[cartelization and monopoly pricing]."445 In opposing the pro-
posed American Airlines/British Airways alliance (which, inci-
dentally, would compete with the United/Lufthansa alliance,
which had been conferred immunity from the application of the
antitrust laws) Murphy said, "Governmental bodies have as their
dual goals freeing the industry in terms of the elements of com-
444 State of Competition in the Airline Industry: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 57-743 (May 19, 1998) (testimony of Paul Hudson, Exec.
Dir., Aviation Consumer Action Project).
445Hearing Before the Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights Subcomm. of the Sen-
ate Comm. on theJudicary (April 22, 1997) (statement of Cyril Murphy).
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petition and protecting their citizens from the potential for anti-
competitive abuse of that new, open environment. This
means ... developing anti-monopoly policies that provide strict
scrutiny of the 'superhubs' so as to maintain the opportunity for
meaningful intrahub competition." '446 Among the remedies pro-
posed by United was the surrender, by American Airlines and
British Airways, without compensation, of slots at Heathrow, JFK
and Chicago O'Hare Airports, a restriction on the acquisition of
new slots, and the termination of code-sharing agreements with
British Midland.
Yet United and other major airlines take a different view when
addressing competition issues in the superhubs they dominate.
Though United Airlines advocates vigorous governmental inter-
vention to prevent monopoly abuse at London's Heathrow Air-
port, on April 10, United Airlines CEO Gerald Greenwald said,
"Try to get the government to come in and solve competitive
issues, and we will all regret it."'447 Northwest hired several econ-
omists to refute the allegation that predatory pricing exists in
the airline industry, or that monopoly hub carriers exact a mo-
nopoly fare premium from passengers.44 Northwest CEO John
446 Id.
447 Richard Williamson, United Slaps Back At Frontier, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS,
April 10, 1997, at lB. Though United had urged the U.S. government to strip its
competitors of slots at Heathrow, JFK and O'Hare Airports, United Executive
Vice President Stuart Oran complained that Frontier had asked the DOT to pro-
vide it with "free slots" at LaGuardia Airport. Press Release, United Airlines, May
8, 1997. The affordable fare carriers possess less than 1% of the takeoff and
landing slots at the four slot constrained airports-Chicago O'Hare, Washington
National, and New York Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports. United was given
"free" slots at each of these airports (and it is asking for more "free" slots at
London Heathrow Airport). Because of slot regulation, incumbent airlines have
been able to capture a monopoly premium associated with monopolization of a
finite public resource. Deregulation of slots would open these clogged monopoly
bottlenecks. Similarly, perimeter rules are inconsistent with a free market system.
44s According to Northwest Vice President Elliot Seiden, "the available evi-
dence does not support the allegation that network airlines extract a 'hub pre-
mium'." State of Competition in the Airline Industry: Hearing Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 57-743 (May 19, 1998) (statement of Elliott M. Sei-
den, Vice President, Law and Government Affairs, Northwest Airlines). North-
west financed a study to prove that there was no hub premium, a conclusion
reached by no independent study since deregulation. The study was produced by
Professors Darryl Jenkins and Robert Gordon. Contrary to nearly all prior re-
search on the subject, they described the "hub premium" as a "myth." The
Northwest Airlines' study insisted that, instead of higher fares, "residents of Min-
neapolis/St. Paul, Detroit and Memphis actually enjoyed a modest hub discount
of 4 percent .... Furthermore, Jenkins and Gordon concluded, "Those passen-
gers originating or terminating their travel in a Northwest hub receive a travel
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Dasburg insisted, "Are we to believe today that the nation's air
transportation system now depends upon the survival of a hand-
ful of thinly capitalized new-entrant airlines and, therefore, an
interventionist policy is warranted and desirable?"449 Northwest
Vice President Elliot Seiden said, "What is really at work here is
the sense that some firms are entitled to a break - let them get
started, give them a shot, let them get their roots spread ....
Our view is that's just a formula for slow death. 45 ° Competition
bargain compared to other passengers on Northwest Airlines." DARRYL JENKINS
AND ROBERT GoRDoN, HUB AND NETWORK PRICING (2000).
The Jenkins-Gordon study was quickly and widely criticized. Frank Berardino,
President of Gellman Research Associates observed:
Only Northwest Airlines' fares are included in the analysis, and so,
the full competitive alternatives available to consumers are never
part of the comparison. Therefore, how do we know if the fares are
relatively high or low? . . .The authors never report their regres-
sion analysis; their whole hub premium comparison is based on
them.
Noting that the Jenkins-Gordon study failed to compare fares at dominated and
non-dominated hubs, Kevin Mitchell of the Business Travel Coalition concluded,
"the study's results fly like arrows thick and fast at the conclusion of virtually every
credible analysis regarding hub premiums since deregulation .... ." Kevin P.
Mitchell, Letter to the Editor, Bus. TRAVEL NEWS (Oct. 15, 1999). Five major inde-
pendent studies of airline pricing at Minneapolis/St. Paul since 1990 have con-
cluded that fares are between 30% and 49% higher for trips beginning or ending
at MSP than in competitive markets. Minnesota Planning, Flight Plan: Airline
Competition in Minnesota 6 (1999).
In January 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation issued a study on "Domi-
nated Hub Fares". On its first page, the DOT sharply criticized the Jenkins-Gor-
dan study:
[O]thers have reported on the prevalence of high fares paid by pas-
sengers at hub airports dominated by a network carrier; indeed, no
credible study concludes otherwise....
A hub study prepared by Professors Darryl Jenkins and Robert
Gordon and funded by Northwest, "Hub and Network Pricing in
the Northwest Airlines Domestic System," purports to show that
Northwest fares in its nonstop hub markets are lower than North-
west fares in competitive connecting markets. Aside from finding
the study's conclusion implausible, we have been unable to deter-
mine how the authors reached their result. The authors have not
responded to our requests for further detail about the analytical
model used.
DOT, DOMINATED HUB FARES 1 (January 2001).
449 Dasburg Calls On Government to Halt Market Intervention, AVIATION DAILY, Apr.
24, 1997, at 151.
4,50 Lisa Zagaroli, Unfriendly Skies: Market Domination: Why Feds Went After Ameri-
can, DETROIT NEWS, July 20, 2000, available at http://www.detnews.com/2000/
business/0007/20/al2-93466.htm. Apparently, Northwest fears that consumers
might prefer the services of low-cost/low-fare competitors to its own. Yet the anti-
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is a formula for slow death? Hmmm. Is monopoly Northwest's
formula for a long life?
In a carefully orchestrated counterattack to the DOT initia-
tive, major airline executives, and a gaggle of institutes, founda-
tions and think tanks (some of which were financed by the big
airlines) decried the DOT policy as "re-regulation." Nothing
DOT has proposed would restore route licensing or tariff filing,
once the heart of economic regulation. 51 Moreover, the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978 explicitly insists DOT protect the pub-
lic against "unfair, deceptive, predatory or anticompetitive prac-
tices in air transportation."
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The competition unleashed by airline deregulation has been
beneficial to large segments of the consuming public, particu-
larly discretionary travelers able to book their flights well in ad-
vance of departure. But competition should be further
advanced so that a larger universe of Americans can enjoy the
benefits of airline deregulation. In the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978, Congress explicitly affirmed its commitment to prevent-
ing unfair, deceptive, predatory or anticompetitive practices in
air transportation, avoiding unreasonable industry concentra-
tion, excessive market domination, monopoly power and other
conditions that would allow a carrier unreasonably to increase
prices, reduce service or exclude competition in air
transportation.
Real air fares, though below 1978 levels, are falling at a significantly
slower rate than they did in the pre-deregulation era. Compare the 20
years preceding deregulation with the 20 years for which we
have data since deregulation. From 1958 to 1978, before der-
egulation real (inflation adjusted) yields fell 46% or at an aver-
age annual rate of 2.3% per year. From 1978 to 1998, since
deregulation real yields have fallen 40%, or at a rate of only
2.09% per year.45 (See Chart 18). The price of business travel
trust and competition laws exist to allow consumers to choose among competi-
tors, and not to allow the dominant firm to deny consumers of that choice.
451 See PAUL DEMPSEY & WILLIAM TiHOMs, LAW & ECONOMIC REGULATION IN
TRANSPORrATION (Quorum Books 1986).
452 See ESG AVIATION SERVICES, THE AIRLINE MONITOR 14 (Nov. 1999); ESG AVI-
ATION SERVICES, THE AIRLINE MONITOR 9 (Sept. 1997); ESG AVIATION SERVICES,
THE AIRLINE MONITOR 4 (Nov. 1994). Given the circuitry of travel mandated by a
hub system (the dominant megatrend on the deregulation landscape), a yield
measure probably overstates the post-deregulation decline in prices, for yields are
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increased 17% in 1997 alone.453 Business Week recently reported
that in 1998 the air fare portion of the Consumer Price Index is
increasing 37% on an annual basis. Moreover, Alfred Kahn has
found that unrestricted fares have increased 73% under deregu-
lation.454 According to Kahn, "I do not see how anybody can
object in principle to calls for reregulation when you clearly
have a good deal of monopoly power. Hubbing seems to have
contributed to that, and the carriers are ever more exploiting it
at the expense of nondiscretionary travelers." '455 Thus, if der-
egulation is to continue to be perceived as a consumer success,
competition must be enhanced.





6 ._ -- ----- o
year
Prices are not fully competitive for travel to or from airports
dominated by a single airline, and for travel to and from small
communities. In the first decade of deregulation, 61% of the
514 non-hub communities receiving air service in 1978 suffered
declines in flight frequency, 28% lost all service; only 6% en-
based on revenue passenger miles (the revenue derived from passengers per mile
flown, measured in cents per mile). Nonetheless, as a proxy for prices, it pro-
vides a rough approximation of long-term trends.
453 Charles Stein, United-Delta Alliance Off For Now, BosrON GLOBE, Apr. 25,
1998, at El.
454 Aviation Competition Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, of the House
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 105th Cong. 1067 (Apr. 23, 1998) (testimony
of Alfred Kahn).
455 Id.
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joyed the inauguration of new service. By 1995, 33% had lost all
service, while only 5% had gained new service.4 -6
It's not just a case of inferior service; it's a case of higher
prices. The General Accounting Office found that passengers
flying from small-city airports to major airports paid 34% more
if the major airport was concentrated and 42% more if both the
small-city and major airports were concentrated. The DOT
found that passengers pay an average of $54 less per flight in
markets with low-cost carrier service. Market dominant airlines
are using their domination of public resources in a manner to
suppress competition. Because airports and the airways are pub-
lic resources, they should be used for public benefit, and airline
competition produces major public benefits.
In recent years, new entrant airlines like Air South, Sun Jet
International, Kiwi, Pan American World Airways (including
Carnival Airlines), Vanguard, Midway, Access Air, and Western
Pacific have disappeared from the competitive landscape. Since
deregulation in 1978, the 43 pre-deregulation airlines have
dwindled to 15, while two-thirds of the 226 post-deregulation en-
trants have disappeared. Most of the surviving new carriers are
cargo, charter or megacarrier feeders, and not independent
scheduled passenger airlines. In recent years the number of
new entrant airlines collapsing has exceeded the number of new
airlines emerging.
The arsenal of anticompetitive activities used by major airlines
against new entrants is not new, though these tactical weapons
have been used with increasingly better precision and effective-
ness over time by the major airlines. Far too many low-cost/low-
fare airlines have found themselves in the cross-hairs of the ma-
jor airlines. It is also apparent that a failure of government
agencies to impose sanctions against such practices has led to a
widespread belief among the major airlines that our nation's
competition laws do not apply to them. The DOJ and the DOT
should take such enforcement action against a major hub-domi-
nant airline for blatantly anticompetitive activities such as those
described herein as is necessary to preserve competition, while
there is still competition to preserve.
New airline ventures fail for a number of reasons. A spike in
fuel costs, recession, the failure to find a market niche, or mana-
456 Data calculated by Dr. Andrew Goetz of the University of Denver In-
termodal Transportation Institute.
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gerial ineptitude can destroy a new airline. So too, can the
predatory practices of the major airlines.
The homicidal cycle is well established:
1. Major airline establishes monopoly in a market, and raises
prices to confiscatory levels
2. New low-cost airline enters the market, offering low fares.
3. Major airline responds by matching fares (even if below cost),
sometimes adding aircraft capacity and frequency. Major air-
line rebates a portion of the ticket price in the form of fre-
quent flyer travel, and bribes travel agents with commission
overrides to steer business their way.
4. After suffering severe economic losses new entrant airline
withdraws from the market.
5. Major airline reduces service and raises prices to confiscatory
levels, often higher than those prevailing before the new en-
trant emerged.
The cycle repeats itself, though less often, as the pile of bank-
rupt airline corpses has grown higher, and chilled investment
enthusiasm for new airline ventures.
What is wrong with this scenario is the economic impact route
monopolization has on the local and regional economy, for air
transportation is an essential part of the infrastructure of eco-
nomic development. Business executives need frequent and
reasonably priced air transportation, and will locate offices, fac-
tories, and warehouses only in those communities that have it.
Deregulation's principal architect, Alfred Kahn, has long de-
cried our government's "abysmal dereliction" in failing to en-
force the competition laws on airlines. In applauding DOT's
new initiative, Kahn told Congress, "The most grievous govern-
mental failure in recent years has ... been the failure to prose-
cute a single case against what appears to have been flagrant
cases of predatory competition by incumbent major airlines
against new competitors."
What can arrest concentration and monopolization of air
transportation and foster competition? The DOT's proposed
policy against predatory practices is a step in the right direction,
but more is needed. A legislative moratorium against carrier al-
liances should swiftly be promulgated. Hub dominant airlines
should be required to offer new entrants nondiscriminatory
connections, as the courts have required the telecommunica-
tions industry to do.
Though the government should not be concerned about the
survival of individual competitors, it should be concerned about
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the survival of competition. Monopolistic exploitation cannot
long be tolerated in infrastructure industries upon which the
rest of the economy depends. Better to have a competitor disci-
pline a monopolist than have the government do it.
The major airlines forget that the people own the airports
and the airways. The people have a right to insist that these
public resources be used to serve the public interest. Competi-
tion is consistent with the public interest; monopolization is not.
Ron Chernow, author of the biography of John D. Rockefel-
ler, Titan, observed, "Free markets do not exist in a state of na-
ture. Free markets are things that have to be defined by custom
and law." '457 Congress has commanded that the market of air
transportation be free of unfair and deceptive practices and un-
fair methods of competition. Two decades into deregulation, it
is time for the Department of Transportation to finally give
meaning to those words. As the New York Times opined, "Al-
though it can be hard to draw the line between predation and
clean competition, the Federal Government needs to try. A fly-
ing public upset at the high fares on many routes deserves assur-
ance that pricing practices are fair."45
Neither the Department of Transportation nor the Depart-
ment of Justice need protect an individual competitor from the
rigors of the marketplace. They should, however, protect com-
petition. Without application of the competition laws, preda-
tion runs riot, and competition is jeopardized. Because of the
profound economic externalities airlines impose upon commu-
nities and businesses across America, monopolization in the air-
line industry cannot be tolerated. As Senator John McCain has
observed, "The only thing worse than a regulated monopoly is
an unregulated one." After all, the American people own the
airways and the airports, which were built with their tax dollars.
These are public resources to be used in the public interest. It is
reasonable to insist that air carriers serve the public interest.
Monopolistic exploitation of consumers, and anticompetitive
conduct designed to achieve it, are antithetical to that duty.
457 JOSEPH CHERNOW, TITAN (1998).
458 Unfair Airline Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998.
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